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ABSTRACT
This study investigates the manner in which welfare workers interpret and
implement several rules of the program for Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC). Although program rules are established at the federal
and state level, the "front-line" welfare worker is responsible for
implementing those rules when interviewing clients and determining
eligibility. These rules are intended to limit worker discretion, but
the nature of the rules and agency environment give workers large amounts
of discretion over client treatment.
Data collected in a large Massachusetts welfare office shows that there
is considerable variation among individual workers in implementing
program rules. Fifteen intake workers were observed with respect to
client contact, case dispositions, and case processing times. Workers
with randomly assigned clients appeared to vary as much as 100% in their
case approval rates, processing times, and time spent with clients. In
separate interviews with these and other workers, respondents identified
factors in their job, agency, and environment which they felt influenced
their implementation of program rules and client treatment.
The data suggests that workers in part respond to problems inherent in
the original program rule. Vague wording, conflicting instructions,
scarce resources, role conflicts, and difficult working conditions tend
to make program rules conflict with the real world environment. Workers
appear to modify these rules to make them "fit" the worker's perception
of the environment. The study develops a model for recognizing the
interrelationships among rules, agency factors and the environment.
Dissertation Supervisors: Dr. Leonard Buckle
Dr. Suzann Thomas-Buckle
Dr. Gary Marx
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Chapter 1
THE PROBLEM OF IMPLEMENTING PUBLIC POLICY
Everyone of us, at some time or another, finds ourselves
confronting a representative of a public agency who has the authority to
grant or withhold the benefits which we desire. These agents may be
policemen, social workers, hospital attendants, registry clerks, tax
collectors, teachers, or city inspectors. Usually these service
providers receive little of our attention and function simply as "stocked
characters" in our everyday environment (Coffman, 1971). Although the
amount of time we spend with these service providers may be relatively
short, the amount of control or support they exercise over our lives can
be considerable. The critical influence of these public agents is
exercised in at least two important ways. First, by virtue of their
agency position and work skills, the service provider can control both
the immediate interaction and our future activities in the organization.
Second, the providers introduce definitions of the situation -- and of
their perceived reality -- to which we must adhere.
Although not usually as powerful as the "gatekeepers" Erickson
(1975) identifies, the individual service provider can nevertheless
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function as a type of social deflector. Rather than controlling such
things as social mobility (as a guidance counselor might do) or
advancement (as a review board might do), these providers can control the
extent to which an organization will solve our particular problem or met
our needs. Social workers, for example, have control over who receives
what kinds of services, and the degree of attention may determine whether
more serious needs will occur in the future. Similarly, teachers can
focus their efforts on only the brighter students in the class, resulting
in a loss of learning for those not selected. Finally, police have the
power to determine the extent to which our behavior must fit the social
and legal norms, and, if we are found to be deviant, our subsequent
treatment in the correctional system. The decisions on the part of the
provider can have not only long term impacts on the recipient, but "when
individual cases form patterns, such decisions may have consequences for
society as a whole, especially if these patterns are determined by race
and ethnicity" (Erickson, 1975, p.45). Thus, in our experiences as a
client of a public agency, the service provider can play a particularly
important role in our life.
But from the organization's perspective, the service worker has an
even more critical role, for it is the service provider who actually
implements the policies of the organization and who represents the
organization to the client, public, and outside world. In simplest
terms, the actions of the worker are the actions of the organization, and
the worker can make decisions about the client that can substantially
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affect the client's chances in life. The selection and designation as
client can, in many instances, initiate the process leading to
self-fulfilling prophecies of behavior. Thus, the recipient of service
does not experience the social policy set by government but instead
experienceses the daily reality of waiting rooms and the service worker's
actions (Piven and Cloward, 1977, p.20-21). It is the manner in which
the service provider chooses to implement agency policy and represent the
organization to the outside world that will be the focus of this study.
1.1 Policy Implementation in Bureaucratic Organizations
1.1.1 Accomplishing Organizational Objectives
Organizations are traditionally formed by groups of individuals who
wish to accomplish specific goals the members could not otherwise
accomplish alone. Individuals acting alone are able to satisfy only a
portion of their own needs and desires; to satisfy their remianing needs,
individuals must work together in some coordinated fashion. Schein
(1970) defines an organization as the
... rational coordination of the activities of a number
of people for the achievement of some common explicit purpose
or goal, through the division of labor and function, and
through a hierarchy of authority and responsibility (p.9).
Schein points out that the object of the coordination is not people
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themselves, but rather the activities of people. A particular activity
may involve more than just one person and a person can belong to several
organizations simultaneously. But all of the people working in the
organization are striving toward the same goals. In a similar defintion
of an organization, Galbraith (1977) identifies five essential attributes
which organizations possess: organizations are
1) composed of people and groups of people 2) in order
to achieve some shared purpose 3) through a division of labor
4) integrated by information based decision processess 5)
continuously through time (p. 3).
That organizations exist to accomplish a set of goals implies that
the structure of the organization will be designed to achieve those
goals. The goal structure, in essence, becomes the structure for the
hierarchy of activities, and the goals carry with them a variety of
premisies and constraints which are imposed on those activities. As the
organization grows or adopts additional goals, the number of activities
increases and the degree of specialization among activities becomes
greater. In the process of specialization, the functions of policy
making and policy implementation frequently are separated and assigned to
two different groups. A small, select group performs the former function
while a much larger group carry out the activities implied by those
policies. As soon as the two functions are separated, however, the
policy makers must develop ways to insure that the policy implementors
carry out their responsibilities as intended.
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1.1.2 Coordinating Members' Roles
Policies and programs created on paper do not function by
themselves; people must carry out the programs which will achieve the
desired organizational goals. Therefore, programs will include a
specification of the individual's behavior who is to perform the
program. The program and its behavioral constraints constitute a "role"
for the individual, and the role exists independently of the particular
person who occupies that role. The theatrical metaphor is used precisely
because it denotes that behavior adheres to the part and not the player.
Thus, organizations will coordinate roles rather than individuals.
Roles carry with them expected behavior of both a formal and
informal type. The expectations are more than just guidelines; they
include a qualitative aspect that influences the way in which activities
will be performed. Role expectations, according to Sarbin and Allen
(1968), include the
...collection of cognitions -- beliefs, subjective
probabilities, and the elements of knowledge -- which specify
in relation to complimentary roles the rights and duties, the
appropriate conduct, for persons occupying a particular
position (p. 498).
As role imperatives, expectations insure that the enactment will be
appropriate and, when generalized, constrain the action of each member
into channels consistent with those taken by others in the organization.
Each member of the organization directly associates with others who
depend on his or her performance in some way, e.g., supervisor,
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subordinates, clients, professional associates, friends, who form his
"role set". It is the members of the person's role set who largely
generate the expectations, prescriptions, and proscriptions for
behavior.
1.1.3 Programmed versus Discretionary Behavior
The organization will assign a formal behavior or task to each role
usually in the form of a job description prepared by the head of the
organization or some personnel specialists. The job description can be
one of the strongest influences (expectations) on the actual role
behavior because it specifically states the activities to be performed,
where, and for how long. Certain roles have not only a job description
by the organization, but may also have -- as in the case of the police or
government officials -- a legal definition of behavior. The formal rules
and regulations of the organization supplement the formal task by
identifying other acceptable (or more correctly, unacceptable) behavior
of the individual. The formal behavior of the job description, legal
codes, and regulations together form the programmed component of the
role. Jaques (1956) distinguished the programmed component, which
establishes the specific framework within which the role is to be
executed, from the discretionary component, which allows the occupant to
carry out the activity as he chooses. Thus, a "role" as defined by
Argryis (1957) is the totality of the informal tasks, formal (programmed)
tasks, and personal acts (discretionary behavior) as organized by the
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individual. I will discuss the nature of discretionary behavior in more
detail in the next section.
It should be noted that the mix of programmed behavior and
discretionary behavior in a single role can vary between the extremes of
each, depending upon the occupation, and can also vary across different
aspects of the job. The individual may perform both clearly specified
activities and independent decision-making during the course of the day.
For example, while clerks are often highly programmed by rules,
regulations and close supervision, policemen are assigned a wide range of
discretionary activities. The predominance of discretionary behavior
over programmed behavior in a member's role makes it much harder for the
organization to control the manner in which the person carries out his
implementation responsibilities. Our interest in improving the behavior
of organization member, then, is really an interest in modifying their
discretionary behavior; for the discretionary component of the role takes
on the significance of influencing the overall effect of the activity.
The behavior of some public agency workers is uniquely influenced
by one particular programmed task. Organization members such as police,
teachers, social workers, etc. are all programmed to provide some kind
of service to "clients" of the organization; service is the primary
component of their job description. The client becomes the focal point
of the worker's attention and is usually the major recipient of the
organization's output. The organization usually has some control over
which clients it services, although clients themselves may be voluntary
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or involuntary. Voluntary clients are customers in public or private
establishments who exercise choice in the consumption of the service.
Involuntary clients are usually low-income individuals who, for one
reason or another are forced to deal with the public bureaucracy (Lipsky,
1969).
1.1.4 Translating Policies into Rules
If the organization is charged, either by law or by the voluntary
association of its members, with carrying out a set of objectives, then
operating policies are the general instructions for achieving those
objectives. A governing body of the organization formulates general
policies and guidelines for achieving the set of desired objectives and
passes those policies to the organization's managers for implementation.
Management, in turn, elaborates those policies and generates the rules
and regulations for the daily operation of the organization. The purpose
of rules and regulations, then, is to insure that the various components
of the organization -- as well as individual members -- behave in
accordance with the overall set of objectives (Gottlieb, 1974). The
entire set of rules and regulations is then intended to guide the
individual member in the specific tasks of his or her assigned job.
Formal rules are the sinews that keep large organizations together and
functioning. Indeed, Max Weber listed the principle of rules as one of
the key characteristics of a bureaucratic organization: "There is the
principle of fixed and official jurisdictional areas which are generally
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ordered by rules, that is, by laws or administrative regulations" (Gerth
and Mills, 1946, p.196).
It is important to note that the rules generated by both the
governing body and the management are not uniform in focus. Kadish and
Kadish (1973) suggest that one of the most important distinctions between
the types of formal rules is their "restrictive" or "permissive" nature,
i.e., designating what individuals can and cannot do. Mandatory rules
impose on the individual an obligation for some action (or inaction) and
reinforces that obligation through the imposition of sanctions if the
rule is broken. Mandatory rules also attempt to foreclose the freedom of
choice for the individual member. Permissive rules, on the other hand,
authorize the individual to take certain actions but do not impose any
obligation or sanction. Under permissive rules, the failure to follow
the rule or procedure simply means that the member fails to secure the
benefits from the rule or to exercise his power of choice. While the
mandatory rule restricts individual choice and behavior, the permissive
rule provides a recognized channel for carrying out choice.
Naturally, the mandatory and permissive rules promulgated by
management are not the only rules or constraints on individual behavior
in the organization. Individual members bring with them an understanding
of the broader rules of social conduct and interaction (Goffman, 1967).
For example, we are taught as children that it is impolite to keep other
people waiting for more than a few minutes or that to greet someone with
hostility will likely elicit a similar response from the other person.
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The pressure for acceptable social behavior, i.e., according to the norms
of our society, introduces yet a third type of rules into the
organization setting. I shall refer to these unwritten rules which
derive from outside the organization as "normative" rules.
1.2 Sources of Discretionary Behavior
As just discussed, the purpose of rules in organizations is to
constrain behavior in accordance with the goals and objectives of the
organization. In the interest of accomplishing those objectives,
organizations want to discourage decisions or actions which will conflict
with those objectives or waste resources. To the extent that the
individual's behavior cannot or should not be regulated, the individual
has discretion to perform his or her tasks. Webster (1968) defines
"discretion" as the "freedom or authority to make decisions or choices,"
but that freedom can carry with it vulnerability to influence by outside
pressure when implementing a rule. With permissive rules, the
organization explicitly delegates discretion to the individual and
recognizes that workers may vary in their actions as they see fit. With
mandatory rules, however, there is no such delegation; the organization
expects that each worker will perform the task in exactly the same manner
and with the same outcome. With normative rules, the organization simply
assumes that the individual will follow socially acceptable behavior,
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although the acceptable boundaries of that behavior are much broader.
But the existence of discretion in a worker's job is often a function of
much more than the decision-making delegated by the organization.
1.2.1 Legislative Ambiguity
Handler (1979) suggests one factor which mitigates the governing of
behavior through rules and regulations is legislative ambiguity in the
program's creation. Congress, federal agencies, the state legislators,
and the state administrative agencies create the statutes and rules for
program operation. But in most social service programs the statutory
provisions are "vague, ill-defined, ambiguous, and subject to conflicting
and competing interpretations" (p. 9). The lack of knowledge, lack of
agreement on competing values, and the desire to have agencies develop
consistent programs of a technical nature prompts the legislature to
purposely leave the statutes ambiguous. If the legislature does not have
enough information to solve a problem it may simply define the problem
and delegate the task of finding the answer to an administrative agency.
If they have the solutions but cannot agree, the legislature may
compromise and delegate the conflict to an agency. Or the legislature
may not be institutionally suited to continually monitor the problem,
e.g., utility rate regulation. As Handler notes, "all three of these
reasons for statutory ambiguity and consequent delegation were present in
the development of social service programs in the 1950's... "(p.9).
The vague wording of the statutes is often passed to the wording of
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the administrative regulations, and delegated from each level to the next
lower within the agency. Handler describes this "downward flow" as
follows:
Initially, the supervising agency interprets the
statutory language and issues its interpretations in the form
of regulations. The drafting and promulgating of such
regulations is an exercise of discretion; the agency is
making interpretive choices. Not unexpectedly, the
regulations are also often vague, so lower level officials in
turn have to make choices as to the meaning of the
regulations. The process continues down through the
administrative structure until the lowest field officer
interprets the rules and guidelines for specific cases
(p.9).
1.2.2 Bureaucratic Structure and Fragmentation
Handler also suggests that as the delegation continues the amount
of discretion given to the worker is enhanced by a parallel source: the
complex bureaucratic structure of the public agency itself. Organization
charts depicting the agency structure as a pyramid with rules promulgated
at the top and carried through a chain of command belie the often
uncontrolled activity and hide the vast amount of staff initiated
discretion. Just as there are distinct and conflicting goals among
legislators who create the agency or program, so there are conflicts
among the individual administrators, among agency departments, or among
groups with different resources, expertise, or perceptions. The
conflicting goals or differing resource bases make it difficult to
measure performance or to persuade others to change their behavior. What
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occurs, then, is a bargaining of superiors with lower level personnel to
resolve the conflict. As Crozier (1964) and Mechanic (1962) have shown,
the lower level staff derive their bargaining power from their control of
the clients upon whom the agency is dependent, as well as from their own
information and expertise.
Another structural factor is that organization members sometimes
function outside of the normal confines of the organization or under
regular supervision. Organizations exist within some larger framework or
environment such as another organization, a community , or a whole
society. Organizations share this environment and interact with the
other inhabitants as necessary to accomplish the organization's goals;
yet they maintain their separate identity according to their particular
set of objectives. All the resources, programs, and the individuals
common to one set of goals are considered to be part of one
organization. The men and resources common to the goals of law
enforcement, for example, comprise the organization "police," while the
people and resources common to the goals of education form the
organization of "school". Both groups have a set of distinct goals and so
are separate organizations, but both are part of the larger organization
"city government" and the "community". Because the organizations are
distinct from one another, we can talk about the boundaries which
delineate the extent and composition of their existence.
In small groups, every member serves as a part of the boundary for
the organization and so serves as the interface between the organization
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and the surrounding environment. As the organization becomes larger,
however, there is a greater division of labor and specialization.
Instead of members having roles interacting with others both inside and
outside the organization, now roles deal predominantly with one or the
other. Special roles and programs are developed to perform at the
boundary and to interface with those outside the organization. We shall
refer to these roles as boundary roles and the individuals who perform
them as "boundary personnel". Kahn, et. al. (1964) define such
boundary positions as "one for which some members of the role set are
located in different systems -- either another unit within the same
organization or another organization entirely" (p. 101). Almost every
member of a group has some role related contact with individuals outside
his unit. This is particularly true for departments within
organizations. But our focus for this discussion will be those boundary
personnel who spend the majority of time in contact with non-members of
the organization (i.e., clients) and whose effective performance depends
upon such contact.
The distance of the boundary personnel from the rest of the
organization is an important determinant in discretionary behavior.
Adams (1976) considers it important that
the occupant of such a position ... is more distant,
psychologically, organizationally, and often physically, from
other members of his organization than they are from each
other, and he is closer to the external environment and to
agents of outside organizations... (p. 157).
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Following the gravitational model of influence (Lewin, 1951), the
member's distance tends to weaken the organizational constraints and
strengthen the influence of the environment. The result can sometimes
lead to greater organizational suspicion of member's behavior.
Conversely, knowledge by the boundary person that he is
removed from the parent organization may give him greater
behavioral freedom in performing tasks than is possessed by
other members and arouse anxiety of how he is perceived back
home. (Adams, 1976, p. 157)
The general degree of suspicion will be influenced by whether the
organization perceives the environment or clients as being hostile or
friendly. An extreme example would be an undercover policeman who's
deviant behavior arouses the suspicions of the department.
1.2.3 The Quantity of Program Rules
A third source of discretionary behavior is the sheer number of
rules and regulations that have to be followed. Lipsky (1980) points out
that even with close supervision and control, the rules:
...may be so voluminous and contradictory that they can
only be enforced or invoked selectively. In most public
welfare departments, regulations are encyclopedic, yet at the
same time they are constantly being changed. With such rules
adherence to anything cannot be expected (p.14 ).
Thus, welfare workers and other organization members cannot be expected
to invoke all of the rules they are charged with enforcing during their
daily routine.
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Gottlieb (1974) found that there are a number of factors within the
welfare agency itself which tend to work against any type of consistent
adherence to the rules on the part of workers. First, there are
inconsistencies due to staff pressures.
A state directive with significant impact on client
income not only reached the department past its effective
date but was also received in units within the agency at
different times. There was general acknowledgement in their
staff discussions that work pressures were such that staff
would take this up with recipients at staggered times, so
that some recipients will have felt the effect of this rule
change weeks, perhaps months, before others (p.47).
Second, deviations are a consequence of one's position in the office
hierarchy. Gottlieb encountered workers who believed that those higher
in the agency were free to go beyond the rules, e.g., in making
exceptions or reversals, while other workers were not.
1.2.4 Discretionary Treatment of Clients
Because of factors such as the three just described, it is
virtually impossible for an organization to rigidly control the worker in
every action. Even if it were possible for the organization to foresee
every specific situation or eventuality, the agency's limited time and
resources would make extensive rule making impossible. Bureaucratic
organizations must, therefore, state the formal rules of application and
behavior in general terms and hope that training, sanctions, and other
mechanisms will ensure the desired actions on the part of the
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individual. As Gottlieb (1974) notes, it is at this point that
significant variations in policy implementation can occur.
They (the rules) are meant to be essentially
impersonal and universally applicable, but they are also
elastic enough to accommodate different personal situations.
They are elaborate and exacting to preclude arbitrary action
by staff, but because they permit individual interpretation,
arbitrariness abounds. They prescribe precisely what the
system can offer its clients, but the overwhelming work
needed to meet that prescription makes even that minimum
amount difficult to provide (p.39).
1.3 Alternative Perspectives on Individual Behavior
If those charged with implementing program policies through the
execution of the various agency rules have a great deal of discretion in
performing their work, what determines how they will actually behave?
Since the discretionary behavior can lead to the implementation of policy
contrary to that intended or to policies developed entirely by the
individual that are not in agreement with the organization's objectives,
it is important for the organization to know why the dysfunctional (from
its perspective) behavior comes about.
There are at least four schools of thought on factors which might
influence individual behavior among policy implementors. The focus on
individual behavior is generally attributed to the "street-level
bureaucrat" perspective advanced by Lipsky. Lipsky explains individual
behavior in policy implementation in terms of the scarcity of program
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resources and the hostility of the worker's environment. But prior to
Lipsky, Blau examined the behavior of workers from a
structural-functionalist perspective, attributing behavior to certain
structural features of the organization and the group. Goffman examined
individual behavior from the social-psychological perspective through the
examination of role and the individual's desire to project (and protect)
a particular self-image. Finally, Skolnick, a sociologist, viewed
behavior as a reaction to elements of the worker's job; elements which
caused the member to develop a "working personality". I shall briefly
describe each of these perspectives in the remainder of this chapter.
1.3.1 Lipsky's "Street-Level Bureaucrat"
Lipsky (1976, 1980) coined the term "street-level bureaucrat" to
refer to individuals in service agencies who interact with clients and
who have wide discretion over the benefits or sanctions assigned those
clients. Lipsky (1980) points out that "the decisions of the
street-level bureaucrats, the routine they establish, and the devices
they invent to cope with uncertainties and work pressures, effectively
become the public policy they carry out" (p. xii). The reason why
street-level bureaucrats have a critical role in daily government is that
the policy they deliver is often immediate and focused entirely on the
individual client. Lipsky argues that while the street-level bureaucrats
are trained to respond to the individual needs or characteristics of the
clients they confront, within the rules of the organization, in reality
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work requirements prohibit individualized service. Workers instead
respond with modes of mass processing and strategies of self-defense and
protection.
Consequently, there are aspects of the individual's daily job which
make it impossible for the organization to set all the rules for
behavior. Lipsky (1980) describes two characteristics of service type
jobs which make it difficult to severely reduce or eliminate choice.
Those jobs which "involve complex tasks for which elaboration of rules,
guidelines, or instructions cannot circumscribe the alternatives" (p.15).
First, the worker's situation is too complicated to reduce to a
programmatic format. Second, the worker's situation often requires
responses to the human dimension, rather than the technical dimension of
the problem. "They have discretion because the accepted definitions of
their tasks call for sensitive observation and judgement, which are not
reduceable to programmed formats" (p.15). Essentially there is the demand
for both impartiality and compassion.
Another interesting and useful concept in Lipsky's model is the
idea of "coping behavior", i.e., strategies and actions that workers take
to contend with the complex environment and to get their work finished
(1980, pp. 140-156). Workers are presented with the expectations of the
agency, a set of rules to be followed, the scarce resources of time and
space, and demands from a continual stream of clients. Each worker views
this collection of inputs differently and each develops his own strategy
to make it all work.
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Both Lipsky and Prottas (1979) identify several of the coping
strategies common across street-level bureaucrats. First, workers
control the access the client has to them through a screening process.
Second, workers arrange their clients in a queue according to some
priority or ease of processing. Third, workers establish "paths" for the
client through the agency and develop routines for getting the client
from one step to the next. Fourth, workers modify their own conception
of their job and their work by emphasizing private goals and/or
specializing in one part of the job. Fifth, workers attempt to control
the "consequences" of the service as well as the service itself. I shall
examine these and other coping strategies more fully in later chapters.
1.3.2 Blau's Model of Organizational Change
In a significant work on organizational change, Blau (1962) used
the conceptual scheme of functional analysis to examine the behavior of
two bureaucratic organizations. Through direct observation of workers in
those organizations, Blau empirically established the process of
organizational development whereby organizations continually try to
correct the dysfunctions arising within the organization. Dysfunctions
occur because the members of the organization adapt their behavior to the
structure of that organization or group. The adaptive behavior often
conflicts with some other desired agency operation or outcome and,
therefore, becomes dysfunctional. When the organization becomes aware of
the dysfuntional or problematic behavior, it develops new policies to
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correct that behavior. Blau's model state's that this new policy will
itself trigger further adaptive behavior by workers and the cycle starts
again. In schematic form the model appears as:
agency policy
problem . adaptation
The dynamic nature of the bureaucracy, then, comes from the constant
correction of one set of dysfunctional behavior and the subsequent
creation of another.
Since Blau's major argument is that the structure of the
organization or of the social group influences the adaptive behavior,
this concept must be introduced into the model as well. In schematic
form, the structure appears as the causal influence of adaptive behavior:
policy structure
problem ( adaptation
Blau identified several important factors which constitute the structure
of the organization and group. Among the organizational factors were
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rules, record keeping systems, performance standards, role definition,
and sanctions. Among the group factors were consultation arrangements,
networks, social cohesion, unofficial norms, and authority. Thus,
"structure" in the above diagram is representative of several other
characteristics.
1.3.3 Goffman's "Presentation of the Self".
The individual worker comes to the role with a set of needs,
expectations, and resources, and he use his resources within the
organization to meet his needs. Among those needs are a set of basic and
higher rewards and expectations about his or her ability to perform.
Goffman (1971) points out that the individual's need is often to simply
sustain a particular self-image.
It is clear that for the individual, the maintenance of
these personnel standards is important not only as a means of
carefully coping with routine difficulties, but as a means of
sustaining an image of himself to which he is attached (p.
278).
A great deal of effort is expended by the individual to maintain his
image in situations of high stress. Police, for example, attempt to
maintain the image of bravery during confrontations with dangerous
criminals. Thus, the worker will be internally motivated to meet his
expectations, physical needs, image, etc. and much of what might be
considered idiosyncratic behavior is simply the individual acting on his
own needs. However, the extent to which acting on one's own needs is
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contrary to the expectations of the organization will result in
additional stress being put on the worker.
Goffman (1959) offers the dramaturgic or impression management
perspective as a contrast to the perspectives of 1) technical (goal
achievement) 2) political (power and rewards), 3) structural (social
Divisions), and cultural (values norms and standards of behavior) for
analyzing social establishments. Behavior constitutes performances that
the actor tailors to specific activities. To succeed in social
interaction, the individual must be skilled in the dramaturgical
techniques of both executing and maintaining impressions. One needs
information in order to socially interact: information comes from
experience, setting, etc. but most importantly from the individual
himself. Acquiring all of the information about a context of interaction
is of great predictive value to the individual. But since full
information is not always available, people rely on appearances.
"Proper" role behavior stems from the appearance of discharging the
role's requirements, not just the functional requisites. It is expected
that the performance of the role will be consistent with the "face"
presented. A person who enacts the same routine to the same audience
will probably develop a standardized relationship with them. The
performance of any given individual interlocks with that of one or more
others, and taken together, these project a definition of a situation
which is common to the cooperating players; any members can give the show
away if they don't maintain the same impression with one another. Thus,
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after a person establishes a role in an interaction, ho or she, is
motivated to maintain or repair the role.
1.3.4 Skolnick's "Working Personality"
A fourth perspective on the behavior of individual service workers
is provided by Skolnick's study of police. Skolnick (1966) joins the
sociological discussion of the influence that occupations have on a
person's work and his outlook on the world. Skolnick concludes that
certain outstanding elements in the policemen's work environment, i.e.,
danger, authority, and efficiency, combine to
... generate distinctive cognitive and behavioral
responses in police: a "working personality." Such an
analysis does not suggest that all police are alike in
"working personality", but that there are distinctive
cognitive tendencies in police as an occupational group (p.
42).
While the particular combination of three elements is unique to police,
the development of a working personality can occur in other professions
that share some of the same elements. Each group then develops ways of
looking at the world distinctive to themselves.
The policemen's working personality develops through exposure to
the job and its environment. The element of danger makes the policeman
attentive to signs of potential harm and tends to make him "suspicious".
Danger also isolates him as a friend and from the general citizenry. The
element of authority reinforces that isolation by directing the action of
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the citizenry. Since all police are exposed to these same elements,
Skolnick suggests that the working personality is common to all police.
On the basis of this concept we would expect uniform behavior among other
types of service workers.
1.4 Purpose and Overview of this Study
The purpose of this study is to explore how the "front-line"
workers in local welfare agencies go about implementing program rules and
regulation and to determine the impact of their behavior on the treatment
of clients. Earlier research has shown that "front-line" service
workers, i.e., those individuals who directly interact with clients in
the implementation of policy and the provision of services, have a large
amount of discretion in how they carry out their responsibilities
(Goffman, 1961; Kadish and Kadish, 1973). Lipsky (1980) and Prottas
(1982) have shown the importance of discretionary behavior among
"street-level bureaucrats", and have suggested that these workers develop
coping behavior to deal with their environment. This coping behavior
then becomes the de facto policy of the agency regardless of the way in
which the policy was initially stated. The following study provides
empirical evidence on the way in which front-line workers individually
implement agency policy through their treatment of clients.
Specifically, this study examines the behavior of 15 intake workers in a
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large Massachusetts welfare office, and supplements those observations
with interviews from workers in other offices across the country.
The following discussion is organized into eight chapters. This
chapter discusses the function that rules serve in large organizations
and suggests three types of rules that attempt to control behavior.
Chapter 2 discusses the problems that arise in trying to control behavior
through rules in the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
program and the ways that discretion is introduced into workers' jobs.
Chapter 3 describes the research methodology that was used to collect and
analyze the data for this study. Chapter 4 then examines the behavior of
workers in the Massplace welfare office in light of the mandatory rules
they are required to follow. Chapter 5 presents a similar examination of
worker behavior in light of the permissive rules established by the
agency. Chapter 6 continues the examination of worker behavior with the
third and final group of rules, i.e., normative rules; the chapter also
discusses problems that workers face in role definition and role conflict
while performing their job. Chapter 7 summarizes the findings from the
data and suggests a model for explaining the behavior that occurs.
Finally, Chapter 8 draws general conclusions from the data and discusses
the implications of the data for policy makers and for further research.
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Chapter 2
POLICY IMPLEMENTATION IN THE WELFARE PROGRAM
This study focuses on one particular type of street-level
bureaucrat, the front- line welfare worker; specifically those workers
who determine whether clients will be admitted to the AFDC program. In
this chapter, I focus on a few of the rules and regulations governing the
behavior of workers who administer the Aid to Families with Dependent
Children program in order to explore the extent to which those rules
control the everyday behavior of the worker.
2.1 The Purpose of the AFDC Program
The general system of federally sponsored, public welfare in effect
today was originally initiated by the omnibus Social Security Act of 1935
[1]. One of the principle components of public welfare established by the
Act was the program for Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).
1. Public Law 271, 74th Congress, 49 Statute 620.
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Under Title IV (Grants to the States for Aid and Services to Needy
Families with Children) federal funds are provided for children deprived
of adequate care due to loss of parental support through death, absence,
incapacity, or unemployment of one or both parents. The specific
provisions creating and defining the program sets forth that the federal
government will provide grants to each state
... for purpose of encouraging the care of dependent
children in their own homes or in the homes of relatives by
enabling each state to furnish financial assistance and
rehabilitation in such state, as far as practicable under the
conditions in such state, to needy dependent children and
parents or relatives with whom they are living to help
maintain and strengthen family life and to help such parents
or relatives to attain or retain capability for the maximum
self-support and personal independence consistent with the
maintenance of continuing parental care and protection, there
is hereby authorized to be appropriated for each fiscal year
a sum sufficient to carry out the purpose of this part. The
sums made available under this section shall be used for
making payments to States which have submitted, and have
approved by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
state plans for aid and services to needy families with
children.
The funds of the AFDC grant are awarded to the designated parent or
caretaker relative of the child(ren) and are to be used to provide the
child(ren) with an adequate level of food clothing, and shelter. These
subsistence payments are made monthly or semi-monthly (depending upon the
particular regulations of the state) in the form of a check to an
assistance group consisting of the caretaker relative and eligible
child(ren).
In order for a family to receive AFDC benefits, each member of that
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family must meet a variety of eligibility criteria. First, at least one
child must meet the requirement of deprivation described earlier.
Second, that child must be living with a specified relative in the
relative's home; the relative must be a blood relative, e.g., mother,
father, sister, brother, aunt, cousin, or an adoptive relative. Third,
the qualifying child must be under 18 years of age, or, if 18 through 20
years of age, must be attending school on a full-time basis. Fourth, all
members of the assistance unit who are over 16 years of age and not in
school full-time must register for the Work Incentive Program (WIN) and
with the State's Division of Employment Security. Fifth, all recipients
of AFDC must sign over any rights to child support to the state and must
cooperate with the state's efforts to locate and collect reimbursement
from the absent parent.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the recipient family must
have an income below the standard of need established by the state. Each
state is responsible for deciding its own maximum ceiling on family
income for purposes of financial eligibility and/or establishing the
amount of the assistance grant. All income and resources in money,
goods, or services are considered in determining a family's need for
assistance, and deductions are allowed only for that income which is
actually being received. Income in-kind is evaluated separately and
deducted accordingly. Depending upon state regulations, certain amounts
of earned income are also disregarded in computing total income and
certain deductions are made for work related expenses. Financial
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eligibility is then computed by comparing the net countable income to the
standard grant amount for that size family. The difference between the
standard grant amount and the net countable income is the amount of money
that the family receives as its AFDC grant each month.
2.2 The Administrative Organization of the Program
While the Title IV clearly established the objectives of the AFDC
program, it gave administrative responsibility for the program's
operation to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) and
the individual state governments. Whereas HEW formulates the overall
rules and regulations for AFDC, the program is actually administered by
the fifty states, i.e., it is a federally financed, state administered
assistance program. Operating within the federal framework, state
legislators adopt statutes establishing an AFDC program and designating a
responsible state agency to distribute payments. Most states choose to
have a state agency directly administer the program, while a few states
choose to have counties or cities administer the program under state
supervision. Under both arrangements, however, the state adopts its own
set of rules and regulations which spell out how, in accordance with the
Congressional mandate, federal regulations, and state law, AFDC will be
administered.
Within the organization of the state, there is usually either a
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single public welfare department or an umbrella agency that coordinates
and provides all human services for the state. The designated state
agency is responsible for ensuring that the AFDC program is administered
properly. The central or state level offices of the agency provide
programmatic and administrative direction for the welfare system but the
direct provision of services/assistance is delegated to a network of
local offices. An illustration of the state organization in
Massachusetts is shown in Exhibit 2-1.
There is a second level of organization immediately below the
central department offices in most states. A network of six to ten
regional offices, geographically dispersed around the state, carry out a
middle management function. Functioning as an intermediary between the
state and local offices, the regional office serves as the primary
disseminator of policy changes and the principal monitor for the quality
and quantity of the work done in the local offices. The region may also
be responsible for the hiring and firing of staff at the local level.
The 50 to 160 local offices that exist in most states constitute a
third level of bureaucracy. Local offices are responsible for
determining client eligibility for all medical and financial assistance
programs. In addition, the local offices provide limited social services
and referrals to other agencies, and make periodic redeterminations of
eligibility as well as grant adjustments. Most offices are structured
into an additional several layers of hierarchy and administrative
responsibility. In Massachusetts for example, the local office may have
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Exhibit 2-1
ORGANIZATION OF THE MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE
(1980)
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three to five levels of supervision. At the top is the local office
director and his deputy and assistant administrators. Next come several
supervisors and head administrative clerks, each who supervises several
first-line supervisors. Finally, at the bottom of the hierarchy is the
front-line workers and clerical staff. The front-line worker units
provide either social services or financial assistance. Thus, there
could be a total of nine levels of administration between Congress and
the worker who actually implements the program service: Congress, HEW,
Office of Family Assistance, Mass Dept. of Public Welfare central office,
regional office, the local office director, assistant director, head
social work supervisors, the unit supervisor, and finally the worker.
2.3 The Flow of Rules and Regulations
When Congress created the legal framework for AFDC, it left to the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) the elaboration of
rules and regulations for the program's implementation. In establishing
safeguards for the expenditure of funds by the individual states who
actually administer the program, HEW imposed 23 conditions on the states
(Sampson, 1972). Among these conditions are that the state must provide
for personnel employment in a merit system (i.e., civil services system),
use an income/ means test in determining eligibility, provide the
opportunity for appeal hearings, and safeguard all information. The
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volume of specific regulations explaining these and other conditions'are
contained in the Code of Federal Regulations, published in the Federal
Register, and amplified in letters from HEW to the states. While the
regulations for AFDC cover several hundred pages in the CFR and are
formidable reading in their own right, a similar set of regulations was
created by the Dept. of Agriculture to govern the Food Stamp Program and
by the HEW.
Because AFDC is a program administered for HEW by the individual
states, each state further expands on the federal rules through state
legislation, the formal interpretation of federal and state policies,
court verdicts, and even local considerations. Each state welfare agency
generates a set of state manuals which describes how each program will
work, the official forms to be filled out, guidelines for making
decisions, steps for processing cases, and the daily work of the welfare
worker. At each step in the delegation of administrative responsibility
the program rules and regulations become more complex and detailed. The
resulting set of written regulations given to the individual worker
could, in most states, fill a four foot bookshelf. The proliferation of
rules and regulations in recent years raises important questions about
the true impact of such rules on the way in which the AFDC program
operates.
2.4 The Structure of the Worker's Job
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The responsibility for translating program rules into actions and
for bringing the AFDC program to life rests with the financial caseworker
(hereafter refered to as simply the "worker"). The financial caseworker
has the job of 1) collecting information (both initially and on an
ongoing basis) from the client and from third parties familiar with the
client's situation; 2) verifying the completeness and accuracy of the
information given; and 3) using the information to assess the client's
situation and arrive at a decision about the client's eligibility for
assistance. Within the general category of financial assistance worker,
there are two categories of worker: "intake" and "on-going". The intake
worker specializes in determining the initial eligibility of applicants
for AFDC or other assistance programs, and processes the case to begin
the payment process. The client's case is then reassigned to an on-going
worker who periodically redetermines that the client is still eligible
for assistance. This study deals almost entirely with the intake worker
since the intake worker has the most direct role in alleviating a
client's crisis situation. The behavior and motivation of the on-going
worker is similar to that of the intake worker, and many of the
observations offered here will apply to those workers as well.
2.4.1 The Job Description
The agency has several means by which it defines the role of the
worker and the behavior that is expected. The first mechanism is the
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formal job description. This is a brief written description of the tasks
to be performed and is used to assign the worker a civil service
ranking. Most job descriptions for welfare workes define the job as
"determining eligibility for financial assistance" and give various
examples of the tasks and functions contained therein. Expressed as a
process, the job is to "determine through interviews, home visits, and
collateral interviews the eligibility of applicants and their need for
financial assistance" (Greene, 1979, p.4). Or expressed as a task, the
worker "analyzes and evaluates data compiled from interviews, field
investigations, and collateral contacts to assess circumstances;
interprets and applies complex policies and regulations to determine
client eligibility (ibid)".
2.4.2 Training
The second mechanism is the initial and on-going training of
workers to better recognize and understand agency rules. Initial
training of new workers is done by the state or regional staff over a
period of weeks or months. In Massachusetts, for example, new workers
start off with about 15 days of training by the regional staff spread out
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over a three month period. During that time the new worker is given
instruction in program requirements, use of the state manual, agency
procedures, and a few practice cases. Classroom training is supplemented
by on the job training and a partial caseload of actual cases. At the
end of the six month probationary period, new workers are expected to
function as regular workers with a full caseload. Although some
supervisors were critical of the initial worker training as being just "a
rereading of the manual" rather than working with actual cases, most
workers appeared to be satisfied with the training they had received.
Beyond the initial training, there is virtually no formal training
of workers except that which is provided directly by the unit
supervisor. Supervisors are trained and then are expected to pass along
the information on new rules to units. However, several supervisors
indicated that they feel they do not have the time to do all the
necessary training.
But the initial training for the worker behavior can be weakened by
numerous problems in the agency's own organization. First, it is often
difficult to get workers to go through the training sessions and those
who do volunteer tend to be the same workers all the time. Second, there
is a serious lack of consistency across the training programs and across
offices. Workers reported that their recent Food Stamp training, for
example, gave conflicting interpretations of regulations to different
groups of trainees. Third, the existing training doesn't really give an
understanding of how the agency operates. Commented one supervisor:
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Most workers come here right off the street, and their
only training occurs on the job... there should be a lot more
training that tells the worker not only the who, when and how
of entitlement, but that also makes the worker familiar with
the other agencies and services available. Workers know very
little about the system.
Fourth, training is usually held at a location outside the office,
occassionally outside the community, and once or twice each year outside
the state. Supervisors and workers in several offices complained of
having to travel across the state for some types of training. The 14
cents a mile reimbursement by most states made it costly in terms of time
and money for the worker to go.
In all of the offices, workers expressed an interesting mix of
attitudes toward the first and ongoing training. Workers agreed that the
initial training was useful. On continued training, however, there were
two strong sets of feelings. The predominant feeling was that the
training sessions were a "colossal waste of time": material was covered
which workers already knew or the new forms being taught were not
available for examination in class. Furthermore, workers resented being
sent off for several days of training when they were already behind in
their work, and the time away would only put them farther behind. A few
workers, however, felt that the opportunity to go for training was indeed
an incentive for good performance. The value of training was not as much
in improving themselves but more to "get away from this mess for
awhile". However, others appear anxious to learn more about the constant
changes in policy.: "We need lots of training all the time because things
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are constantly changing" commented one worker.
The job description, legal code of conduct, and formal training
constitute what Jaques (1956) describes as the "programmed component" of
the workers job. The programmed component establishes the specific
framework within which the worker is to behave. But Jaques also argues
that there is a "discretionary component" as well which allows the
occupant of the job to carry out the activity as he chooses.
2.4.3 Caseloads and Work Standards
Up to this point I have described the AFDC processes and the
structure of the local offices on the assumption that there was but a
single category of worker who did either intake or case maintenance. Now
I will drop this assumption and introduce the civil service grade
structure as it pertains to assistance payment workers. The grade
structure is important to the AFDC process both because of the relative
wage ratio and because of the work standards or "quotas" set for each
grade. This discussion will focus on the personnel system as it is in
the Massachusetts offices.
The Massachusetts Civil Service System is organized into 22 grade
levels, 6 of which are used in the local welfare office. At the bottom
of the six is a grade 3 worker, also called a case aide. Grade 3 workers
carry 60% (108 points) or a normal caseload and receive a wage that is
60% percent ($145.53/per week starting salary) of the regular worker. At
the next level is a grade 9 or "financial service technician." Grade 9
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workers are responsible for a 75% caseload (135 points) and receive 75%
($178.23/week staring salary) wage. The caseload against which these two
grades are measured is the Grade 12 worker who carries a maximum caseload
of 180 points and who has a starting salary of $204.18 per week. Grade
13 and 14 (Financial Assistance Workers II and III respectively) both
carry the same size caseload as the Graded 12 but receive slightly more
pay to reflect worker longevity and skill.
The work standards for each grade of worker are established as part
of the negotiated collective bargaining contract. According to the
contract, grades 3,9,12, 13, and 14 workers can be required to do the
appropriate point-level amount of work -- but no more-- during the month.
The contract then goes on to assign point counts for different types of
work and cases. In intake, workers receive points for each application
taken (not just for the interview done): six points for an AFDC
application, three points for a General Relief application, and 1.5
points for a medical assistance application. It is assumed that each
worker will complete within the 22 day time limit all the applications
she has taken. Thus, a regular intake worker (Grade 120 would be
required to take 30 AFDC applications (30 x 6 points = 180) or 60 GR
applications (60 x 3 points = 180), or some combination of the two in
order to meet his or her quota for the month. Since workers reported
that their caseload of applications is about evenly mixed AFDC and GR
cases, this would imply that an intake worker would have approximately 20
AFDC and 20 GR applications per month.
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Many workers feel that the quota system is very unfair since it
does not take into account or give credit for the other types of work
being done. This was especially true among case maintenance workers who
were called upon to do a variety of things for clients outside of regular
case processing, e.g. helping a client who was just burned out her
home. Further, the system has a built in incentive for absenteeism:
workers are given a "backoff" in their quota of points if they are absent
five or more days in the month. Thus, if a worker is sick for only three
days, the incentive is to stay out the extra two days and benefit from
the "backoff policy".
What sanctions does the worker face if he does not meet the quota
for the month? Because the department places such an emphasis on
production (or "numbers" as the worker say), there is naturally a great
deal of attention paid to worker and office quotas. Throughout the
month, the unit supervisor monitors each worker to guage the worker's
progress toward their quota and to offer guidance in completing cases.
If the worker still does not meet the quota, the supervisor discusses the
problem with the worker and puts a letter in the worker's record. If the
worker misses his or her quota a second time, the worker is sent a
warning letter by the head social work supervisor. At the third
occurance, the worker is given special training and placed under close
supervision. The fourth occurence prompts the assistant director to
initiate the laying-off of the worker. However, it is very rare that a
worker will go through all four sanctions; the constant checking of the
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supervisor is usually enough to keep workers on target.
2.5 Exercising Discretion in Welfare Work
That a welfare worker's job possess considerable discretion has
been documented by several studies. Hanson (n.d.) and Teknekron (1979)
both found that the absence of clearly specified rules, instructions, and
performance standards imparted substantial discretionary authority to the
welfare worker. Lipsky (1980) and Horejsi, Walz and Connolly (1977)
discovered that workers will assume large measures of discretion in their
job in order to resolve the conflict of program goals and regulations.
Scott (1961) found that the welfare workers sometimes reinterpret agency
rules as client situations vary. Finally, Reid (1972) discovered that
workers were far from uniform in applying agency rules when refering
clients to the Work Incentive Program.
Since workers deal with a large number of decisions in the
processing of each case, it is possible for the worker to exercise
discretion at each step of the process. By virtue of their position in
the agency and their expertise the worker can heavily influence -- if not
completely control -- client treatment, the amount and accuracy of work
completed, support of agency policies, and the agency's successful
performance. Studies of local welfare offices in Georgia, Washington,
Illinois, and Massachusetts (Bateman, et. al. 1980 a,b,c,d) identified
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five general and thirty-three specific actions or decisions over which
workers feel they have considerable discretion. The list, compiled from
reported or observed behavior among approximately 200 workers is
presented in Exhibit 2-2.
The lack of clear rules and sanctions by the local agency allows
the worker to be more responsive to and sensitive to other factors when
processing clients. These other factors may come from the client, the
office setting, the environment, or from the worker himself. Different
workers in the same situation are influenced by different sets of factors
because of the attitudes and experiences which they bring to the job.
These secondary factors may motivate the worker to behave in a manner
different from that predicted or desired by the agency. Agencies
perceive worker behavior which is not in accordance with agency program
objectives as undesirable and to be discouraged. For example, under the
agency's objectives, the worker is to approve only those clients who are
truely eligible for assistance, and the worker is to authorize a grant
amount that is in accordance with agency standards. The worker could,
however, make an "error" (either intentionally or unintentionally) in the
client's favor by approving an ineligible person or by giving and
eligible client a grant amount that was too large. The worker could also
make an error against the client and in the agency's favor by denying an
eligible client or by underpaying an eligible client. Or the worker
could make an error in his own favor by reaching the proper decision for
the client but taking shortcuts in the paperwork and validation so as to
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Exhibit 2-2
ACTIONS AND DECISIONS SUBJECT TO WORKER DISCRETION
1. The amount of work that is done:
a. The number of interviews, redeterminations, etc., completed
b. Frequency and timing of absences, coffee breaks, etc.
c. Number of referrals made for information or services
d. Help given to other workers in.the unit
2. The amount of time devoted to various work tasks:
a. Talking with clients in interviews or via telephone
b. Reviewing case documents
c. Processing forms
d. Pursuing leads and follow up on problems
e. Completing miscellaneous reports
f. Attending to personal business
3. The amount of help or information used in a case:
a. Asking questions of unit supervisor or agency director
b. Asking questions of co-workers
c. Asking clients follow-up questions
d. Checking manuals
e. Relying on past experience or intuition
4. The demand they place on the client, client treatment:
a. Extent of documentation required for verification
b. Frequency of reporting changes
c. Frequency and duration of face to face interviews
d. Availability or access for client initiated contact
e. Scheduling home visits
f. Making referrals to other benefits or assistance
g. Returning client telephone calls
h. Duration of client waiting times
i. Initiating client contact
j. Effort at understanding the client's situation
k. Timing of grant changes or termination
5. The support of Agency policy:
a. The order in which forms or work is processed
b. Completing mandatory or voluntary referrals
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c. Computing expenses, income, or grant amount properly
d. Using non-standard forms, notations, routing
e. Modifying deadline requirements or other standards
f. Timing paper processing or case actions
g. Adherence to informal rules, standards and office conduct
h. Reporting known or observed errors
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save himself time and energy. Elaborate quality control mechanisms have
been established to determine the extent to which these kinds of errors
occur but little has been done to sanction the worker directly.
2.5.1 Parallel Assistance Programs
AFDC is only one of several welfare programs provided to low income
families through the local office and front-line worker. Two other
assistance programs are also provided federally and administered parallel
to AFDC. The first program is targeted to food support, while the second
is targeted to medical assistance. There is a third program as well in
most states which is sponsored exclusively by the state government for
individuals not qualified for these other programs. The existence of two
or three additional programs for the worker to administer generates a
further complexity to the job.
The Food Stamps (FS) program provides coupons earmarked for the
purchase of food to low income individuals and families. The full cost
of the food coupon benefits and 50% of the state' administrative costs
for the program are paid by the federal government. Eligibility for FS
is determined on the basis of income, assets, and work registration, with
deductions made for work-related, medical, and certain living expenses.
Workers in the local offices determine eligibility and calculate benefit
levels, which are provided in the form of an Authorization to Participate
(ATP) card. The ATP is used to obtain the amount of Food Stamps
authorized at coupon issuing locations at no cost to the recipient. The
- 53 -
amount of Food Stamps authorized varies with net income levels and the
size of the household. Program regulations provide for both "expedited
services" (an accelerated eligibility determination process which can be
completed in 48 hours) and for immediate authorizations if the applicant
has emergency needs.
Medical Assistance (MA), also called "Medicaid", pays the medical
bills of cash assistance recipients (e.g. AFDC families, Supplemental
Security Income recipients) and the medically needy, i.e., individuals
whose incomes are too high to qualify for cash assistance but whose
medical expenses reduce their effective incomes to below the poverty
level. Program benefits to all except General Relief recipients include
inpatient and outpatient hospital care, nursing home care, physician and
dental services, drugs, mental health services, and other ambulatory
services. The most costly group of Medicaid recipients are the elderly,
accounting for half the program expenditures, even though the comprise
only a fifth of the recipients.
The General Assistance (or General Relief) program is designed to
provide financial assistance to persons who are ineligible for federal
assistance but whose income is insufficient to meet basic needs as
defined by the state welfare agency. Under GA, financial assistance is
available to help eligible individuals and families, meet basic living
expenses, including the cost of necessary medical care, and funeral and
burial expenses. An adult GA case contains one GA recipient, and a
family GA case consists of one or more children who live with a relative
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but do not meet all the non-financial requirements of AFDC. The relative
and the relative's spouse may not be included in the GA family case. GA,
the only public assistance program financed entirely by state and local
funds, also provides recipients with social service allowances to assist
clients in securing employment.
2.5.2 Proliferation of Regulations
Workers in the Massplace office indicated that another major
condition contributing to error is the sheer number of rules and
regulations that have to be taken into account during the eligibility
process. Different regulations and standards apply to different types of
income or assets. Workers find it hard to remember all of the provisions
and exceptions and do not always have the time (or inclination) to look
up policy in the state's policy manual for AFDC. Furthermore, the
regulations and standards are not uniform across time. The state is
constantly creating new regulations and adjusting old standards as
program policy is updated and refined. It appears that there may be an
"overload" of rules in the local office and therefore all rules become
less important to enforce. The state's attempt to be explicit as to
program administration generates a constant stream of policy memos and
revisions to the worker. The worker, already pressed for time to get
everything done, tends to cope with the stream by simply inserting the
memo(s) in the manual and forgetting about it until a specific client
problem occurs.
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A frequent and widespread complaint among workers regarding the
manual was the timing and delivery of changes. The state manual is
updated regularly through a series of "state letters" which indicate
changes in the assistance program's policies and procedures. These
letters are delivered to each worker and require the worker to take the
time to read the letter, make the appropriate changes in the manual, ask
questions of the supervisor, and spend a few moments thinking about the
policy on each case until it becomes routine. The timing of the letters
has been a topic of controversy between state and local offices. In
Massachusetts, for example, the state's initial policy was to distribute
the letters as they were prepared in order to get the changes implemented
as quickly as possible. Workers complained, however, that this schedule
meant continual interruptions to them each week, and they requested that
state letters be collected and sent to them all at one time each month.
The state office agreed and made the schedule adjustment, but more
recently has gone back to distributions throughout the month. During
August and September 1979, local offices in Massachusettes received a
total of 26 state letters changing regulations and over 75% of them
arrived during the last week of each month. It should be noted that
these letters also arrive about the same time as most workers are trying
to finish their quota of eligibility redeterminations for the month.
Two additional complaints among workers are that state letters
either arrive long after their date of implementation (automatically
putting the worker in error) or they arrive on the day of implementation
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and give the worker no warning of the change (thereby making another
"surprise" in the worker's day). A review of the 26 state letters
received in August and September, for example, showed that: 4 letters
were effective three days to two months retroactively; 9 letters were
effective immediately, 8 letters gave 4 to 40 days advance notice,, and 5
letters were for information purposes only.
2.5.3 Rule Ambiguity
Workers are confronted by both rules which contain ambiguous
mandates and rules which specifically give them the authority to decide.
The situation is an uncomfortable one for workers. As one worker put it,
"How do I interpret the word 'may'? Does it mean 'will' or 'can'? How you
interpret that one word can change an eligibility decision." For
example, one state's manual says that if the client owns property, the
property may be exempted as a resource as long as it is about the same
size parcel as everyone else's in the area. No absolute size is
specified.
Rule ambiguity also occurs because of weaknesses in agency
administration. Administrators in the Massplace office complained that
they were given very little explanation or guidance of new program
regulations they were asked to implement. Quite often, the office
received a notice of policy change but no instructions about
implementation. As one administrator said, "The state letters almost
assume that the local office will not have any questions on the policy or
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its implementation and will simply go ahead and do it. But, in fact,
there can be serious problems in carrying out the implementation, and
there is nowhere to turn for guidance." A frequently cited example among
the workers is the receipt of instructions for using a new form but no
copies of the new forms themselves. Staff complained that the forms may
arrive in the office up to two months after the office becomes
responsible for making the change.
What, then, can workers do when confronted with rule ambiguity?
When workers encounter questionable interpretations they can either go
back and reread the manuals, ask a fellow worker for her interpretation,
or ask a unit supervisor for clarification. While the logical (and from
the agency's perspective, desirable) recourse is to ask the unit
supervisor for clarification, workers complained that the policy
interpretation can vary drastically from supervisor to supervisor. In
the words of one worker:
Nothing is uniform! Each supervisor and alternate
supervisor have different ways of interpreting policies and
procedures or have set ways of performing a particular task.
For example, some supervisors want a new Food Stamp
application completed at each redetermination; others only
want an updated form. Or they have some personal preference
about how memos are to be worded. Why can't they give us a
clear set of regulations which say what you do and don't do?
Consequently, workers often seek answers or interpretations from their
fellow workers rather than risk being bound by a disagreeable
interpretation from the unit supervisor. Even more frequently, workers
simply decide on their own what a policy means and what is the
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appropriate action to be taken.
Rule enforcement is also quite dubious when the worker encounters
the "unworkable rule." Such rules exist in formal agency regulations but
are perceived by workers as being unworkable, illogical, and/or,
contradictory to rational bureaucratic behavior or even the manifest
purpose of the agency. Workers speak openly of these rules and usually
argue with their supervisors, office director, or anyone else for the
elimination of such rules. For example, workers consider any attempt to
get police verification of stolen checks to be an exercise in futility
and so they feed fictitious data into the computer to satisfy agency
requirements. Or workers feel it is ridiculous to constrain the amount
of bus fare given the client when slightly more fare would get them to a
job that would make the client self-sufficient.
In these last two chapters I have looked at rules from the
perspective of the organization and its policy makers. Chapter 1
introduced the function of rules in an organization: to control and
coordinate the behavior of the organization's members towards the
accomplishment of some set of goals and objectives. Each rule
establishes a boundary for the member; on one side of the boundary is
acceptable/desirable behavior in the eyes of the organization while on
the other side is unacceptrable or deviant behavior. Taken together the
rules map out the total area of acceptable behavior much the way streets
can delineate the boundaries of a city block. But Chapter 1 also noted
that it is impossible for an organization to generate rules governing
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every action of its members, and that even those rules which are
established are weakened in many ways. The result is that a certain
amount of discretion is either intentionally or unintentionally delegated
to the member.
This chapter introduced the local welfare office as an organization
with goals and objectives and the AFDC program as the source of rules
controling the behavior of its organizational members, i.e., workers and
clients. But factors such as political controversy, administrative
hierarchy, program complexity, and "bureaucratic" writing have imparted a
great deal of discretion to workers in carrying out their job. In spite
of the objectives of uniform and equitable treatment of AFDC clients, the
evidence from several welfare offices shows that there is often
substantial variation in the way clients are treated and the outcomes
produced by the agency. From the perspective of the policy maker, the
occurrence of client outcomes other than those originally intended
represents a breakdown in the policy implementation process. The task at
hand, then, will be to identify why those variations occur and propose
actions that will result in the desired implemention.
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Chapter 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This paper is essentially a case study of the intake workers in a
single large welfare office. The analysis presented shows the variations
in individual worker behavior and is based on data from a two major
sources. The first source was a major work measurement study of the
Massplace Welfare Office. The second source was a management survey of
fifteen local welfare offices across the country. Both data sets were
originally assembled as part of an important study by Abt Associates,
Inc. for the Dept. of Health and Human Services. [2] The Abt study
focused on the welfare office as the unit of analysis and aggregated all
data on individual workers to the section or office level. The current
study, in contrast, focuses on the individual worker as the unit of
analysis and represents a secondary analysis of the Abt study data. Each
data set has its own methodology for the collection and analysis of data
as described below. The following discussion in each part first
describes the circumstances for collecting the data, then the data
2. The purpose of the Abt study was to construct a computer simulation
model of a local welfare office to be used by DHHS in policy development.
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collection procedures, and finally the steps in data analysis.
3.1 Observed Worker Behavior
The data on individual worker behavior was collected in the Massplace
Office by Abt staff between April 26th and May 30th of 1980. The entire
planning and supervision of this data collection was done by the author,
and the author was directly involved in data collection on a daily
basis. The data collection team consisted of three professional staff
and twelve part-time, trained observers. In addition to the two work
measurement techniques described here, the Abt study involved a
random-moment survey of worker activities, direct observation of
worker-client interaction, a survey of clients, and a review of
approximately 1200 AFDC case records.
3.1.1 Office Selection
The Massplace Office was selected by the Abt project staff as the
data collection site for three reasons. First and foremost, the
Massplace Office was considered to be representative of other large
caseload offices which the staff had examined in other states (see the
management survey discussed below). Earlier studies of state and local
welfare systems had shown that program administration varies
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significantly from office to office (Congressional Research Service,
1977; Newman, et. al. 1977). While the Abt management survey confirmed
that substantial variations do exist among offices, it also showed that
there were fundamental similarities among offices as well and that part
of the previously identified variations were due to differences in
labeling, terminology, or form processing. A cross-state synthesis by
Budding (1980) showed that in spite of apparent differences all offices
have to interact with the client, have to determine client eligibility,
have to determine the level of benefit, and have to establish the timing
for the payment to the client. Thus, it is possible to talk about a
representative welfare office and to generalize from such and office to
other offices.
A second reason for selecting the Massplace office was the size of
the AFDC caseload and the presence of other federal assistance payment
programs. The Massplace office is among the largest in the state with an
active AFDC caseload in 1979 of 7,924 cases -- almost 7% of the state's
total AFDC cases. Because such a large portion of the cases are
administered by a few large offices in any state, any valid analytical
model must be based on these larger offices. As with most other welfare
offices, Massplace also administered the General Relief program for the
state and the Food Stamp program for the Dept. of Agriculture. The
office's 1,726 General Relief cases in 1979 accounted for almost 9% of
the state's total GR cases, while the offices 7,599 public assistance
Food Stamp cases accounted for 7% of the state caseload. It is
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interesting to note that the office is significant not only in the number
of cases but also in the total dollar amount of its payments. Each month
the office pays out in excess of $2.6 million in direct payments for
AFDC. One administrator estimated that if the value of Medicaid, Food
Stamps, and other assistence were also considered, the total "cash flow"
for the office was over $8 million per month.
The third reason for selecting the Massplace office was its
proximity to the Abt corporate offices in Cambridge. The number of
research staff involved, the intensive level of measurement, and the
transportation costs of staff and supplies necessitated the selection of
a welfare office that was easily accessible. After these three selection
criteria were applied to the Massachusetts welfare offices and the
Massplace office selected, a formal request for the office's
participation was made to the Commissioner of Public Welfare and to the
Director of the Massplace office. Both parties agreed to participate in
the work measurement study.
3.1.2 Time Lapse Measurements
One portion of the work measurement study focused on the length of
time that certain case processing activities took. The study needed to
determine the length of time that clients had to wait before seeing a
welfare worker and the duration of various types of interviews. This
data was collected by making slight modifications to the normal process
for notifying workers that clients were waiting to see them. When a
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client enters the Massplace office, he or she immediately checks in with
the receptionist and asks to see a worker. Prior to the Abt study, the
receptionist would fill out a "reception slip" indicating the client's
name and social security number, the date, and the worker's name. Either
the receptionist or a clerk would then distribute the reception slip to
the appropriate worker as four or five slips would accumulate. The slips
were placed in a pouch near the worker's desk, and the worker would
periodically check the pouch to see if any clients were waiting.
In planning for the study, I modified the office's reception slip
system in three ways. First, I replaced the original single reception
slip with two slips. An "interview slip" was to be used if the client
was coming to the office for the first time to apply for AFDC. A
"reception slip" was to be used if the client was coming in for a
follow-up interview (or for any other reason) with the worker. The
interview slip contained space for all the data usually collected by the
receptionist, but it also had space for the worker to indicate whether
the client failed to show up for the interview ("no-showed") or whether
the worker declined to take an application from the client ("no-app").
The data entered on the the new reception slip was identical to the
information on the original slip.
Second, each of the new "interview" and "reception" slips had a
unique identifying number pre-stamped on it. Each slip also had a
self-carboned second sheet attached to it to record all of the data
enetered on the top slip. When the receptionist finished filling out the
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appropriate slip on the client, the receptionist separated the second
copy and set it aside for collection by the Abt staff. The original or
top copy was distributed in the normal manner described above. As the
originals were later collected from the workers, each slip was matched
with its yellow copy by the unique identifying number on the slip.
Third, I installed a Simplex time stamp machine on the counter next
to the receptionist and another Simplex machine on a stand by the door
leading to the interview cubicles. After the receptionist completed the
slip and separated the copy, she inserted the top copy into the machine
to be time stamped. The first (or earliest) time stamp was defined as
the starting time for the client's wait. While it is possible that the
client may also have had to wait to see the receptionist, my direct
observation of the waiting lines showed that clients waited no longer
than 2 to 4 minutes.
To the existing reception slip system I also added a new step.
Instead of workers discarding the "reception slip" when they went to see
the client, as they had done previously, workers were asked to stamp
additional times on the slip. As the worker passed through the doorway
from the office into the waiting room, he or she inserted the slip into
the Simplex machine stationed by the door. This second time stamp was
defined as the end of the client waiting period and the start of the
worker's interview with the client. The interview then took place in one
of the cubicles in the interview area. After the interview, the worker
returns to the office through the doorway and again inserts the slip into
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the Simplex machine. This third stamp was defined as the end of the
worker client interview.
When the worker has finished with the slip, he or she dropped the
slip into a box next to the Simplex machine. Every 30 minutes a member
of the Abt research staff collected all of the slips and matched the
original with its yellow copy. If the worker had indicated on the
"interview slip" that no application was taken or the client was not
there when called, the Abt staffer would first report the information to
the receptionist so that the worker would be assigned another interview.
At the end of the day those second copies which were not matched to an
original (i.e., the worker had not dropped the the original in the box)
were set aside to be tracked the following day. The next day an Abt
staffer would ask the worker for the slip on the missing interview. The
worker was usually able to find the slip in the paperwork on his or her
desk, in the case file, or in some other place in the office.
During the work measurement period a total of about 300 interview
slips and 650 reception slips were used for intake cases. Of these all
but about 9% were successfully matched. Of the 9% unmatched slips, about
90% were slips belonging to one intake worker who refused to participate
in the study. The non-participating worker was the union shop steward
who felt that the data from the study would be used by the Dept. of
Public Welfare to raise work standards or otherwise harass workers.
Thus, time lapse data for this portion of the study is available for only
14 of the 15 intake workers. The balance of the unmatched slips were
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assumed to be either lost or accidentally destroyed.
After the six week measurement period had ended, all of the data
from the interview slips and reception slips was key-entered into an SAS
data set for analysis. The data from the interview slips constituted one
data set while the data from the reception slips constituted a second
data set. For each data set, SAS processing was used to calculate the
client waiting time, the lapse time of the interview, the number of times
clients "no-showed", and the number of "no-apps" interviews. Each data
set was then sorted by worker name, and the time lapse averages were
computed for each intake worker. The results of the analysis for the
individual intake workers are reported in Chapters 4 and 5.
3.1.3 Date-Lapse Measurement and Disposition
A second portion of the work measurement study looked at case
processing times that took longer than a few hours to complete and at the
final outcome of the case. This data was collected from an "application
log" book regularly maintained by the office. As part of the initial
processing of an AFDC application, the intake worker will record in the
application log the client's name, client's social security number, the
data of the application, and the worker's case assignment number. The
date entered as the application date is actually the date on which the
interview took place and , for purposes of this study, was defined as the
start of case processing.
When the intake worker completes the processing of the case and
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reaches a final decision on the application, a clerk will enter
additional information in the application log book. On the same line
started by the worker, the clerk enters the date of the disposition and
whether the case was approved, denied, or withdrawn by the client. If
the application was denied, the clerk also enters a two digit code
indicating the reason for denial.
In early July 1980, after all the applications started during the
six week measurement period had been disposed of, the data from the
application log book was key-entered into another SAS data set. SAS
processing was used to calculate the total processing time for each
application. The data set was then sorted by worker case assignment
number (a unique identifying number for each worker assigned by the
office) to generate an approval/denial rate, an average processing time
by type of decision, and a frequency count of application withdrawls for
each intake worker. The resulting data is also presented in Chapters 4
and 5 that follow.
3.2 Worker Reporting of Behavior and Motivation
The analysis in this study is based on data from a major management
survey of fifteen local welfare offices, including the Massplace Office,
across five states. A portion of the data was also collected through
open-ended interviews with workers during the work measurement study
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described in the preceding chapter. I had the opportunity to conduct
first hand observations of intake workers processing case paperwork,
interviewing clients, and conducting home visits. As I observed these
activities I asked workers why they were doing things in their particular
way or why they had made a particular decision. These observations were
later recorded as notes and are used through the discussion in this
chapter. I also debriefed the three other Abt professional staff
regarding their observations of worker behavior and self-reports from
workers. These secondary observations were later recorded as notes and
also used in the following discussion.
The majority of data for this chapter, however, was collected by
Abt staff during a management survey of fifteen local offices conducted
between February and October 1979. The planning and supervision of the
data collection effort in 9 of the 15 offices was done by the author, and
the author was directly involved in the data collection in each of those
9 offices. The data collection team consisted of six professional staff
trained in interviewing and document collection. The purpose of the
management survey was to document, in detail, the steps followed in
processing and maintaining AFDC cases.
The state offices, local offices, and individual respondents who
were interviewed for the survey were selected on a "volunteer" basis.
The Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation in HEW
contacted state officials in several states asking for their cooperation
as a study site. The first five states to agree to participate were
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Georgia, Illinois, Massachusetts, Oklahoma, and Washington. Within each
of the five states, state welfare officials (usually the director of
assistance payments) selected three local offices as study sites. Abt
requested that the offices represent different size offices in the state,
i.e., that state officials choose one small, one medium, and one large
size office on the basis of office caseload. The list of the fifteen
local offices is presented in Exhibit 3-1.
Within each local office, the office director selected the workers
and unit supervisors that would be interviewed. While some directors
asked for volunteers, others simply chose the individuals they felt were
the most suitable. Thus, the data is not collected from a random sample
of offices or respondents, and will reflect the biases of those who
volunteered or were responsible for selecting the respondents. However,
the fact that the interviews were conducted across fifteen local offices
and more than 150 workers greatly improves the reliability and
representativeness of the data.
Each worker was interviewed by an Abt staff member in a private
area, usually away from the worker's desk. Prior to the start of the
field interviews, an interview guide was developed as an aide to the
interviewer. The interview guide was intended to help explore the nature
and content of the worker's job by providing the interviewer with a set
of open ended questions to be asked. The interview guide is presented in
Appendix A. The interviewer was free to ask the questions in whatever
manner and whatever order that seemed most appropriate at that time, as
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Exhibit 3-1
LOCAL WELFARE OFFICES VISITED DURING MANAGEMENT SURVEY
State/Local Office
Massachusetts
Hancock Street*
Worcester*
Springfield*
State offices*
Washington
Shelton*
Olympia*
Tacoma Avenue*
State offices*
Illinois
Franklin County
St. Clair County
Southeast District*
State offices*
Georgia
Wayne County*
Floyd County
Fulton County*
State offices*
Oklahoma
Tulsa County
Muskogee County
Wagoner County
State offices
Date Visited
Sept. - Oct.
1979
June 1979
April 1979
Feb.-March
1979
June 1979
* Designates offices in which the author trained and supervised
interviewers and conducted worker interviews.
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long as all points of the guide were covered. The full interview lasted
from 60 to 90 minutes depending upon the complexity of the worker's job
and the extent of their experience. The interviewer took notes during
the interview and subsequently organized and supplemented the notes
according to the interview guide.
The data from the intake worker interviews has been aggregated in
two steps. First, the responses for all workers in the local office were
aggregated at the office level by type of worker, i.e., all responses
from intake workers were combined to describe and explain the activities
of the intake section. Second, the office level analyses were aggregated
across the three offices in each state by type of worker. The results of
both levels of analysis were reported in Bateman (1980 a,b,cd, and Avis
1980). The discussion in this chapter is based on a reanalysis of the
interview notes and the direct observations from the management survey.
In this reanalysis, the data from the Massplace office has been separated
from the other offices and organized by type of worker and rule. The
data from the other fourteen offices was then organized in the same
fashion and used as supplementary observations for the Massplace data.
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Chapter 4
WORKER BEHAVIOR UNDER MANDATORY RULES
In Chapter 1, I cited the distinction among "mandatory,"
"permissive," and "normative" rules in organizations. Mandatory rules
were defined as those rules which impose on the individual an obligation
for some action (or refrain from action) and reinforces that obligation
with the threat of sanctions if the rule is broken. In Chapter 2, I then
discussed the proliferation of rules that has accompanied the AFDC
program and noted that a substantial number of these rules are
"mandatory" in nature. For example, if the client meets all the
requirements for eligibility, the case worker must approve the client for
assistance. If the client has not produced all the necessary
documentation to prove eligibility, then the caseworker must deny the
client assistance. In theory, then, the job of the caseworker should be
made easier because the mandatory rules establish clear guidelines for
what actions must and must not be taken.
In the reality of the local welfare office, however, the certainty
of the rule's mandate appears to often conflict with the uncertainty of
the work environment and the expectations for fair treatment. Local
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conditions can call into question the policy maker's requirements and
intent at the same time that sanctions for rule violation are mitigated.
In this chapter I shall examine the observed behavior of workers
functioning under "mandatory" rules in order to identify those contextual
factors which facilitate or undermine the implementation of the formal
rule. One might expect that, given the same mandatory rule for all
workers, all workers would behave in the same manner in implementing that
rule. While each worker may accomplish the objective within the
constraints allowed by the rule, the manner in which they go about their
tasks has definite consequences for client treatment and efficiency.
The following discussion presents four rules which generally govern
the activities of the worker and which are critical in the determination
of client eligibility. The first requirement discussed is that workers
must see clients on the same day that the client first enters the office
to request aid. The second requirement is that workers must verify all
the relevant information regarding the client's eligibility. The third
requirement is that workers must reach a final decision on the client's
eligibility, while the fourth requirement is that the decision must be
made within 22 days. These four rules are by no means exhaustive of the
rules governing the eligibility process but are representative of the
demands placed on the worker. For each of the following rules, I shall
describe the observed behavior of the intake workers in the Massplace
office and discuss factors which workers have cited as influencing their
execution of the rule.
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4.1 Rule 1: Workers must see clients on the day clients
first enter the office.
All AFDC applicants must be seen by a worker on the day in which
they come into the office to apply for assistance. In the Massplace
office, clients enter the waiting room and check in with the
receptionist. The receptionist assigns the client to one of the fifteen
intake workers on a totally random basis, i.e., there is no use of the
client's characteristics in the assignment process. Each worker is
assigned an average of three AFDC clients to see each day (plus three or
more General Relief applicants). Exhibit 4-1 shows the average time that
each worker made his client wait for the interview. Note that Grant made
clients wait only 36 minutes on average versus Charles who had them wait
almost 72 minutes on average.
Thus, from a client's point of view, a random assignment to Charles
would mean waiting twice as long for an interview as if assigned to
Grant. This delay is significant if the end of the day is approaching
because it increases the likelihood that the client might not be seen and
the rule violated. Unfortunately, it was not possible to determine
whether Grant was somehow less accurate or thorough in quickly processing
cases, a fact which might make the shorter waiting time less desireable.
For purposes of this discussion I will assume that both workers are
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Exhibit 4-1
CLIENT WAITING TIME FOR INITIAL INTERVIEW
April 24 through May 27, 1980
No. of AFDC Av. Waiting
Worker Application Time
Interviews (minutes)
Grant 32 36.4
Gibbons 31 40.9
Smith 31 42.0
Hunter 29 45.1
Chase 30 50.4
Rogers 32 54.5
Chambers 27 54.7
Hollins 30 55.2
Little 22 56.5
Crocker 21 59.0
Stafford 33 60.0
Clemson 20 61.3
Charles 31 71.7
Pope 8 103.4
Shepard 23 n/a
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equally accurate in their work.
One explanation for the difference in wiating times is that Charles
is simply a slower worker than Grant or the other workers. While it was
not possible to objectively compare workers on competence, workers did
report that there were events in the office which often delayed their
ability to see clients right away. In some instances workers became
backlogged in their interviews because they couldn't find space in which
to interview the client. In other instances, the amount of workload
necessitated spending more time working on case records than seeing
clients. These factors do not appear to cause significant time delays by
themselves, but the frequency with which they occur does appear to have a
cumulative effect on client processing.
4.1.1 The Problem of Interviewing Space
Since the interview is the primary vehicle through which the worker
collects information, the type and quantity of space in a welfare office
reserved for interviewing has important implications for both parties.
For the client who wishes to conduct his business in private, the
seclusion of the interviewing area may be of concern. For the worker who
wishes to conduct the interview at a particular time, the availability of
space to do so may become an issue. Even the atmosphere and noise level
in the interviewing area might affect the substance and length of the
interview. In the Massplace office, all interviews are conducted in one
area at the back of the ground floor. This area is connected to the
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client waiting room and street entrance by a single door.
Passing through the door from the intake area to the interview
area, one immediately perceives a rise in both the noise level and the
temperature. The six-foot partitions that carve out the 23 interview
cubicles provide visual privacy of sorts but mute the sound of several
simultaneous interviews only slightly. Added to the hum of voices
interviewing and being interviewed is the noise of a constant parade of
workers, clients, and families along the narrow hallways separating the
cubicles. At any time, an in-progress interview in a cubicle may be
punctuated by other workers looking for an empty space for their own
interview, or requesting spare forms, answers, or help. Eight of the
cubicles are assigned to 15 intake workers, two to a cubicle. One worker
uses the cubicle in the morning the other in the afternoon. A harried
ongoing worker may usurp a cubicle set aside for an intake worker and be
thrown out in the middle of the interview as a result. The hum of worker
and client voices pervading the interviewing area belies any notion of
privacy for the client. Standing in the hallway of the room, or in a
cubicle, a conversation in any of the surrounding cubicles is clearly
audible and distracting to both worker and client.
4.1.2 The Ebb and Flow of Work
Workers in most offices identified two major types of secondary
activities which occur during (or parallel to) the basic workflow process
and which exert an influence on their work: fluctuations in workload over
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time and outside interruptions. While both types of activities do not
necessarily affect the sequence of events in the processing of a case,
they both affect the total time available to complete each step, the time
between the steps, and the total time for processing work. It appears
that the two types of activities can further fluctuate along two
important dimensions: frequency and duration. Increases in the workload,
for example, occur regularly at the beginning and end of the month (when
clients are most concerned about their own situation) or happen
sporadically and suddenly (such as when there is a factory strike
locally). Similarly, interruptions in the form of unit meetings occur
regularly each week while interruptions from clients burned out of their
home and needing immediate assistance can happen anytime. Both the
workload fluctuations and interruptions can last from a few minutes, as
in the case of a client telephone call, to several weeks, as in the case
of a special project to collect information for updating case record.
The worker's daily routine can also be affected by activities which
change from week to week or that happen at only certain times during the
month. One such change is the number of applicants entering the office
during the month. Just as the early part of the week is a peak time for
applications, the first and last weeks of the month appear to be peak
times in the Massplace office. Exhibit 4-2 shows the fluctuations in the
average number of interviews by week of the month. Intake workers
reported that during the "slower" times of the month, they find they
spend more time on paperwork and "catching up" from the peak periods. It
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Exhibit 4-2
FLUCTUATIONS IN APPLICATIONS BY WEEK OF THE MONTH
Massplace Office
Week of Month (No. Days) and Month of Year
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should be noted that the dramatic decline in the number of interviews
during the last few days of long months is an indication of workers
reaching their quota (and therefore taking no more applications), rather
than the decline in the numbers of people entering the office to apply.
There are also at least three important changes that occur over the
course of the year which influence the workload productivity of the
office. First, as shown in Exhibit 4-3 the total number of applications
received (and the number of interviews) varies from month to month. In
peak months, intake workers have to work harder to process the
applications, and the greater number of applications may have some affect
on worker accuracy. Second, there are fluctuations in worker
availability during the year: workers tend to be absent on sick leave in
the winter months, while more workers tend to take vacation leave in the
summer.
4.2 Rule 2: Workers must verify all information regarding
the client.
Although it would have been desireable to observe directly the
extent to which each worker verifies the information collected on each
client, it was not possible to do this within the confines of the present
study. However, workers reported that they start the verification
process during the interview and will continue it through the required
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Exhibit 4-3
FLUCTUATIONS IN APPLICATIONS BY MONTH OF THE YEAR
Massplace Office
10,000
9,900
9,800
9.700
9,600
9,500
9,400
9,300
9,200
9,100
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
(1978)
Month and Year
12 3
(1979)
home visit. Workers have very definite attitudes about the usefulness
and purposes of the home visit and there are certain patterns and
attitudes that emerged in discussion with workers. Some workers feel the
visit is important and will do it regularly, while others feel that it is
a waste of time and will rarely do it. Workers will also use available
outside sources to confirm the client's situation. It appears that the
extent to which workers verify information is a function of their coping
behavior and basic attitude toward their job.
Workers may also ask clients to return to the office with
additional information that is needed to complete the application. Some
clients do not know what information is required of them during the
application interview, while others are knowledgable from previous visits
to the office. It is a matter of worker style whether the worker asks
the client to return to the office with the information or whether the
worker simply waits to pick up the information during the home visit.
Exhibit 4-4 shows the total number of follow-up visits for each worker
during the period of observation. These visits may not all be required
by the worker but may be initiated by the client to check on the status
of the application or just to visit. Note that Gibbons had 20 clients
return after the initial interview while Chase had 78 clients return for
the same period. The number of return visits is significant because of
the travel expense involved and the need to find a babysitter for the
child(ren). Exhibit 4-5 indicates the total number of meetings each
worker had with his or her clients.
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Exhibit 4-4
NUMBER OF FOLLOW-UP INTERVIEWS
April 24 through May 27, 1980
No. of AFDC
Worker Follow-up
Interviews
Pope 10
Gibbons 20
Shepard 26
Grant 30
Crocker 32
Little 32
Chambers 34
Charles 35
Hollins 37
Clemson 41
Rogers 42
Smith 44
Stafford 50
Hunter 67
Chase 78
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Exhibit 4-5
TOTAL NUMBER OF WORKER-CLIENT MEETINGS
April 24 through May 27, 1980
Total No. of Total No. of
Worker AFDC Cases AFDC Client
Processed Meetings
Pope 6 16
Gibbons 24 50
Little 16 51
Shepard 21 52
Crocker 20 58
Clemson 20 61
Grant 28 61
Chambers 24 62
Charles 25 67
Hollins 28 69
Rogers 24 71
Smith 29 76
Stafford 27 82
Hunter 25 96
Chase 24 108
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Program regulations require that virtually all of the information
elicited from the client be verified through the appropriate
documentation. Full documentation of the facts must be presented in the
case record, otherwise the case will be considered to be in error.
Workers in the Massplace Office were quick to point out that obtaining
the required verifications and documentation was perhaps the most
frustrating part of their job. Verifying information, like elicitation,
can be complex and problematic. On the one hand, state laws protect
client privacy, and on the other, cooperation from other public agencies
can be very slow.
Verifications are usually accomplished through documents supplied
by the clients, other people, e.g., the landlord, and agencies such as
schools (to verify the child's enrollment), business (to verify past
employment) and government offices (to obtain social security numbers or
birth certificates). However, applicants rarely bring with them all the
verifications needed during the intake interview. More commonly,
applicants are missing birth certificates, pay stubs, rent receipts,
etc. which they are instructed to drop off as soon as possible or have
ready for the home visit. The following four conditions were suggested
by workers or observed to inhibit the verification process and to
contribute to error: client delays in submitting verifications, slow
responses from other public agencies, privacy laws protecting clients,
and the requirement of for a home visit. The criticism of the home visit
as a verification mechanism also raises a parallel issue of worker safety
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while in the field.
4.2.1 Client Delay in Submitting Verifications
If the documents were not given to the worker at the time of the
home visit [3] or submitted within a week after the visit, the worker
begins to process a denial for the application. Whether the worker
pursues -- either through a telephone call or letter -- clients who do
not turn in the necessary materials is a matter of personal discretion.
While most workers interviewed indicated they would attempt at least a
follow-up call before denying the case, some indicated they had little
tolerance for such clients. The few workers in the latter category set
definite time limits for the client and made it clear that if the
materials were not back in ten days the case would be denied. Their
feeling is that if the client cannot at least make the effort to call
them and explain the delay, why should the worker bother to help the
client.
In reaction to these lengthy and often frustrating delays, it
appears that intake workers often devise their own system for getting
clients to submit verifications quickly. One worker described her system
which tied the documents to the Food Stamps application. Since most
clients who apply for AFDC also apply for Food Stamps, and since the
3. Some workers indicated that 40 to 50 percent of the clients still do
not have all the verification needed at the time of the home visit
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client has to wait at least an hour or more while the Food Stamp forms
are processed, the worker instructs her clients to use that time to
collect verifications. For example, the worker cited the case of a
client who was eligible for $367 in Food Stamps and who needed nine
pieces of verification in order to prove eligibility for AFDC. The worker
told the client to go home, get the nine documents amd that when he came
back the worker would give him the food stamps. Essentially the worker
is complying with the requirement that the client be given Food Stamps on
the same day that he applies. However, the client is also given the
mistaken impression that his Food Stamps may be in jeopardy if he does
not proceed with collecting the verifications as quickly as possible.
The worker reported that she doesn't use this technique very often, but
if it appears that the client would have to wait a long time and that the
verifications are relatively easy to obtain, she will encourage the
client to do so.
Many workers perceive an increasing client reluctance to comply
with the verifications requirement, but could not explain why this was
occuring. One intake worker observed that,
for the most part, these are people who don't know how
to manage their lives or their money, and they think that by
coming on welfare they can get rid of these problems. Many
people just want to walk in the door and get a check with no
verifications.
Another intake worker felt that clients should expend more effort in
getting verifications:
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...people who apply for welfare are often too hesitant
to do things for themselves. They're too content to sit back
and I don't think its good social work. I think people
should have to do things for themselves, and I put the burden
on them.
Another comment on the problem of verifications came from another worker:
Clients are not used to functioning in an environment
where they have to produce something. This is why its so
hard to get verifications -- clients are not used to
deadlines or obligations.
4.2.2 Slow Responses from Other Public Agencies
Delays are not always the client's fault, however. Some workers
pointed out examples of where they had held applications open up to the
last possible day in order to help a client who was having difficulty
obtaining verifications but was actively trying to meet the agency's
requirements. As a last resort, the worker may decide to accept some
other form of verification. Explains one worker:
The problem is getting a birth certificate from Puerto
Rico within 22 days -- it simply can't be done. We often
have to get an affidavit from a neighbor regarding ther
child, or in a few cases we may leave the child off the grant
pending the receipt of the birth certificate.
The problem also arises with incapacitated or disabled applicants:
clients have a hard time getting their doctors to send the necessary
medical verifications.
Similarly, when schools get inundated with verification requests
but have no extra staff to process them, they often simply ignore the
- 90 -
requests or take four to six weeks to process it. Employers are
reluctant to get involved with the system, filling out forms or digging
through old records for missing data. There can also be a great deal of
resentment in the overlap in the requests to the employer with one form
being used for AFDC and another, separately mailed form request for Food
Stamp information. Even Social Security causes severe problems through a
four to eight month delay in getting Social Security numbers assigned.
Individually these delays may seem short, but together they intensify the
time pressure on the worker, who is being held accountable for completing
the application within a fixed period of time. Many worker left no doubt
that a major portion of their day in the office was spent on the
telephone trying to get these other sources to return the requested
materials.
4.2.3 Laws Protecting the Client's Privacy
A third condition that slows the verification process in
Massachusetts is that workers must rely entirely on the client for all
verifications (although many workers feel that the burden should be on
the client anyway). Under current state regulations protecting client's
right to privacy, workers are not allowed to contact other people or
agencies directly unless the client have first given her permission in a
signed release. This does not prevent the worker from acting on
anonymous telephone calls from neighbors of friends alerting the agency
to client fraud. For example, some workers may go ahead and contact the
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employer if they suspect that the client is working but not reporting
it. In general, however, the processing of the case can proceed only as
quickly as the client acts to provide the verifications or give his
permission.
4.2.4 Questioned Usefulness of the Home Visit
Workers are required to do home visits on all applications,
redeterminations, and prior to case closings. Since state regulations
mandate only that the visit be done, the frequency, duration, and content
of the visit is a function of the worker's involvement in the case and
the worker's perception of the visit's purpose.
Workers disagree about the usefulness of these visits. Some
workers describe them as being fairly important for understanding the
client's situation. They feel that the information about the presence of
children in the home, evidence of one parent being absent, and evidence
of need for other services is more accurate when collected in the home,
and that counseling and referral would be more appropriate at that time.
However, no special techniques are used to look for evidence of the
absent parent or to assess social service needs. The worker simply looks
around the area visible to him or her during the interview, watches the
children if they are present, and listens to the client talk about her
problems. This kind of informal interaction also has a special
importance to the worker: it provides a sense of "closeness" to the
client that is otherwise missing, and it fulfills the need to perform as
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a social worker rather than just a paper processor.
Other workers feel that home visits have little importance and are
a waste of time. But because the state requires that a home visit be
done on every applicant prior to approval, the worker waits until she is
certain of eligibility before going out to see the client. For these
workers, the home visit is done only after all verifications are
submitted and as the last item before the formal approval decision.
Thus, the time period between the initial interview and the home visit is
much longer than between the home visit and the final decision.
Still other workers show a combination of attitudes: they will do a
home visit on each applicant in order to pick up the remaining
verifications from the client and thereby speed up the decision process.
Like the first set of workers, all of the third group's applicants get a
home visit, but in contrast to the first group, the disposition time for
the third group is much shorter. In this example, all three workers are
complying with the formal requirement of a home visit on each approved
case. However, the three groups of workers differ greatly in their
interpretation of the purpose of the regulation.
4.2.5 The Physical Danger to Workers on Visits
If client hostility (discussed below) constitutes a threat of
physical harm to the worker while in the office, then robbery and rape
constitute the threat of harm while in the field. Physical safety is a
major concern for workers, at least in urban welfare offices. Most
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female workers said they routinely would not do a home visit to a male
General Relief client. Instead they would ask the client to come into
the office for a redetermination interview. Similarly, home visits would
not be done on AFDC clients who lived in "dangerous" neighborhoods. It
is left to the worker's discretion whether to do a particular home visit
and supervisors easily agree to the worker's request to substitute an
office visit for a home visit.
The problem of personal safety is particularly acute in racially
mixed areas. For example, in Boston, the Hancock Street service area
spans a number of communities in Dorchester. The strong ethnic character
of each neighborhood has created problems for workers and clients alike.
Black clients and workers have expressed concern about travel to and from
the Hancock Office, as it is located in a predominantly white, low-income
community in which frequent racial incidents have occured. Conversely,
white workers have expressed concern about travel into those
predominantly Black and Hispanic communities in Dorchester. The racial
tension that seems to pervade the city of Boston as a whole only serves
to aggravate the stress that workers experience in the everyday execution
of their job. Although some workers make an effort to team up with
another worker doing home visits in certain neighborhoods, most workers
simply ask the client to come to the office.
One Black caseworker reported that she could "feel the resentment"
when she went to the home of a white family. When she started as an
intake worker in 1973, white family members were uncomfortable because
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their worker was a Black woman. "They would open the door and the minute
they did, you could see how they felt -- this is it, I've really hit
bottom now." The client would answer questions, but refuse to look at
the Black worker while doing so. Instead she looked around the room
avoiding eye contact. Feelings of white families intensified further
when busing became an issue. One Black worker just stopped making home
visits in Savin Hill because groups of white youths harassed her as she
walked to and from her car. She felt that if something were to happen to
her in that community, she would not get the necessary police support;
whereas she felt that a white worker would get police support in a Black
neighborhood. She felt that the police would probably tell her that she
"had no business in the area anyway" even though it was her job to be
there.
Thus, the threat of physical harm from either crime or racial
harassment can directly affect verification of information by prompting
workers to substitute office visits for the required home visit. One
worker who had cases in a dangerous neighborhood indicated that she did
fewer than half her redeterminations as home visits. [4] Not only was it
safer but it gave her more time to do other office work as well. Workers
also complained of problems with dogs and suggested that the office
4. On one series of home visits in which I accompanied a female worker,
the worker commented that she was going to do home visits on three cases
she had had for two years but hadn't seen previously. On this day she
felt it was "safe" to do the visits because she was accompanied by a
male.
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supply them with mace or other protection. Several of the workers noted
the danger involved in home visits and at least one worker raised the
issue of an office dress code. Whereas female workers are required to
wear dresses in the office and present a neat appearance, such an
appearance in a particular neighborhood during a home visit would likely
attract unnecessary harassment or physical harm. This particular worker
usually went home and changed into blue jeans or similar attire before
going to the home visit.
4.3 Rule 3: Workers must reach a final decision whether a
client is eligible for assistance.
Once the intake worker has accumulated all the relevant information
on the applicant and completed the budget worksheets, she [5] must decide
on the client's eligibility. Workers usually review the designated
points of eligibility as they record all the verifications and compute
the applicant's budget. Any questions the worker has about eligibility
parameters are checked out either in the assistance payment manuals or
with the supervisor. The worker finally considers all of the information
and requirements and reaches a decision as to whether the applicant is
eligible for assistance. The eligibility decision is a complex and often
5. Since the majority of intake and on-going workers in welfare offices
are women, the pronoun "she" will be used throughout this paper.
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intuitive one on the part of the worker.
At the same time that the worker collects information pertaining to
financial eligibility and begins to compute the client's available
resources, the worker is also beginning to compute the amount of
assistance to be paid. The amount of AFDC grant is essentially the
difference between what the client has available as total resources each
month and the income standard established by the state legislature. For
example, if a family of four had $280 in available resources each month,
then they would be entitled to approximately $379.30 (i.e., the
established standard) - $280 = $99.30. The exact monthly grant would be
slightly different from this figure because of the payment of quarterly
grants and because of certain other deductions. The potential for errors
in payment arise in part from the errors in eligibility, e.g., incomplete
information, and in part from the complexity of the grant formula
itself.
During the intake interview, the worker decides whether the client
appears to be eligible for assistance and, if so, will complete an
application for the client. Once the application is taken and logged in,
the worker must process the case and eventually reach a decision as to
eligibility. Exhibit 4-6 shows the disposition of AFDC cases for the 15
workers. Note that Gibbons approved 75% of the applicants while Charles
approved only 36%. Since all applicants are randomly assigned to workers,
we would assume that the approval rate for workers would be about the
same. However, from the client's perspective, the random assignment to
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Exhibit 4-6
DISPOSITION OF AFDC APPLICATIONS
By Worker
April 24 through May 27, 1980
No. of
Applicants
Approved
18
20
4
14
16
15
15
12
8
14
9
9
10
10
9
Percent of
Applicants
Approved
75
71
67
58
57
56
54
52
50
48
45
45
42
40
36
No. of
Applicants
Denied [1]
6
8
2
10
8
12
13
9
8
15
11
11
14
15
16
Percent of
Applicants
Denied [1]
25
29
33
42
43
44
46
48
50
52
55
55
58
60
64
TEl] Includes applications which were
withdrawn or formally denied.
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Worker
Gibbons
Grant
Pope
Chambers
Rogers
Stafford
Rollins
Shepard
Little
Smith
Crocker
Clemson
Chase
Hunter
Charles
Gibbons as opposed to Charles means that the chances for getting
assistance are twice as good. This suggest that factors other than
strict eligibility may enter into the workers decision to grant aid.
Earlier in this section I noted that workers differ in their
approaches to interviewing clients and also differed in their
self-perceptions as advocates or adversaries of clients. These attitudes
became critical in the final stages of the eligibility process when the
worker has to finally decide if the client is eligible. It is at this
point that the worker must assemble together, evaluate, and interpret a
large amount of information. As the worker does this, the worker is free
to decide how lenient or strict he or she will be in the application of
standards. For example, the extent to which the worker includes or
excludes specific items of income (earned or otherwise) in the trial
budget can dictate the instant denial of a case. The lenient worker may
"overlook" a minor source of income or missing verification in the belief
that the "grant payments are too low anyway", while the strict worker may
exert additional pressures (i.e., questioning) of the client to reveal
even the smallest source of income. Workers know that by controlling the
degree of the standard (and therefore the approval or denial) they can
also influence the amount of subsequent work that has to be done for the
case. As an extreme example, it generally takes much less work to close
out an earned income case than to recompute the budget for AFDC and Food
Stamps after each change.
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4.3.1 Evaluating Numerous Budget Items
Although the formula for computing the size of the AFDC grant
payment is clearly described in the state policy manual and is structured
on a special budget worksheet, the computation is made very complex by
the number of factors to be considered and the number of steps to be
taken. Each factor or each step creates the potential for error and the
more steps the more likely an error. The large number of factors was
highlighted by an HEW official in testimony before the U.S. House Ways
and Means Committee. Assistant Secretary Morrill illustrated the
complexity of the worker's job with the following hypothetical example:
Mrs. Jones' husband deserted her and their three
children -- Robert, age 16, John age 13, and Dorothy age 7.
Mrs. Jones works in garment factory and, like many garment
workers, has irregular hours and earnings each month.
Robert, the 16 year old, is a half-time student and holds
down a part-time job.
John, the 13 year old, is a full-time student and has a
morning paper route. Dorothy, the 7 year old, is in school
and Mrs. Jones hires someone to provide part-time child care
for Dorothy.
Let us suppose that Mrs. Jones decides to apply for
AFDC. To determine the family's eligibility, the caseworker
would go through a calculation somewhat like the following:
Mrs. Jones monthly gross income is added to that of
Robert's (the income of John is not considered since he is
under 14, although it would be considered if he were 14 or
older).
From this total income, the caseworker deducts
work-related expenses, car fare, special uniforms, taxes, and
what not, including the cost of Dorothy's child care
expenses. The resulting net income is subtracted from the
needs standard in the state to determine whether or not the
family is eligible.
Mrs. Jones must register with the WIN office within 60
days to be eligible even though she has a regular job. Also
Robert would be required to register with WIN if he were less
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than a half-time student (since he is 16 or older).
Additionally, Mrs. Jones must be refered to the Child Support
agency within three days. Now that we know the family is
eligible, we must calculate the benefit amount. To do this,
the caseworker goes back to Mrs. Jones' gross income.
Robert's income, which was used in determining eligibility,
is now disregarded since he is a half-time student.
From Mrs. Jones' gross income, the caseworker subtracts
$30, then another third of the remaining income, then work
expenses are subtracted from the remaining income, then
finally child care costs are subtracted.
This leaves us with countable income. Countable income
is then subtracted from the payment standard for the family
to determine the actual benefit which Mrs. Jones family will
receive. To further confuse matters, the payment standard in
many states is not the same as the needs standard that we
started out with.
Now that we have an initial benefit payment for Mrs.
Jones family, we must realize that the payment will change
month to month depending on how much she earned in the
garment factory, and how much her work expenses vary.
For example, the assistance payment for Mrs. Jones'
family will vary each month depending on how often she
continues to work during the rush hour, when bus fares are
higher, and how often each month she commutes during
non-prime time.
Each change in income, expense, and family status must
be reported and the benefit payment adjusted
accordingly.[6].
Although this example may seem extreme, in many ways it is overly
simplified. It does not include, for example, accounting for family
resources, unearned income, work and training situations, or home
produced goods; nor does it include the eligibility for the related
programs of Food Stamps and Medicaid.
4.3.2 Making Complex Computations
6. William Morrill. Testimony before the Subcommittee on Oversight,
Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives, May 3, 1976
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The above example is also oversimplified because it lumps together
the several computations needed to determine combined income and to
deduct allowable expenses. I will take another example to illustrate
these additional steps. Workers compute the client's income,
eligibility, and grant amount in Massachusetts all on a single "AFDC
Budget Worksheet" (see Exhibit 4-7). The worksheet is set up with six
subsections, A through F. The first step of the computation of net income
is to enter "Gross Income from Wages" for the month, calculated from the
last five consecutive pay stubs. In the example shown in Exhibit 4-7,
the applicant has a gross average weekly pay check of $105.10 for each of
the past five weeks (if the five amounts were different, they would be
averaged). The weekly gross is then converted to a monthly gross monthly
income by multiplying by four and one-third. The monthly gross ($451.10)
is entered on the first line of section C.
The second major step is to add in the gross income from
self-employment to yield "Total Gross Earned Income". Next, the worker
moves to Section A and calculates the employment related deductions from
the earned income. In this example, the applicant has deductions for
taxes ($35.05), carfare ($15.00), standard work allowance ($23.00), and
health insurance ($19.00) that total $92.75. Moving from section B, the
worker calculates any business expenses from self-employment and enters
the total here ($0.00 in this example). The total of the two sets of
deductions ($92.75) is entered into Section C.
The final steps for the worker in computing net income are to
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Exhibit 4-7
AFDC BUDGET WORKSHEET
EVALUATICN OF :NCC'B. BUDCET WC ZEET
Name EYAM A Effective Cate
Address Nurber Incl d
Does applicant have earned or unearned income? YES
If yes, ccmplete sections A through F.
If no, comolete section F only. %O
A. Emplovment Related ~eductions frem
Earned Income (Monthly)
Taxes - Fed., State, FICA
Transportation
Work Related Expenses
Child Care 00
-7 ~
Other
Total Deductions
B. Business Expens-s from Earned inccme
3elf Employment Peductions
(Specify) S-
E. Income Dirregard
Gross Income from Wages /.
Gross Earned -ncome from
Self Emplovment
___________________ 
'9/. -/O
Less Total Section 3 p. oa
$30.00
q 1. -
Less 1/3 Remainder -- /o. 35
Total Section A - 9 *f
Total jff- D
Social Worker Signature
in Gra;.:
Food- .I
4 - pe "'7Pi.
C. Net :.ncome nta.- .ol/
Grcs rnc rom ,
Tr:s Earned incI.
Total - -ns A + Z -- / s
Unear.c. Income .3. O.D#
.:et irccr.. 35 3
D. Test of Elig:*ility Yn..ie ly'
Consolih2ted jrar.: 377.
1/3 -- arL-terly,, ' r -e-.t pl/-
Total-
If the total of Section C exceeds tLe utal or
Section D, an applicant is 4i. igible for
ADFC assistance.
F. Monthy Grant
Consolidated Grant 3 19, 3o
Tital Section Egg. Oe
Unearned Inc me - . @0
Protective Payments
Monthly Grant
i 'il. 30
- 0-
ff. 30
HE-3 REV. 6/78
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calculate any unearned income, enter it in Section C, and total all
income sources and deductions. The net monthly income for the applicant
in the example is $358.35.
After the worker has figured the monthly income. that amount must
be compared to the state standard of need in order to determine financial
eligibility. To do this, the worker first looks up the consolidated
grant amount for the applicant's family size. For example, if the family
unit is the mother and three children, the consolidated grant is $379.30.
The worker enters this amount in Section D and adds to it one-third of
the extra quarterly grant payment. Since the net income ($358.35) is
less than the state standard ($419.30), the applicant is eligible for
AFDC.
Thus far the worker has only tested for eligibility; now she must
go through an additional set of calculations to compute the monthly grant
amount. The monthly grant is calculated in Section F using the
consolidated grant amount from Section D and subtracting the income
disregard from Section E. The income disregard starts with the gross
income from wages ($451.10) and is decreased by the amount of gross
earned income from self-employment ($0.00), both from Section C. Next,
the worker subtracts the self-employment business expenses ($0.00) from
Section B and the standard $30.00 deduction for all grants. The worker
the subtracts one-third of the remaining amount ($451.10 - $30.00 =
$421.10 - $421.30/3 = $142.35 - $421.10 - $140.35 = $280.75) and
subtracts the employment related deductions from Section A. The total
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income disregard ($188.00) is then entered back in Section F. Next, the
worker subtracts any unearned income indicated in Section C and subtracts
any protective payments ($0.00) applied to the applicant. The final
total is the monthly grant amount the applicant will receive.
Financial eligibility and budget computations were not mechanized
in most offices in Massachusetts at the time of this study, although the
state was experimenting with the use of mini-computers in a few offices
to handle these routine calculations. At best, workers would bring in
their own pocket calculators to help cut down on arithmetic errors and at
worst would do the calculations with pencil and paper. According to the
Quality Control review for FY 1978, approximately 2% of the errors found
in the AFDC caseload were due to mistakes in arithmetic, with most of
those mistakes resulting in an overpayment to the client. The small
number of mistakes found contributing to underpayments most likely
reflects the corrective mechanism of the client appeal rather than any
bias on the part of the the worker.
4.4 Rule 4: Workers must approve all eligible applications
within 22 days.
Several court cases in Massachusetts have established time
deadlines for approving eligible cases (but not for denials), and cases
which extend past the deadline are subject to litigation. The worker can
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dispose of the case at any point during the available time once all the
required information has been submitted. Exhibit 4-8 shows the average
time each worker took to approve AFDC cases and the average time to
dispose of cases. Note that Shepard approved clients, on the average, in
only five days whereas Stafford held the case for 22 days (the full
amount) before giving approval. Note also that Gibbons denied cases
after an average of only 6 days while Stafford again took 23 days for the
same action. From the client's perspective, the additional time used by
one worker to approve a case translates directly into a dollar amount of
assistance, since aid starts from the date of the decision. Also the
rapid denial of cases suggests that perhaps not all the necessary
information was considered in making the decision.
If workers feel most driven by quotas, their second greatest
sensitivity is to the mandated time constraints for processing
applications and redeterminations. Under a federal court order [71 the
state is compelled to process a person's application and to provide that
person with a check or a denial notice within 30 days of the date the
application is signed. To allow for its own computer processing,
internal delivery, and the delays of the U.S. mail, the state has imposed
its own deadline for a worker to complete an eligible case within 22
days. Thus, most of the attention in intake is focused on the status of
each application at the end of the day.
7. Fortin v Minter, U.S. District Court, Massachusetts 74-5065K, 1975
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Exhibit 4-8
AFDC APPLICATION PROCESSING TIME
By Disposition and by Worker
April 24 through May 27, 1980
Av. No. Days
for Approval
4.8
6.1
7.5
9.0
9.4
10.7
13.4
13.7
14.8
15.8
15.9
17.0
17.0
17.2
22.0
Av. No. Days
for Denial
15.0
15.3
15.3
17.0
6.0
21.0
16.8
12.3
18.2
20.2
19.3
20.5
16.0
15.2
23.0
Av. No. Days
for Withdrawl
3.0
2.0
3.6
1.0
6.0
5.0
5.0
3.5
21.0
14.3
7.3
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Worker
Shepard
Hollins
Hunter
Pope
Gibbons
Grant
Little
Clemson
Crocker
Rogers
Chambers
Chase
Charles
Smith
Stafford
Unit supervisors carefully monitor the register of applications to
identify those applications which are approaching the time limit for
processing. When he identifies such a case, the supervisor goes to the
worker, asks to see the application, and reviews the case circumstance.
In most instances the worker is waiting for some additional
documentation, e.g., medical reports that have to be turned in or the
arrival of a birth certificate. For those cases which are delayed beyond
the deadline, approximately 80% are due to clients not submitting all of
the necessary documentation and only 20% are due to workers not
completing their work. For example, it is not uncommon for a worker to
be in a situation where she is given 22 days to process an application
but the client cannot get a doctor's appointment for at least four
weeks.
The heavy emphasis on timeliness and the worker's desire to finish
a case as quickly as possible appears to have taken its toll in the
treatment of clients and the collection of information. Several workers
commented that they were not always able to spend as much time as they
would like interviewing the client or at the home visit because of the
rush to meet the deadline. On-going workers also frequently criticized
intake workers of not adequately documenting a case before approving it.
Intake workers responded to the criticism saying that if they hold the
case until all the documentation is in, the case would extend beyond the
22 day limit and the office may be sanctioned. Thus, the court imposed
time constraint has resulted in the elimination of much of the
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information that used to be collected on the client and inhibits the
intake worker from building an overall picture of the family that is
useful in providing assistance.
For the past two years the state office has been reinforcing it's
emphasis on timeliness by circulating quarterly management indicator
reports that note the degree to which a local office is in or out of
compliance. The Massplace office administrator was quite critical of
these indicator reports for two reasons. First, it might take as much as
six weeks to get a new case registered on the computer and the delay
results in the office not being given credit for work that is actually
complete. This delay makes the management indicator reports frequently
in error. Although these time delays affect all offices across the state
equally and therefore "average out", the office that knows how to play
the game can make its performance look better than it really is.
Second, the state measures "timeliness" of application processing
differently in different local offices around the state. The regulations
stipulate that the worker is to terminate the application if any
verifications are still missing after 22 days. In some offices, if the
client comes in with the missing verification on the 23rd day, the denial
is allowed to stand and the client must begin the application process all
over again. While this office policy allows the office to comply with
the time requirement, it places the cost of compliance on the client.
However, in the Massplace office, if the client comes in on the 23rd day,
the worker is told to withdraw the denial and proceed with the processing
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of the original application. While this policy places the office out of
compliance with the state directive, it reduces the burden on the client
and reduces the worker's time spent processing the application. The
staff of several local offices felt that it was very unfair that an
office was criticized for following a policy which essentially saves time
and energy for both the agency and client.
In summary, this chapter has identified several environmental
factors which appear to make the accurate (from the agency's perspective)
implementation of policy difficult and which fosters individual
variations in implementation among workers. First, space limitations,
noise and distractions, and fluctuating workloads appear to affect the
timeliness of the initial client interview. Second, client delays in
submitting verifications, lack of cooperation from other agencies,
restrictions on client information, and the requirement of a possible
unnecessary home visit appear to prevent workers from rapidly processing
cases and assuring valid information on each client. Third, the number
of budget items and the complexity of the calculations involved in
determining financial eligibility further slow the worker and make
compliance with both the accuracy and accessibility requirements
difficult. Finally, the court imposed deadline of 22 days for processing
eligible cases appears to further divert attention away from seeing
clients and toward attention to paperwork. In the next chapter we shall
see that some of these same factors affect the implementation of policy
under permissive rules.
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Chapter 5
WORKER BEHAVIOR UNDER PERMISSIVE RULES
The second category of rules identified in Chapter 1 was that of
"permissive" rules. In contrast to the required behavior of the
mandatory rule, permissive rules authorize the individual to take certain
actions but do not impose any obligation or sanction. The permissive
rule recognizes the person's ability to make judgement on the present
circumstances and follow the appropriate course of action. The
permissive rule officially delegates authority and discretion from the
policy maker to the worker.
In this chapter, I discuss three permissive rules found in the
eligibility process in the Massplace office. The first rule permits the
worker to determine when during the day the worker will meet with the
client. Workers are given the discretion to determine their work
schedule for the day and the approximate order in which to deal with
clients. The second rule permits workers to discourage people from
applying for assistance if the worker feels that the individual is
clearly ineligible for assistance. The client still has the right to
apply, but the "informal denial" of the applicant is used to save time
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and resources of the agency. The third rule permits the worker to
determine how much time will be spent interviewing clients in the office
or during the home visit. In determining the time spent with the
applicant the worker is also determining the type of activities that will
transpire in the interview.
Whereas theory might predict that all workers would behave
similarly under mandatory rules, one would not necessarily expect all
workers to show the same behavior under permissive rules. Conditions
such as the same office, same supervisor, same routine, and same
mandatory rules which would lead to uniformity appear to be offset by
individual values, experiences, workload, and self-image. The following
discussion examines the observed behavior of the Massplace intake workers
under the three rules listed above and explores the factors which workers
reported as influencing their behavior. Note that, as with the mandatory
rules, the manner of implementation of these rules can have significant
consequences for client treatment.
5.1 Rule 1: Workers are permitted to determine when during
the day clients will be seen.
The visit of the client to the office is usually an unscheduled
event. When the client enters the office, she informs the receptionist
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that she is here to see a particular worker and waits to be called. The
worker receives a reception slip indicating that the client is here and
the worker decides when to see the client between application
interviews. Some workers give priority to returning clients while others
give priority to the new applicant. Exhibit 5-1 shows the average time
the worker kept the client waiting for the follow-up interview. Note
that Grant kept clients waiting only 7 minutes while Gibbons kept them
waiting 29 minutes. Clients report that they get frustrated waiting for
the worker and seeing others who arrived at the office after they did
being seen before them.
In the following discussion we will briefly describe the various
fluctuations and interruptions identified by workers. It should be noted
that each activity is more or less an independent timetable for the other
activities, that each activity is outside the control of the individual
worker, and that the demands of the various activities can be spread
evenly or compound one another at various times. For example, if unit
meetings are scheduled for days which are slow, then the interruption to
workflow is minimal. If, however, the unit meeting comes on a day when
there is a peak influx of clients or telephone calls, a worker's duty
day, and the day the worker is asked to do a special project, the total
and conflicting demands of the interruptions can consume all the time
otherwise devoted to the processing of cases.
5.1.1 The Daily Routine
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Exhibit 5-1
CLIENT WAITING TIME FOR FOLLOW-UP INTERVIEW
April 24 through May 27, 1980
Av. Waiting Time
Worker for Clients (minutes)
Grant 7.3
Pope 9.5
Clemson 13.6
Crocker 14.3
Smith 14.7
Hollins 19.2
Charles 20.0
Little 20.2
Hunter 21.6
Stafford 22.1
Chase 22.2
Rogers 23.5
Chambers 23.7
Gibbons 29.1
Shepard n/a
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Intake workers usually arrive in the office each morning between
8:45 and 9:00, although some may arive as early as 8:45 and some even
after the official starting time of 9:15. Workers proceed to their desks,
possibly get their morning coffee, and visit briefly with fellow
workers. By 9:00 they are ready to see the first applicant for an
interview.
The door to the waiting room opens to clients at 9:00 a.m., but the
first applicant usually has to wait until 9:15 or 9:30 (sometimes as late
as 9:45) to be seen. The interim time is required by the receptionist to
fill out the half sheet log, pull the old case record, and get the
interview assigned to an intake worker. The intake worker uses the time
between the office opening and the receipt of the first slip to attend to
unfinished paperwork from the day before. When the slip does arrive in
the worker's envelope, he may either set aside the paperwork and conduct
the interview or may take a few more minutes to finish the task at band.
The interview process is carried out at least three times during the
morning; sometime around 10:30 the worker takes a 15 minute break at her
desk or one of the lounge areas. Spare moments between interviews are
devoted to paperwork.
At noon there s a shift in the intake worker's activity from office
interviews to home visits. The workers takes a 45 minute lunch hour and
then leave for a series of 2 or 3 home visits in the afternoon. Those
workers on the opposite shift, i.e., mornings doing home visits and
afternoons in the office doing interviews, usually arrive in the office
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about 12:30 pm. The first home visit is usually scheduled for around
1:00 p.m. It can take the worker from 5 to 20 minutes to travel to the
first applicant's house -- sometimes longer if the weather is bad.
Because workers try to schedule visits in the same geographic area on the
same day, it takes only a few minutes for the worker to get from one home
to the next. Between 1:00 and 3:00 p.m. the worker does 2 or 3 home
visits and may take a 15 minute break at some point during that time.
Home visits take, on the average, about 15 to 20 minutes to complete.
Workers try to be back in the office by about 3:00 to receive
client telephone calls, return calls, read the day's mail, and begin
processing the paperwork from the home visits. Occassionally, there will
be a returning applicant with verifications waiting for a worker when he
comes back to the office. Most of the client contact in the office comes
through telephone calls from applicants who want to know the status of
their applications, asking about verifications, rescheduling home visits,
or reporting changes and/or emergencies. Between telephone calls and
brief conferences with the unit supervisor, the worker continues to
process the myriad of forms and other paperwork. Toward the end of the
day, the worker fills out a daily application report for the unit
supervisor showing the number and type of applications taken that day.
Finally, around 4:45p.m., workers sign out and begin leaving the office
for home. By 5:00 p.m. the office is empty of workers and clients.
Intake workers generally perceive that mornings tend to be a much
busier time than afternoons. It appears that applicants in some way feel
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their chances of being taken care of are better if they come into the
office early in the day. Similarly, there is a high proportion of
telephone calls for the workers during the morning. In spite of the
heavy influx of applicants in the morning, however, the scheduling
process for interviews evens out the workload over the day. In Massplace
office, for example, there may be 40 clients arriving between 9:00 and
9:30 a.m. The scheduling routine assigns each of the first seven
applicants to each of the seven intake workers, repeats the process for
the next seven, etc. until each worker has a total of three applicants
in the morning (for a total of 21). The 22nd applicant even though he
arrived at 10:30 a.m. is assigned to the first intake worker in the
afternoon shift. Thus, the workload is made more even for workers at the
expense of additional waiting time for the clients. Intake records for
Massplace show that there is a balancing of interviews between morning
and afternoon, with a little more than half (51-57%) of the applicant
being seen in the morning.
The intake worker does not necessarily follow the same routine
every day; on some days certain activities take priority over others.
One important variation comes from spending one day each week as "duty
worker". The duty worker is usually responsible for taking all the phone
calls for workers who are out on leave or who are in the field. The duty
worker also handles any clients who walk into the office with problems.
At least one worker considers the job a mixed blessing:
You get to stay in the office all day and, if it is
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quiet, can catch up on your paperwork; but you might also get
a complicated case with emergency needs that is really
another worker's responsibility.
Thus, on duty day the worker does not go into the field at all and rarely
gets to do much on her own caseload. As a consequence, home visits may
be done only 2 or 3 days each week.
A second important variation in routine comes from scheduled
meetings. Unit meetings are held on a regularly scheduled basis in the
Massplace office. On Tuesday afternoons at 4:00, for example, two intake
units are scheduled to hold meetings, usually lasting 30-60 minutes.
A third variation is caused by fluctuations in client initiated
workload. Intake workers indicated, and the daily interview record
confirms, that more applicants come to the beginning of the week than at
the end. Exhibit 5-2 shows the substantial fluctuations in intake
interviews during the week. Tuesdays appear to be the heaviest intake
days with Fridays being the least busy. It is also interesting to note
that the peak intake day is the same day that the unit meeting is
scheduled.
5.1.2 The Problem of Constant Interruptions
One condition that appears to disturb workers and contribute to
error is the interruption or distraction of the worker while making
calculations or completing forms. Workers try to establish routine for
their job because the repetition of events such as budget computations
makes the job easier and more secure. During these routine actions
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Exhibit 5-2
FLUCTUATIONS IN APPLICATIONS BY DAY OF THE WEEK
Massplace Office
.35
30
29.
28-
27.-
26-
25
24.-
23
22
21
20
19
18-
17
16
14
2
10 -
12.82
s.-TOTAL INTERVIWS
(AFDC + GR)
0.91
SCEULED MCRNING INTERV3S
+ GR)
65
12.26
12.09 10.62
10.29
TOTAL SCEEDULED AFT.RNCCN
INTERVIEWS (AFDC + GR)
30.10
27.50 26.47
14.0
13
15.56
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workers concentrate on the activity at hand and attempt to follow
prescribed procedure. Workers reported, however, there are continual
interruptions during their routines and these interruptions make it
difficult for them to complete their work. For example, while a worker
may have a goal of completing a case writeup on the day following a home
visit, one worker suggested that "we are never able to complete a writeup
from start to finish without being interrupted. As a result the writeups
are always lagging behind". Client telephone calls, agency telephone
calls, walk-in clients, or even special requests from supervisors are all
cited by workers as constant sources of interruptions. The Massplace
office receives about 290 telephone calls an hour, with the heaviest
volume in the morning. The heavy influx of calls at one time minimizes
the amount of other work that can be done between calls.
Both unit supervisors and the state quality control reviewers
believe that the continual parade of clients and constant interruptions
take a toll in terms of case accuracy. The QC reviewers have commented
that when they review a case they can easily spot where a worker was
interrupted in the middle of a task. The case record shows an omission
of some type or a gap in the form, or an incomplete arithmetic
calculation. In the work measurement study we found that workers in the
Massplace office were interrupted on the average of once every two
minutes (an interruption is defined as a distraction initiated by another
person or some outside event). In addition, workers changed tasks
approximately every 2-3 minutes and changed cases every six minutes.
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With this kind of rapid changeover, no doubt there is increased
likelihood for error.
Workers in the Massplace office identified a wide range of
activities and distractions which they feel to be interruptions to their
basic processing of cases. Among these are
* calls from a client whose house has burned and who is
in need of emergency food and shelter. Taking care of a
single AFDC client can consume an entire day for the worker.
* calls from clients facing imminent eviction for
non-payment of rent, also requiring immediate attention.
Discussions with the client's landlord or finding other
housing can take several hours.
* calls from clients facing a shut off of utilities for
non-payment of bills. Working out a repayment schedule with
the utility company can take over an hour.
* requests for emergency assistance when an appliance
breaks down and needs to be replaced immediately. Locating a
new refrigerator for the client can take half a day.
* snow storms, which can make the worker's travel
difficult and which brings a surge of calls for assistance
from clients.
* receipt of special project assignments ranging from
the checking of information to the coversion of cases.
" days on which the office is too hot or cold to work
and on which the workers are sent home.
" social events, birthdays, farewell parties, baby
showers, etc. which are usually held during the lunch hour
but which can last into the afternoon.
It is a common misperception that workers process one case from
start to finish before working on the next case. Instead, workers switch
from case to case through out the day, performing small discrete tasks on
each case. The daily routine for the worker consists of small amounts of
work on ten to fifteen different cases, with the type of work ranging
from the completion of a form to interviewing a client. It is this
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constant switching of cases that may cause a worker to confuse or forget
facts and which may increase the chances of error.
5.2 Rule 2: Workers are permitted to discourage individuals
from applying for assistance if they appear to be ineligible.
During the first few minutes of the intake interview the worker
collects information on the basic eligibility of the client. For
example, if the client has no children, then clearly he or she is not
eligible for AFDC. If none of the five basis of deprivation can be
established for a particular applicant then the application is denied.
This denial may be made either formally (if the applicant has already
signed the application) or informally (if the applicant has not signed
the application) by simply explaining the applicant's ineligibility and
designation the interview a "nonapplication". All applicants have the
right to receive a formal denial and the right to request a fair
hearing. If after receiving an informal denial, the applicant requests
that the intake worker issue a formal denial, then the worker must go
through the rest of the interview and enter the application into the
system.
Interviews which do not result in an application for assistance are
referred to as "no-app" interviews and the worker receives no points for
that case. Exhibit 5-3 shows the practice of "no-app" interviews among
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Exhibit 5-3
NUMBER OF NO-APPLICATION INTERVIEWS
April 24 through May 27, 1980
No. of AFDC
Worker No-application
Interviews
Clemson 0
Pope 0
Rogers 1
Grant 3
Little 3
Smith 3
Shepard 3
Chambers 4
Hunter 4
Hollins 4
Stafford 5
Chase 6
Crocker 6
Gibbons 6
Charles 7
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the 15 workers. Note that only Clemson and Pope took applications from
all of the clients they interviewed, while Charles generated informal
denials for 7 of the clients interviewed. Again, from the clients
perspective, the random assignment to Charles could mean that the chances
are much greater for being informally denied, perhaps with no information
about the right to apply. Note also that, in Exhibit 5-4, Rogers spent
an average of only 4 minutes with the applicant before informally denying
assistance while Chase spent 46 minutes exploring the client's
circumstances.
Establishing client deprivation is made difficult by the lack of
knowledge and information on the part of the client. Clients coming in
for help do not always know what they want nor do they understand the
differences among programs. Workers did report that clients in general
are becoming more knowledgeable about AFDC and what they are entitled to,
and, for example, bring some documentation to the interview with them.
But there is still a larger number of applicants who know nothing about
the program and have difficulty expressing their needs. No prescreening
is done by the receptionist to determine the appropriate program or
potential eligibility. Again, this means that before the worker can
begin collecting information for the application forms, she has to get
enough data to determine which program is relevant and how extensive the
need is. Workers feel that they waste a great deal of time seeing people
who are there for the wrong program or who are "obviously ineligible".
A procedure which parallels the "no-app" interview for saving time
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Exhibit 5-4
LENGTH OF NO-APPLICATION INTERVIEWS
April 24 through May 27, 1980
Av. Time of AFDC
Worker No-application
Interview (min.)
Clemson
Pope 0.0
Rogers 4.0
Hunter 7.0
Hollins 7.0
Grant 11.0
Gibbons 13.0
Chambers 14.0
Smith 17.0
Crocker 19.5
Charles 20.7
Little 32.0
Stafford 32.0
Chase 46.7
Shepard n/a
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for the worker is the withdrawl of an client's application once it is
submitted. Refering back to Exhibits 4-6 and 4-8 we see that there is a
relatively high incidence of withdrawls among five of the workers. These
five workers all had more than 10% of their applications withdraw; one
worker had over one quarter of her applications withdraw during the two
months. Why should the number of withdrawls be significantly higher if
the applicants are again randomly assigned? One possible explanation
lies in the interaction of the workload quota system with the demand for
paperwork.
Workers are given points for each application taken and the points
are applied toward the amount of work required for the month. Since
workers do not get points for "no-app" interviews, it is in the worker's
interest to take applications from everyone. Once the application has
been taken and points awarded, the worker must dispose of the
application. Because there is much less paperwork for the worker if the
client withdraws her application than if the worker must make a formal
denial, it is again in the worker's interest to get the client to
withdraw. The degree to which eligible clients may be denied in order to
save on paperwork for the worker cannot be known from the data, and
further research is needed.
5.3 Rule 3: Workers are permitted to determine how much
time will be spent interviewing clients.
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This rule is somewhat constrained by the first rule discussed in
the preceeding chapter which stipulates that all clients must be seen on
the day they come into the office. But it is up to the worker to decide
how much time will be spent on the various tasks such as interviewing.
Exhibit 5-5 shows the average duration of the application interview for
each of the workers. Note that Clemson spent an average of 33 minutes
with each client versus Hollins who spent 65 minutes. Thus, the client
might spend twice as long with one worker as another, a fact that could
influence the chance of approval or counseling. Exhibit 5-6 shows the
average duration for follow-up interviews. Note that Pope spent only 5
minutes with the client versus Smith who spent 17 minutes with the
client. From the client's perspective, the amount of time the worker
will spend with the client is indicative of the attitude of the agency
toward their problems.
Program regulations require that workers have face to face
interviews with all AFDC applicants. The eligibility system in
Massachusetts, like many other states, calls for interviews in which the
worker asks questions of the client, the client responds to the
questions, and the worker records the information on a set of printed
forms. The questioning of the applicant can be done by telephone but
most often is done during interviews in the office or the client's home.
While it is often assumed that eliciting information from clients in
question and answer sessions is a simple and straightforward task, there
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Exhibit 5-5
DURATION OF INITIAL INTERVIEW
April 24 through May 27, 1980
No. of AFDC
Application
Interviews
20
24
28
25
25
29
28
16
24
20
27
24
6
28
23
Av.Time of
Interviews
(minutes)
33.5
38.7
41.5
41.7
44.5
44.6
46.7
47.6
50.9
51.4
56.0
57.3
60.0
64.9
n/a
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Worker
Clemson
Gibbons
Rogers
Charles
Hunter
Smith
Grant
Little
Chase
Crocker
Stafford
Chambers
Pope
Hollins
Shepard
Exhibit 5-6
LENGTH OF FOLLOW-UP INTERVIEWS
April 24 through May 27, 1980
Av. Time of AFDC
Worker Interview (min.)
Pope 5.0
Clemson 7.4
Gibbons 8.5
Grant 9.0
Little 9.0
Charles 9.1
Hunter 9.4
Rogers 9.9
Hollins 14.0
Chambers 14.2
Crocker 15.4
Stafford 16.1
Chase 16.6
Smith 16.6
Shepard n/a
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are actually several factors that complicate it. Accurate information
from the client is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for the
correct determination of eligibility.
Workers may elicit information from the client in whatever manner
they choose during the interview and subsequent client contact. It is
very difficult to characterize the eliciting of information, but through
observation it is possible to characterize workers style. Each worker
admits that their style is probably different from the other workers and
they follow what works for them. The style of eliciting information has
definite implications for the client during the interview and represents
to the client the attitude of the agency in general.
5.3.1 Worker Approaches to Interviewing
As workers begin to build their experience at interviewing clients
they also begin to develop their own "style" of interviewing. Naturally,
the style of questioning clients varies from worker to worker, but it is
possible to identify at least two basic approaches. The first approach,
adopted by workers who are very much paperwork oriented, views the
primary purpose of the interview as the filling out of forms. The
interview is often begun with a statement that there are certain forms to
be filled out and the worker follows with the first question on the
application form. The order of the questions asked the client is
approximately the same order as the questions appear on the application
form. When the forms are completed the interview is over. Workers
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reported that the advantage of this approach is the speedy processing of
clients and the elimination of a lot of unnecessary conversation.
The "paperwork" approach does appear to be efficient in terms of
the rapid completion of one interview and the servicing of the next
waiting client. However, there are at least two potential conditions for
error. The first is a negative reaction on the part of the client to
this rather cold and distant treatment by the worker. A few clients with
whom I spoke after such interviews reported that they felt somewhat
"railroaded" by this approach. Clients reacted by only answering the
questions that were asked and then with as little information as
possible. Consequently, important facts or information about the client
may not surface, and the worker may have to make a decision on incomplete
information. There is an answer for every question on the form as
required, but the completed form does not ensure that all the information
has been collected. Thus, the second condition is that a worker may have
a false sense of security in having followed the program regulations and
therefore feels he has the facts. At this point in the process, the
unreported bank account creates the potential for an incorrect approval
of an ineligible applicant while the unreported additional child or
expenses creates the potential for an incorrect denial.
In contrast to the paperwork approach, other workers take a
"conversational" approach, i.e. they emphasize the open conversation
with the client. These workers view the primary purpose of the interview
as getting a complete picture of the client's situation. Specific
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questions and answers do not appear to be as important as the
accumulation of information and cross checking facts. Workers taking the
conversational approach introduce the forms as part of the conversation
rather than structuring the conversation around forms. These workers
reported that such casual conversation a) helps to put clients at ease
and establish rapport, b) reveals much more information (sometimes
contradictory) about the client, and c) allows the worker to become much
more familiar with the client's situation. Workers also feel that the
clients situation is often too complex to be accurately captured by the
forms alone. One worker described rapport building in the following way:
We attempt to make clients feel at ease by establishing
rapport prior to the informational questions. We let them
know that the information is strictly confidential. We
inform them of what verifications are required and we
encourage them to talk with us -- to steer the interview. We
discuss flat grants and how the family is going to manage as
well as discussion of resources that are available to the
clients that they might not even know exist.
Another worker said that she emphasizes "past management " i.e., during
the interview revealing and confronting the clients personal history
because, "this gives the applicant a chance to open up and let the whole
story out."
The open conversation can serve as an important means of
corroborating the client's statements even before the worker begins to
check sources in the field. For example, the worker may encourage the
client to talk freely about the client's problems at the beginning of the
interview in order to assess the client and develop a baseline of facts.
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As the interview proceeds and the client answers the specific questions
on the application, the worker can cross-check these answers with the
facts uncovered in the initial discussion. The worker may test out the
client's honesty, recall, etc. during the interview in order to
establish the validity of the information which cannot immediately be
verified. If the worker has available a previous case record on the
client, the worker may check the client's honesty by asking for
information, e.g., employment history, which is already documented in the
record. Erroneous answers to these questions may cause doubt about the
other, unverified answers from the client. As for fostering familiarity,
a few workers indicated that they will even go beyond the informal
conversation to undertake a limited amount of counseling on family
planning, money management, other services available to the client, or
just sympathetic listening. The conversational approach (especially with
counseling) results in a longer interview but is compensated for by the
better understanding and worker's personal satisfaction.
Errors appear less likely to be incurred with this approach both
because more information about the client is surfaced and because there
is the opportunity to cross-check a portion of the facts. However, the
conversational approach may contribute to technical errors in that
certain questions on the form are never asked and completed. Further,
the worker may take the case record information too seriously and fail to
check for changes in the client's circumstances since the initial
recording.
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5.3.2 Client Ability and Attitude
But even with the most refined interviewing approaches, workers
frequently encounter clients with limited abilities to communicate or
with attitudes resistant to being helped. Workers noted that interviews
with clients who could not read or who could not understand English often
required much more time than their regular interviews and contributed to
delays in the processing of other cases.
Reading Ability. Part of the client's inability to understand the
program and its requirements may stem from the client's inability to read
the descriptive brochures and the forms involved. The importance of
client education for the commission of errors and for the accuracy of the
program in general has been suggested by Bendick and Cantu (1978) in an
article on client literacy levels. The authors point out that the
process of requesting, enrolling, and complying with AFDC program
requirements requires several literacy skills: reading and comprehending
explanatory brochures, filling out forms, providing documentary proof,
and responding to written notices. They found, after examining numerous
agency documents, that there is a significant gap between the actual
literacy level of the client and the literacy skills required by the
agency. One analysis of welfare agency forms in Illinois (Cook County
Dept. of Public Aid, 1963) showed that over half the brochures and forms
which clients are "expected to read actually require the literacy skills
of either a college graduate or someone who has been in college for some
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time". Only about 15% of the documents could be comprehended by a person
with an eighth grade or lower education level. Bendick and Cantu found
the same problem in five other public aid programs.
As a result, Bendick and Cantu also caution against using standard
education levels as measures of client literacy. Lee (1976) found that
people in the poverty range actually perform one to four years below
their reported level of education in terms of reading literacy. "Hence,
the average person who graduated from high school should not be assumed
to possess more than an eighth grade literacy skill level," notes Bendick
(p.59). Studies in Chicago and St. Louis (Cook County Dept. of Public
Aid, 1963, 1964) confirmed that most of the heads of poverty families
have only an eighth grade reading skill. A recent study by Bateman
(1981) has shown that there is an inverse relationship between the level
of client education and the likelihood of there being errors in the
client's case. The errors appear to be caused by the inability or
unwillingness of the client to communicate complete and current
information about her situation.
Speaking Ability. Closely related to the problem of client
education is the problem of language. Racial differences between worker
and client are likely to cause serious communication problems. A
difference in their respective use of words, their dialects, and
intonations can result in not only misinformation but also frustration
and hostility. Bendick (1978) observed in his study of client
demographic characteristics that the "literacy limitations of welfare
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clients based on low educational achievement are often compounded by
foreign language problems" (p.59). Bendick went on to report that in
1975, 10% of the U.S. population aged 19 and above lived in households in
which a language other than English was spoken. At best, these
non-English speaking citizens use English as a second language, and at
worst are completely unable to understand the English-only worker.
The language problems of clients and the potential communications
problems were further highlighted in a recent survey of AFDC clients in
the Massplace office. The survey was conducted among a random sample of
clients (187 new applicants and 238 active clients). The survey
indicated that approximately 78% of the clients spoke English as a native
language with the remaining 22% speaking either Spanish, Portugese,
French, Vietnamese or some other language. Of those clients who had a
native language other than English, approximately 38% reported that they
had difficulty in understanding what their worker said to them. Well
over half (about 60%) of those clients having language problems attempted
to overcome the language barrier by bringing a friend or relative with
them to translate. Approximately 12% did come with a translator, while
the other 25-30% were fortunate enough to be provided a translator during
the interview (though the translator was not necessarily a worker in the
office). While these findings may be atypical for welfare offices as a
group, they suggest that more research is needed in the problem of
language barriers.
Client Hostility. Finally, severe agitation or even open hostility
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on the part of the client can interfere with the collecting of facts and
thereby contribute to eligibility error. Physical outbursts, abusive
language, and threatening behavior on the part of clients are an
anticipated but relatively rare part of the worker's job. Clients are
often defensive about their situation, embarrassed at having to be there
in the first place, or irriated by prolonged waits for service. Workers
indicated that less than one percent of the clients ever become hostile,
but those who did were generally on disability assistance or were
unemployed fathers. "They are more aggressive, more emotional, and
generally more abusive of the system " noted one supervisor. [8]. Other
clients who cause difficulty are alcohol or drug addicts and ex-mental
patients.
The number of incidences of hostile behavior a worker encounters
appears to be somewhat related to the type of case assignment system used
in the office. In the Massplace office, for example, where there are
remnants of geographic districting, workers assigned to certain "bad"
sections of the city are likely to encounter more hostile clients than
workers with other geographic assignments. In other offices where the
assignment system is not geography based, the encounters with hostile
clients are more evenly distributed and fewer per worker. Under either
8. In many instances clients with nothing else to do will come to see
their worker simply to talk to someone. Some clients attempt to go to
the Social Security office, but because there are no service workers
there, clients generally don't wait around very long. Instead, the
clients will come up to the welfare office where they know they can find
someone to talk to.
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arrangement, supervisors reported they were called upon by workers once
or twice a week to speak to clients who were agitated. Approximately 3
to 6 incidents a year in the office require police assistance.
Few workers have ever been attacked in the office, but as Bateman
(1980c) reports, stories of what goes on in other offices are common
knowledge among workers. Consider the experience of one worker in
Washington:
One day a man came into the office demanding that he be
given money for food. He announced to the receptionist and
supervisor in the waiting room that he would wait only until
noon to get his money, after which time he would break every
window in the office. Naturally, the receptionist and others
thought he was bluffing. But at noon he picked up his chair
and methodically broke every window along the front and side
of the office. The man then sat down and waited until the
police took him away. Later he returned and again asked for
assistance. My supervisor asked me to see the client right
away and to register him for assistance even though there was
some question as to his eligibility.
While such outburst are rare, minor disturbances can become a daily
part of the office routine. Consider also the following incident
reported in a security guard's daily report:
1:40 p.m. - Mr. X went into the smoking room and
started kicking ash cans and dumped the contents all over the
floor. I asked him about it, and he says he wants Food
Stamps. He does it about everyday.
As there is a greater mover toward deinstitutionalization, workers and
administrators predicted that more psychopathic clients will be coming
into the agency and there will be a corresponding increase in the
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incidents of hostility. Workers do not like to experience such
hostilities or outbursts, and they criticize the office administrators
for repsonding to such behavior with preferential treatment for the
client. In the workers' opinion, the supervisor's efforts to quickly
process the disturbing client and get him out of the office simply
rewards violent behavior and encourages other clients to do the same.
One worker refered to the technique as "Bitch for Bucks".
Interestingly, several workers indicated they felt part of the
client's hostility resulted from the attitude and demeanor of the
interviewer:
This is the last ditch for many clients -- they're not
feeling really great about themselves. Clients can become
hostile when they don't want to comply with program
requirements... It is important for the interviewer to let the
client know at the beginning of the interview that a number
of questions will be asked in order to determine which
program the client fits into -- sort of a process of
elimination. 'If you don't understand why I'm asking
something, ask me and I'll explain.' If you do that at the
beginning of the interview it will generally defuse the
client's feelings and she won't be so uptight.
Thus, hostile clients are not a constant problem but are a continual
concern for the worker, and that concern is raised with every new
client. When it does occur, workers have to spend the first ten or
fifteen minutes of an interview just trying to calm the client and
establish rapport.
In summary, there appears to be numerous external factors which
influence how workers will use the discretion provided by permissive
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rules. First, the agency has requirements for scheduling, minimum point
counts for the month, and time deadlines which tend to shift priority to
paper processing rather than to working with clients. Second, clients
sometimes lack reading or language skills necessary to complete the
application process and workers are not given the extra resources (e.g.,
time) to follow through with these clients. Third, constant
interruptions from visits, telephone calls, and emergencies mean that
workers must work on cases in 2 or 3 minute segments. The constant
shifting of attention from one case to another increases the likelihood
of errors. Even when confronted with these external demands, some
workers still manage to use their discretion in ways that favor clients.
In the next chapter I will discuss how the normative rules present in the
office may influence workers to follow such interpretations in the face
of the heavy emphasis on paperwork.
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Chapter 6
WORKER BEHAVIOR UNDER NORMATIVE RULES
The third and final category of rules identified in Chapter 1 is
that of "normative" rules. Whereas mandatory and permissive rules are
both formal (i.e., in written form) and are formulated by the agency
itself, normative rules are defined here as informal and formulated by
the society in which the agency functions. Normative rules are rules of
social behavior that apply to individuals regardless of work setting and
which are internalized as part of the socialization process.
Normative rules are, in simplest form, expectations of how one
individual will behave when interacting with other individuals. The
expectations vary according to who the other individuals are and the
setting of the interaction. For the welfare worker, the expectations for
normative behavior come from at least five major sources. The first is
from the worker himself; we each have internal standards of behavior and
rules for dealing with others. The second source is the client whom the
worker is serving and who carries with her the behavior standards of the
community in which she lives. The third source of expectations is the
at-large community in which the agency functions and, more specifically,
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which provides the resources for the program. The fourth source is the
welfare agency, since in addition to the formal rules handed down by
policy the agency has expectations of polite and "appropriate behavior.
Finally, the fifth source of expectations are the worker's peer group,
both in the office and professional associates.
The normative rules from each group may or may not be similar, but
each set is applied to the worker during the eligibility process.
Because the rules are formulated by different groups, it is possible that
the different sets of rules may conflict with one another. The
difference in the backgrounds and experiences of the worker and the
typical community resident, for example, can lead to very different
expectations with regard to treatment of clients or the equity of the
welfare system. In general, all five sources may attempt to influence
the worker toward the performance which will maximize their respective
goals. The extent to which any one set of expectations dominates depends
on the external pressures and internal forces. Since most workers
function in areas of few effective guidelines, the large discretionary
component of the role means that the expectation with the greatest force
can have a major influence on the worker behavior toward the client of
the agency. Because it was not possible for this study to track worker
behavior under specific normative rules, the following discussion is
organized around the differing group expectations rather than rules as in
Chapters 4 and 5.
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6.1 Normative Rules and Role Expectations
Earlier I introduced the notion of the worker's role and suggested
that his role goes beyond the simple job description drafted by the
welfare agency. This role has both a programmed and a discretionary
component. Chapter 1 explored the discretionary component and identified
some possible sources for that discretion as well as a listing of
discretionary actions. I want to now return to the worker's role to
point out that the programmed role often conflicts with the expectations
of the real world. The resulting conflict gives the worker a sense of
frustration and stress and causes him to alter his behavior.
Both the role conflict and role ambiguity appear to be serious
problems for the welfare worker. According to Kahn et. al. (1964) role
conflict occurs whenever there is "the simultaneous occurrence of two or
more sets of pressures such that compliance with one would make difficult
the compliance with the other". Furthermore, "the intensity or magnitude
of a person's role conflict will depend on the absolute and relative
strength of the forces; that is, if there are two opposing forces, the
greater the strength of the weaker force the greater the conflict"
(p.19). Role ambiguity, on the other hand, occurs when a worker is given
incomplete or conflicting information about his role; to be effective the
individual must know what is expected of him, and what behavior will be
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rewarded or punished. Thus, the worker must understand these
expectations of the role and the role expectations must be shared by all
members of the role set if the interaction is to be effective; otherwise
the situation generates stress for the worker.
The conflict between opposing forces is even greater on the
boundary personnel (b/p) discussed in Chapter 1 than on regular agency
staff. Kahn, et. al. (1964) found that the requirement of performing in
two worlds simultaneously is the source of considerable strain for b/p.
Measuring the frequency with which roles place the individual "in the
middle" between two opposing groups, the researchers found that
The experience of feeling in the middle increases
monotonically with the amount of time the person spends in
business relations with persons beyond the boundary of his
company (p. 102).
In the study, 68% of the b/p experienced higher than average role
conflict while only 32% of the non-b/p showed the same results. Further,
b/p experienced significantly higher tension than non-b/p. It is
important to identify and understand these various stresses so that they
may be compensated for in the design of the role and in creating a system
of motivating incentives. If left unaddressed, these pressures will
carry the individual to act independently to reduce stress, acts which
may be in conflict with organizational goals.
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6.2 The Worker's Own Expectations
In attempting to understand observed worker behavior, then, it is
important to recognize that there is an underlying tension between the
worker's self perception (and self-needs) and the requirements of their
job. The workers with whom I spoke all appeared to be genuinely
concerned about the client's adverse situations. These worker's were
basically people-oriented and altruistically motivated -- either by
professional social work training or by natural inclination -- toward
actively helping people. If given the choice, it appears that most
workers would want to take that helpful action sooner rather than later.
Furthermore, amongst the newest workers there was an almost idealistic
belief in what can -- or should -- be done for the client. Although some
workers indicated they were in the system because of not being able to
find work in other fields, no one indicated that they were in it solely
for the pay they received.
In contrast, the responsibilities of a worker require a very
different set of motivations and attitudes, causing a frustration that
gets expressed at various points in the AFDC process. In situations
where the worker wants to help the client solve a problem, the job
requires that she primarily ask questions and fill out forms. The desire
to offer a wide range of help is also bounded by the limited provisions
of the program. For example, where the worker wants to provide immediate
financial relief, the system postpones payment for several weeks. This
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is best illustrated by the comments of one worker who had no previous in
Food Stamps, but who, with a recent reassignment in the department, began
to deal with clients in a much shorter time frame. She expressed great
satisfaction (and amazement) that it was actually possible to help
clients by providing assistance the same day they walked into the
office.
There are other tensions as well. Where the worker is oriented
toward sympathy for the client, the regulations clearly state the minimal
conditions under which the client can be accommodated. Where the worker
may be trusting, their job and the emphasis of the system is to be as
thorough as possible in investigating the client, getting complete and
accurate information, and closely following procedural requirements. All
decisions must be thoroughly documented, a requirement that takes more
time away from the personal dealings with the client. Cases of suspected
fraud, for example, are particularly stressful on workers because of the
simultaneous mandate to investigate the client for fraud while advocating
a continuation of assistance payments.
Finally ,the desire of the worker to treat the client as a fellow
human being with a certain right to privacy must be curtailed in order to
obtain the required data. As mentioned earlier, several workers
expressed reservation, for example, about probing into child support or
paternity matters. The discussion of paternity and threatened
retaliation from fathers is particularly sensitive because the worker is
not allowed to simply accept the word of the client that she has or will
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be harmed; the client must produce a police report or other documentation
of past harm or threat. No other interaction places the worker more
squarely in the role of the unsympathetic bureaucrat. In addition, some
workers expressed discomfort in probing into the personal lives of their
clients. Intake workers stated that they felt it was none of their
business to be asking the personal types of questions related to child
support. Thus, even before the worker encounters the day today
irritations of the process, there is a frustration that arises from the
conflict of self with the job and the rigidities of the institution. The
frustration no doubt works itself out in numerous ways: workers "burn
out" and leave, they bend the rules, they avoid talking about it, or they
express it in humor. The last manifestation is best captured in the
early morning comments of one worker: "Hey, let's make somebody rich
today!"
6.3 Client Expectations
Although the client is the primary focus of the worker's
activities, the client is sometimes excluded as part of the worker's
reference group. In other instances, the worker is very client oriented
but with tasks that clash with the self-intersts of the client.
Consequently, client preferences and expectations are generally ignored
until the client directly controls the rewards/punishment for behavior or
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until the clients collectively can influence the organization. Clients
usually expect to be treated fairly, equally, and quickly; although
occassionally they expect preferential treatment. For the worker to
respond to this set of expectations may accord the client a status which
conflicts with the goals of the organization or the status of the
worker. It may also be physically threatening. The result is a
continual conflict between the worker and the client expectations which
often increases the antagonism of each toward the other.
The ongoing conflict and tension over client expectations can be
exacerbated by the worker's level of trust of the client and their
attitude towards the fairness or justice of the welfare regulations. A
staff member in one office cited several examples of frustrating clients
situations or attitudes. First, a woman and her child who live with the
woman's parents receive the same dollar amount as a woman and child who
lives alone. Second, even in cases where there is a live-in boyfriend
who is capable of support, the client is still eligible for assistance.
Third, the "emancipation by birth" enables a daughter to get her own
grant while living in the parent's household. Therefore, both mother and
daughter are on the grant and obtaining higher benefit levels that if
they were both on a single grant. Finally, the AFDC system allows
mothers to quit their jobs without cause and without penalty, whereas if
the father quits his job, he must wait 30 days before receiving
assistance.
The same person was also displeased with the laxness of an
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emergency assistance program, especially the ease with which stoves and
refrigerators are "given away" by the department. He feels that clients
are now taking advantage of the mortgage arrearage portion of the program
and noted that clients take advantage of this service every year, using
the Department to subsidize their mortgage.
In interviews with workers, the Food Stamp program also received a
great deal of criticism. One worker thinks that the department is "being
raped". One client, to whom he had given Food Stamps on Tuesday came in
again on Wednesday using a different name and asking for more Food
Stamps.
We confronted him and he left. He could, of course, go
to another office. The rules are too lax. Some clients have
a lot of fun with Food Stamps. They are taking on each
other's children in terms of family composition. They switch
the names around. When you catch these people they don't
understand., I've seen approached in a bar by someone who
wanted to sell me Food Stamps.
One supervisor commented that he initiates about four fraud referrals a
week, mostly for Food Stamps.
The coupons can be given to friends or relatives.
There are no names on the coupon and all the client has to do
is come back into the office and tell the worker that his
Food Stamps were stolen or lost.
6.4 Community Expectations
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Community expectations of worker performance may reflect a
stereotype of the role that varies across social classes. When attitudes
are polarized in the community, e.g., along racial or economic lines, the
worker may tend to choose among the conflicting parties, and often the
choice is in favor of the groups demanding unequal biased treatment of
clients. As Lipsky notes,
Invocations to 'clean up' certain sections of town, to
harass undesirables through heavy surveillance... to prosecute
vigorously community 'parasites'...and even to practice
reverse discrimination...-- all such instances represent
calls for unequal bureaucratic treatment (1976, p.145).
Thus, there can be conflicting expectations even within this general
reference group, in part due to different values and in part due to
inconsistencies in the citizens' own value structure. For example, a
citizen will espouse a strong work ethic but when injured or suffering
from financial hardship will seek out public assistance in the form of
Unemployment Compensation or Medicaid.
Workers in all the offices visited appeared to reflect the
attitudes and values of the communities in which they lived. They are
sympathetic towards those clients whom they think are truly needy and are
frustrated when such clients are found to be ineligible for help.
Workers also resent clients who are eligible for benefits but do not
appear to the worker to need them. Workers consider "most clients to be
pretty nice" and commented that "there is some satisfaction in providing
direct help to clients". But workers also express irritation at "clients
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who come in the day after they separate from their husbands -- they'll be
back to their husbands in 30 days"; or clients who "get laid off from
work on Tuesday and come in here Wednesday without first trying to help
themselves". One worker went so far as to mention that these irritations
sometimes make her forget she is there to help people:
... there are some people who are on public assistance
who shouldn't be. I was brought up in the belief that if
you're hungry, you go to work. I have had clients tell me
they're getting more on assistance than working--why should
they go to work?. I resent this as a taxpayer.
Several other workers mentioned that they never knew there even was
a welfare system before working at the welfare office. But it is one
thing to have attitudes and feelings yourself and quite another to hear
them from the community. When the community comments about welfare,
these comments are often directed at the workers as well, holding them
responsible for what clients do. "Workers hate to tell anyone where they
work because when people find out the immediate response is "Why do you
let those deadbeats get money?" As workers become more experienced they
develop ways to deal with their own attitudes and the attitudes of their
communities. A worker in Washington reported that she is so tired of the
abuse she gets at parties and public gatherings when people find out what
she does for a living, that she deliberately falsifies her occupation.
Now, when asked, the worker responds that she "works for the Post
Office". Such comments and incidents indicate that workers are hurt by
the negative attitude that the community (and even family) have of
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welfare and poverty. The reaction to such community expectations and
images appears to vary from indignation to embarrassment.
6.5 Expectations of the Agency
The role expectations by the agency, as discussed earlier, are
primarily embeded in the programmed component of the role. The program
contains a set of actions appropriate to particular situations and
experience teaches the individual responses which have the desireable
effect on program goals. For most workers in the agency, the programmed
and informal expectations are the primary influence on real performance.
But for front-line workers, however, the physical and/or psychological
distance from the organization lessens this influence and strengthens
that of the actors with whom the worker interacts. As a consequence of
reduced sensitivity to organization expectations, the organization may
monitor the worker's behavior, e.g., through quality control reviews,
even more closely to ensure the worker's loyalty. The worker may, in
turn, respond if they are feeling suspect; the extent of the conformity
will depend on the attraction of the worker to the organization. If the
worker is highly attracted, then he will more narrowly, rigidly, and
exclusively interpret and apply the organization's norms and expectations
(Adams, 1976).
But what happens to the worker when turmoil and reorganization in
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the agency cause not only uncertainty about job security, but also
results in severe job "deflation" or downgrading. This was the situation
in Massachusetts at the time of this study, where the Department of
Public Welfare was undergoing a reorganization to divest itself of all
social service functions at the same time that it was substantially
changing the formal job description of the front-line worker. By the
middle of 1980, Massachusetts had created a separate Department of Social
Services to provide clients with all Title XX and other services
currently provided through the social workers in the DPW. The formation
of the new department and the resulting changes within DPW were perhaps
the single most frequent topic of conversation and concern among the
staff interviewed. Most workers and supervisors alike agreed that the
changes would have a profound impact on not only their daily work but
also on their self-image and self-esteem.
Most of the workers in the local offices entered the Department
prior to 1974 when HEW mandated that financial services and social
services be split into two separate functions. Previously, the "social
worker" (job title) had processed the request for financial assistance
and provided counseling, service referrals, emergency assistance, etc.
When the split was implemented, those workers assigned to the financial
assistance functions were dismayed at the loss of what they felt to be a
central part of their job -- social services. Nevertheless, the workers
continued with the title of "social worker" and even continued to provide
minimal levels of counseling. For the most part, they had been trained
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as social workers in school, they had taken the social worker's civil
service exam, they carried a caseload, they had interactions with and
developed professional relationships with clients, they did home visits,
and they used their own judgement or discretion to assess client
situations, even tough their daily work was becoming much more clerical.
In essence, although the nature of the job changed somewhat, workers'
self-perception did not.
In the period from 1974 to 1979, the state policy makers concluded
that the job of assistance payments worker could be even more simplified
and that the entrance requirements could be lowered to utilize less
qualified (and, therefore, less expensive) workers. The underlying
assumption in this transition was that the work of financial assistance
is basically a clerical processing that requires much less judgement and
expertise than the determination of social service needs. While this
assumption may or may not have been correct, the fact remained that the
Dept. already contained a large number of experienced staff trained in
and oriented to the social worker function.
The transition from "social worker" functions to clerical worker
functions was completed on September 30,1979 when the Department
abolished the title of "social worker" for all assistance payments
workers and substituted the title of "financial assistance worker" at the
same grade levels. Simultaneously with the title change, the entrance
requirements for each grade were substantially reduced. For example, the
entrance requirements for Grade 12 financial assistance worker I, which
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had been a BA degree (preferably in social work) was reduced to a high
school diploma and two years experience in a social service agency.
Workers expressed frustration and anger at the gradual modification
of their job and the final title change. Many felt that the long term
trend of deprofessionalizing their work had eliminated the job that they
were originally hired to do. When asked what the purpose of their job
was, workers responded with "to help people", "to determine the needs and
eligibility of people applying for help", and "to help people who are
needy". [9] When asked how they perceived the changes in their job,
however, their answers revealed a different attitude. One worker
commented
I'm not in favor of this (the lowering of entrance
requirements).. .I would like to keep the level of
professionalism up, although the work is becoming a more
clerical type of job than it used to be.
Another responded, "I worked hard in college to become a social worker
and I want to stay a social worker". Still another observed, "Morale is
low... we are getting to feel more like paper pushers". One worker,
also commenting that morale is a problem among his colleagues, blamed the
administration:
The state is trying to make assistance payments (AP) so
9. When asked what they like best about their jobs, many workers talked
about their interactions with clients, especially on home visits. One
worker enjoys meeting her clients for the first time and "matching names
with faces."
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simple. Their view on AP is that you are nothing, you are a
statistic... Everything is totally impersonal.
He attributed some of the problem to the difference in accountability:
"In services you always deal with problems, but in AP you are responsible
only for doing a certain number of redeterminations".
6.6 Peer Group and Professional Expectations
Often treated as a separate source of role expectations and
normative rules is the individual's peer group, i.e., the group used as a
standard for self-evaluation. A great deal of research suggests that
behavior and productivity are greatly influenced by the norms and values
of this group. The common training, skills, and role structure create a
natural affinity, and the group serves to satisfy not only a social need
but a need to resolve ambiguity as well.
These professional and quasi-professional
identifications may provide the person at the boundary (of
the agency) with referent group support in the conflict he
faces, with techniques for resolving such conflicts, or
simply reassurance that his difficulties are not so much a
result of his own shortcomings as the common lot of those who
occupy boundary positions (Kahn, 1964, p.105).
If the organization fails to meet the needs of the worker, he will turn
more and more toward the referent group for satisfaction of those needs.
The professional group will then attempt to gain the worker's support for
their goals, goals which may conflict with the expectations of the
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programmed role. Worker unions, for example, attempt to set standards
which often conflict with the goals of the agency.
While the existence of the union appears to influence the
state-level activities and decision more than those at the local office
level, it imposes at least three major constraints on the local office.
First, collective bargaining virtually requires that workers be promoted
on the basis of seniority alone. Second, one or two union stewards in
each office monitor the temporary assignments of workers to other jobs.
If a worker is being used "out of classification" more than three days,
the union either requests that the worker get temporary assignment pay,
file a grievance, or both. Third, the union has attempted to impose a
maximum, e.g., 30 redeterminations per month, work standard for all
income maintenance workers. State policy requires workers to redetermine
one-quarter of their caseload each month (approximately 45 cases) in
order to have all cases redetermined every four months. The union, on
the other hand, has encouraged a maximum reponsibility of 30 cases per
month, but with little support from members.
Thus, it appears that the recent changes in the worker's job and
title have had a psychological impact on the workers themselves. A few
workers added that the change has been particularly hard because it was
done with great secrecy. From the time the issue of title change first
arose in March 1979 until its announcement in September 1979, workers
received no information about the change. Consequently, a great deal of
the worker's time, energy, and worry in the local office was spent
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discussing rumors and speculating with co-workers on what the outcome
might be.
6.7 Responding to the Conflict
It is possible that the conflict of role expectations and the
ambiguity of the roles themselves may cause dissonance within the
worker. As with any individual, the worker could react to the stress by
developing defensive mechanisms. In some roles the agency itself will
establish the defense mechanisms such as standardization, categorization,
and routines for reinforcing the worker's role. However, there are
several ways in which the individual can also go about protecting himself
from the uncertainty of the job. Unfortunately, each of these ways
appears to further distort the perceived reality of the worker and
generates less than desireable performance. First, he may withdraw from
or avoid those he feels cause the conflict. Lawler (1973) cites the
attempt by the person to reduce communication with his co-workers and the
belief that co-workers lack power over him as symptomatic of this
defense. Kahn (1964) found that under situations of high conflict
workers attribute very low power to those who set role definitions and
they decrease their confidence in the agency.
A second mechanism for dealing with role conflict is to modify the
various expectations of performance. This may involve influencing
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reference groups with certain claims about the role, seeking changes in
the programmed component of the role, or modifying the individual's image
of himself. Furthermore, the worker may simply disclaim any
responsibility at all for the results of his work with the client.
Instead, he claims that the client is responsible for his own actions, or
they say that the client is too far gone to really be helped. Rejecting
responsibility for the client, and therefore for the worker's own acts is
particularly common where no system of evaluation-rewards of satisfaction
to the worker needs. The workers can be very narrow or selective in his
performance, then, in order that they accomplish the programmed part of
their role with the minimum of stress. Teachers, for example, may feel
that they cannot teach all the students so they will focus on only the
brighter children.
Yet another way of coping is to make certain assumptions about the
client which predefine him and fit a set of expectations and thereby
justify the treatment provided. Argyris and Schon (1974) describe what
they call "theories of action", theories which we attribute to other
people to explain or predict their behavior. Workers develop various
informal theories, i.e., stereotypes about their clients which they never
take the time or opportunity to test for validity. Since the workers
tends to reduce uncertainty by simplifying categories and routines, the
stereotype is a shorthand way of making decisions about behavior toward
the client. Workers, for example, may take very different attitudes
toward clients depending upon the person's physical appearance or
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mannerisms. Two developments which serve to reinforce the attribution of
behavior to clients are : accepting partial empirical validation or
accepting illustrative validation of that stereotype. In the first case,
the worker will pay only selective attention to information, usually
neglecting to put that information in the proper perspective. In the
second, the worker will look for particular examples which "prove" the
legitimacy of the stereotype.
Because of the "self-sealing" nature of the theories attributed to
clients, the worker fails to see the impact of his own behavior in
contributing to the problem. Thus, the undesirable behavior is never
modified and the ineffective worker becomes even more ineffective.
Argyris and Schon (1974) use the recollections of one social worker to
illustrate this point:
I feel annoyed with him (the client) and pretty
determined either to cut off our interaction, delve more
deeply into his problem, or demonstrate to him that he is in
fact not interested in changing at all. The last alternative
is fine with me. I dislike wasting my time on futile
activity (p. 53).
While the worker may espouse the values of wanting to help the client
become more self sufficient, her attitude reflects her need to control
the environment and the client. She has
attributed characteristics to him without telling him
so he can confirm or deny them; has decided that the
responsibility for failure lies with the client and therefore
does not explore her possible role in the apparent failure or
assume she is responsible for the client's behavior (p. 53).
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Thus, the worker deviates from the standard program requirements and
criteria in an effort to cope with the frustrations of their own
self-image and conflicting expectations.
In summary, the normative rules influencing worker behavior and
policy implementation can be as strong as the mandatory and permissive
rules established by the agency. The clash between requirements imposed
by agency rules, e.g., that the worker must verify each piece of
information, and the requirements imposed by the worker's self-image or
peer group, e.g., to help the client as quickly as possible, creates a
role conflict that must be resolved by each worker. For some workers,
the normative rules will be stronger; for other workers, the mandatory
and permissive rules will be stronger. Ideally, policy makers should
recognize these external rules that are placed on workers and remove --
rather than create -- the role conflicts. In the remaining two chapters
I will suggest a model which gives greater recognition to the normative
rules.
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Chapter 7
THE DYNAMICS OF RULE IMPLEMENTATION
In Chapters 4 and 5 I identified several mandatory and permissive
rules which represented agency policies and which were intended to
control worker and client behavior. For each rule I traced the
implementation process from intent, through the observed worker behavior
under that rule, to the probable impact on client handling or case
processing. At each step in the implementation process I examined those
factors identified by workers as influencing how they interpreted and
acted upon those rules. In Chapter 6 I then explored the influence of
normative rules on worker behavior and the conflict that arises between
agency and outside requirements.
7.1 General Patterns of Implementation
Several interesting patterns emerge when we look at worker behavior
across the three types of rules. First, worker behavior under each rule
was not uniform. In spite of the random assignment of clients to
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workers, workers showed marked differences in the aggregate measures of
client processing. Some workers, for example, completed case processing
twice as fast as others; and some workers tended to approve many more
clients for assistance. Second, the different worker behaviors and
client impacts shows that each worker implemented the formal rule
differently from her co-workers. In some instances workers interpreted
rules in favor of reducing their own workload at the expense of client
treatment or program accuracy. In other instances workers interpreted
the rules to be as fair and as responsive to clients as possible. Thus,
there are, in reality, multiple versions of the original rule being
implemented. When implementing a rule, worker A's variation becomes the
rule for client A and worker B's variation becomes the rule for client B.
Third, the implementation of one rule appears to have unanticipated
consequences for the implementation of other rules. For example, the
agency defined role of the worker influenced the amount of time devoted
to client interviewing. Similarly, rule implementation appears to have
unanticitpated consequences for other aspects of the agency operation or
client treatment. The implementation of a worker dress code, for
example, ultimately consumes extra time and agency resources because
workers would go home to change clothes before doing a home visit. To
the extent that the agency monitors these unintended outcomes and takes
corrective action, further new policies and rules are introduced into the
work environment.
Fourth, in almost all cases the workers reported that factors
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beyond the simple internal structure of the office were influencing their
behavior. These factors ranged from constant interruptions to hostile
clients and may have been real or perceived in their environment, but the
workers appeared to take these factors seriously when executing agency
rules. Thus, the implementation process appears to be much more complex
than suggested in the simple wording of a rule or policy.
7.2 The Four Models Revisited
In this chapter I will examine the usefulness of the four
alternative perspectives on individual behavior presented in Chapter 1
and will synthesize a fifth model which more closely matches the behavior
observed in the previous chapters. All four of the earlier "models"
provided important insight into the worker data presented in chapters 4,
5, and 6, but none of the four alone was able to fully explain the
individual's implementation process. By combining certain aspects of the
four perspectives, it is possible to develop a more powerful model for
understanding the dynamics of the welfare office and for understanding
worker behavior. There will be two parts to the following discussion.
In the first part I will summarize the strengths and weaknesses of each
of the four models as they appeared in the first chapter. The second
part then prepares an integration of the four perspectives that takes
into account individual behavior within the bureaucratic organization as
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well as the implementation process. In the next chapter, I will discuss
the implications of the revised model for policy formulation and suggest
some guidelines for anticipating rule impacts prior to the actual
implementation of the rule.
7.2.1 Lipsky's Scarce Resources Model
Lipsky's model of the "street-level bureaucrat" appears to have
both strengths and weaknesses in explaining individual behavior in
implementing program policies. First, the model recognizes that program
policy is implemented by specific individuals rather than whole
organizations. Second, and perhaps more important, the model argues that
policy is really made at the street-level rather than by policy makers at
the top of the organization. What actions the front-line worker takes in
serving the client become the agency policy for that client regardless of
the original intent or instructions from the rational policy process. We
saw several instances in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 where workers interpreted
agency policy to fit actual working conditions rather than necessarily
following the original intent of the policy.
Third, we observed that workers displayed definite "coping
behavior" in response to the scarcity of resources. The notion of
workers "coping" in delivering services to clients is useful because it
formally recognizes that the situation faced by the worker is neither the
ideal nor the one envisioned by the original policy makers. Workers
faced a scarcity of time, work space, privacy, travel resources, and even
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personal security in carrying out their responsibilities. The common
scarcities appeared to induce certain common responses among workers,
including the stereotyping of clients and selective attention to client's
problems.
In contrast to these definite strengths, Lipsky's model was much
less helpful in four other areas. First, the model addressed the
individual implementing policy for the organization but did not address
what the implications of the worker's actions were for the organization.
We saw from the data that worker interpretation of rules can affect
office operations as well as the allocation of resources. These changes
in turn affect other workers. Thus, Lipsky's model addressed only one
direction of a two way interaction. Second, the model presented a static
view of the implementation process, showing only isolated events and
actions. Implementation is actually a dynamic process, with one rule
decision affecting subsequent decisions, actions on one case overlapping
actions on other cases, and changes in agency policy to correct for
earlier rule dysfunctions.
Third, the model assumes a certain uniformity among workers in
their responses to scarce resources or hostile situations. The
street-level bureaucrats' "coping behavior" is presented as a generalized
behavior to a particular set of conditions. Yet in the observed data,
workers varied considerably in their responses to the same situation.
People will do what is necessary to get a job done, but will likely take
different approaches in so doing. Different workers behaved differently
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when confronting the same rule and individual workers exhibited
consistant behavior across rules. Furthermore, workers displayed certain
types of coping behavior not even predicted by the model. This variation
among individuals is critical to understanding the implementation process
and client treatment.
Fourth, Lipsky treats the various coping strategies as separate
behaviors. I would expect that any one part of a worker's behavior is
interrelated to other behavior and that an individual's reaction to a
hostile client would affect his reaction to the office's security
policies. The alternative implementation model described below will
emphasize much more heavily the interrelatedness of rules and behavior.
7.2.2 Blau's Structural-Functionalist Model
How helpful was Blau's model, then, in explaining the behavior
observed in Chapters 3 and 4? At least four aspects of the model were
applicable. First, the notion of organization dynamics surfaced in my
examination of the several rules. Changes in the agency and program
generated problems, which in turn generated more changes. Worker
behavior and program outcomes can be best understood from a dynamic
rather than static analysis. Second, Blau's model identified adaptations
on the part of the organizational members as the primary change
mechanisms. When office management perceived that behavior had gone
outside acceptable boundaries, new policies were generated to retore the
system. The same behavior was shown in the Massplace office. Third,
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Blau at least partially addressed the issue of policy implementation and
rule obedience. The model showed that worker interpretations of rules
lead to instances where the actual policy being carried out was different
than that intended by the policy makers. Fourth, Blau predicted that his
organizational and group factors would be important in the welfare
office, and those factors did emerge from the observed and reported
data.
Blau's model, however, proved much less helpful in several other
ways. First, Blau assumed that the agency policy itself was useable as
stated, i.e., that there were no deficiencies in the policy's wording,
timing, or training. But welfare workers reported that frequently the
policy/rule itself is the source of the problem; problems in
implementation existed prior to the policy's reception by the worker.
Second, Blau analyzed organizations in which workers function almost
entirely within the boundaries of the organization. Naturally, the
factors influential there existed internally as well. But welfare ofices
are "boundary spanning" organizations where workers function largely
outside the of direct agency supervision and often outside the physical
boundaries of the office as well. Workers identified critical factors
that influenced their behavior from the outside environment; structure
was considered just one of several groups of factors.
Third, Blau treats the group as the producer unit and attempts to
explain the behavior of the organization based on the group behavior.
Yet in both organizations -- and especially in the Massplace office --
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the real producer unit is the individual worker. Cases and clients are
processed by individual workers rather than by teams. Thus, program
output becomes a function of aggregate individual behavior instead of
group behavior. The individual actor introduced other important factors
into the analysis requiring a more complex model. Fourth, and perhaps
most important, Blau's model identified adaptations as being the source
of problems for the agency. From the worker's perspective, however, the
policy is the source of the problem and the adaptive behavior is a
solution to that problem. Workers reported that they tried to keep
program outcomes within acceptable ranges in spite of conflicting
environmental factors, thereby keeping the system functioning. This
notion of adaptive behavior as a solution rather than a source of
problems suggests that some important modifications are needed to Blau's
model.
7.2.3 Goffman's Image Management Model
Goffman's social-psychological model provided a useful contrast to
the previous two models because Goffman looked inside the individual for
the factors which influence behavior. Although this model was not
intended to address issues of program policy or implementation, the model
does address the response of individuals to the rules of institutions and
service providers' attempts to control the clients they "serve". The
primary factor determining the individual's behavior, then, is the image
which the person has of himself and which he or she wishes to project to
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the world. Organization rules and other environmental factors are
filtered through this self-image, and the person responds accordingly to
project or protect that desired image.
Goffman's model does not expect to find uniform behavior among
people in the same situation. Differences in life experiences, personal
philosophies, and emotional composition all lead to very different
self-images. The only uniformity among people will be attempt to control
the image and the interaction with others. We saw that intake workers
differed markedly in the images they had of themselves and the clients
they served. Some workers perceived of themselves as professional
counselors, others as clerks. Some workers perceived of themselves as
compassionate human beings, others perceived of themselves as irate
taxpayers. To the extent that workers have similar training
(socializing), on-the-job, or client experiences we would expect to find
similarities in behavior and policy implementation. However, the fact
that workers spend more time outside the influence of the agency than
inside suggests that there would be more differences than similarities in
behavior. The agency uses formal mechanisms such as job descriptions,
training, quotas, close supervision, and procedure manuals to invoke the
minimum acceptable level of uniformity in behavior. The worker in turn
uses these mechanisms to control the interaction with the client and to
maintain the desired image.
7.2.4 Skolnick's Personality Model
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The strengths and weaknesses of Skolnick's model for this analysis
are similar to those described above for Lipsky's model. First, the
model's main contribution comes in arguing that the elements of the job
itself can provoke a general attitude about work and the client. This
attitude, or "working personality", determines the daily behavior of the
worker and the type of interactions with the client. The data in
Chapters 3 and 4 showed that intake workers do develop a "working
personality" with regard to certain aspects of their job, e.g.,
soliciting and verifying information during the intake interview.
Second, the same job elements which generate the working personality also
require the worker to develop his or her own program policies. Time
demands, community expectations, or physical threats lead the worker to
implement self-developed policies for dealing with the immediate
situation. Third, the job elements of danger, authority, and apparent
efficiency which Skolnick identifies as being critical for the
policeman's working personality were also present to a lesser degree in
the welfare worker's job
There are, however, at least four weaknesses in Skolnick's model
which partially offset its usefulness for our analysis. First, the model
treats worker behavior as a social phenomenon rather than as an issue of
policy implementation. Consequently, the model says little about the
implications of the working personality for implementation or for the
organization itself. Second, Skolnick assumes that the existence of a
'personality" results in a certain uniformity in behavior among service
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providers in the same agency. Yet our observed data shows significant
variation in both the personalities of the workers and their daily
behavior on the job. Third, the model identified only a handful of
factors which influence worker behavior. The present analysis supported
the few factors Skolnick cited and identified several other equally
important factors, suggesting that worker behavior is even more complex
than described by Skolnick. Fourth, Skolnick's model, like Lipsky's, is a
static perspective that ignores important dynamic interaction.
7.3 An Alternative Model of Implementation
Among the four models examined in this study, Blau's dynamic model
appears to be the most useful for understanding individual implementation
of AFDC policy. Although the basic elements of Blau's model, i.e.,
policy, adaptations, and problems, fit the observed data, the
shortcomings discussed earlier indicate that an improved, alternative
model would be even more useful. For example, the evidence from Chapters
4 and 5 suggests that Blau's treatment of policy as a source of problems
and adaptations as a solution be reversed. Weaknesses in the policy or
rule are an important source of problems; workers make compensations in
their interpretations of the rules in order to make the policy work in
the actual context of the agency. In schematic form, the alternative
model would look like the following:
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policy
problems - > adaptations
Let us examine this model step by step.
The starting point of the model is the same as for Blau's model,
i.e., with policies expressed as rules, resource allocations, roles,
etc. The rules are presented to the worker in the form of either written
announcements, manual supplements, or verbal instructions from the
supervisor. The worker examines the rule to determine what changes must
be made in her work. If the rule is clear, understandable, and not in
apparent conflict with other requirements made of the worker, the worker
proceeds with the required activities. If, however, the rule is unclear,
unreadable, or otherwise confusing, the worker immediately confronts an
implementation problem. Thus, the first leg of the new model can be
expressed as:
policy
problems
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But the worker's analysis of the new rule is not done in a vacuum;
rather, the worker interprets the rule in light of her understanding of
the welfare system, the office, past experiences, perceptions of herself
and others, and the available resources. Thus, the worker is placing an
abstract rule into a real world context (as she perceives that real
world). The worker's knowledge of the program setting may immediately
yield information on additional problems caused by the policy. Such
problems may range from a conflict with an already existing rule to a
moral objection to the action required. Structure, as used by Blau,
becomes simply one part of the program setting. Thus, the second leg of
the model can be expressed as:
environment policy
problem
If the worker perceives there is no problem in implementing the new
rule, then the worker will follow the instructions of the rule as the
situation arises. If, however, the worker perceives that there will be a
problem, she will exercise one of two types of adaptive behavior. First,
the worker will simply ignore the requirements of the rule and continue
to behave in the manner prior to knowledge of the rule. Second, the
worker will change her behavior to meet both the requirements of the
- 174 -
environment and some interpretation of the rule. The planning of an
implementation strategy can be considered to be part of the adaptation
behavior rather than the problem definition step. Thus, the third leg of
the model is:
environment policy
problems - adaptations
It is important to note that because it is the individual worker who
analyzes the rule and develops her own strategy for implementation, each
worker could produce a different adaptation for the same rule. It is the
element of individual interpretation and response that makes the behavior
of the organization much more complex than that assumed by Blau. It
should also be noted that in this discussion I am treating the role of
the worker's supervisor as simply another factor in the environment.
Although the supervisor's function is to foster correct and uniform
implementation of the rules, the influence of supervisors varies
considerably from worker to worker.
Once the worker has developed her adaptive strategy, that strategy
determines the actual treatment of the client or the processing of the
case. Regardless of the wording or intent of the agency rule, the policy
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as defined by the worker becomes the de facto agency policy until the
agency acts to intervene. The agency is capable of monitoring the system
and workers at particular points during case processing and determining
whether the de facto policy is within acceptable limits of the original
policy. If the behavior is outside of acceptable limits, then the agency
may develop new policies to correct or prevent the questioned behavior.
The new agency policy then starts the cycle all over, and the final leg
of the model looks like:
environment policy
problems y adaptations
Again, note that having the individual as the producer unit means
that each adaptation can result in a slightly different policy and each
de facto policy can result in a different revised policy by the agency.
Thus, the "N" number of adaptations can result in "N" number of de facto
policies, each of which is different from the original agency policy.
The alternative model represents this diverging feature in the following
way:
environment policy
policy
N
problems > adaptations
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In summary then, the research presented in Chapters 2 through 5 has
shown that the implementation of policy in social services such as
welfare is dependent upon the behavior of the individual service
provider. Earlier models of individual provider behavior have posed
behavior as a function of either the characteristics of the type of work,
the structure of the agency, the scarcity of resources, or individual
concerns with image. Of the four models considered herer, all except
Goffman assumed that behavior on the part of the worker was uniform
across individuals and all except Blau took a static view of that
behavior. The present study shows that behavior in policy
implementation, in fact, varies across both individual workers and types
of rules. The determinants of individual behavior are not just those
cited by each of the four models, but also those factors interacting with
one another. It is this interaction and the complexity of the service
delivery environment that have serious implications for the design of
public policy and the design of the mechanisms to implement that policy.
In the next chapter I shall discuss some of these implications.
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Chapter 8
IMPLICATIONS FOR PROGRAM POLICY AND IMPLEMENTATION
This study has taken a rather lengthy journey into the world of the
welfare "street-level bureaucrat" in order to better understand how the
individual worker implements program policy. I also discussed the role
of the worker in the AFDC program, the need for and sources of discretion
in the job, examples of the way discretion gets used, and the pressures
from the client, agency, peers, and the community that are influential on
the worker.
The findings presented in Chapter 7 suggest several implications
for both policy making in the welfare program and the management of the
local welfare office. First, policy makers should give greater
consideration to the "real world" context of the program when formulating
new rules and regulations. Second, policy makers should try to
anticipate what the positive and negative consequences of the policy
would be, especially secondary impacts which may be outside the program
objective. Third, policy makers should give front-line workers more,
rather than less, discretion in implementing program policy. Fourth, the
efforts at reforming the welfare system should be focused more closely at
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removing the existing obstacles to program operation than to major
overhauls in the assistance payments formula or eligibility standards.
8.1 Think About the Program Environment
One changed implied by my alternative model is that policy makers
give as much attention to environmental or contextual factors as they do
to the policy controlable factors for directing behavior. Chapters 4, 5,
and 6 identified several of the key environmental factors affecting
behavior of workers; a list of such factors can be kept in mind as new
rules and regulations are drafted. Even cursory examination of how
environmental factors can conflict with policy may show inherent
weaknesses in the drafting or operation of welfare rules.
The list of factors to be considered in formulating welfare policy
at the case level is longer than that summarized by the model. Rather
than encumber the model with a long list of specifics, I suggest that a
few general categories of factors to serve as reminders to policy
makers. For each of the following groups of factors, the policy maker
should ask "What will be the probable influence on the basic producer
unit, i.e. the individual worker?"
Agency/Organizational Factors (policy controllable)
- existing mandatory and permissive rules
- resource allocations
- role definitions
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- performance standards
- structure
- office location and setting
Environmental Factors (non-policy controllable)
- client characteristics
- community standards of behavior
- community expectations of the agency
- other laws
- community resources
Simply, worker behavior is a function of the rule, agency factors, and
environmental factors. Each specific factor or group of factors directly
interacts with the rule to determine worker behavior. The resulting
worker strategy and de facto agency policy is then the aggregation and
interaction of these individual influences.
8.2 Anticipate the Consequences
The alternative model also suggests that policy makers anticipate
the most likely adaptations that workers will make by examining the
requirements of the rules as they would be "filtered" through the
environmental context. The data presented earlier indicates that the
various individual factors interact with one another as well as with the
rule itself. Since the producer unit is the single intake worker, the
interaction of factors occurs in the mind of the worker as new rules are
analyzed. The worker combines her understanding of the agency, the
program, the community, and the client with her interpretation of the
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rule. The assessment across the dimensions is done simultaneously and
yields an outcome in the form of a strategy for action. Thus, policy
makers should also anticipate how the worker makes adaptations in light
of her perceptions of the different actors involved, specifically:
Worker perceptions of
- self (including demographics)
- client (including demographics)
- peers
- agency
- community
Simply, worker behavior is also a function of the worker's perceptions of
the various parts of his world. For example, how a worker perceives of a
client in light of one rule can affect how the worker perceives of the
resources allocated to that client.
If worker behavior is then a function of both the contextual
factors and worker perceptions of those factors, then several key
relationships can be summarized in a single table. Contextual factors
form one dimension of the table while perceptual factors form the second
dimensions. As shown in Exhibit 7-1, the intersections of the two
dimensions are the points at which worker behavior is determined. For
example, a rule may be introduced to further reduce client fraud by
asking for additional verifications. The rule is examined by the worker
in light of the existing demand for documentation and the worker's own
standards for fairness. The worker concludes that the rule conflicts
with the current demands on the client and is therefore unfair. The
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Exhibit 7-1
REFERENCE TABLE FOR POLICY TESTING
Agency (Policy Controlable) Factors: Environmental Factors:
Rules Resources Roles Standards Structure Setting Standards Laws Resources
Worker
Perceptions:
Self
Client
Peers
Agency
:: 0
0
V oV
XN CID X
0 0 0 0 0
F--A
Comuit 4 0 0 0
worker then feels that the agency is becoming unreasonable in its demands
(linkage 1) and that clients should somehow be compensated for that
additional hardship (linkage 2). The worker may choose to increase the
client's grant in some way or to provide more time in counseling. In
either situation, more agency resources are consumed than would be
without the rule change. Thus, the de facto policy becomes one that
demands greater verifications from clients but which also compensates
clients for their time.
The matrix in Exhibit 7-1 provides a device for linking the various
factors which appear to influence individual behavior. Using the table
as a guide, policy makers can trace out possible worker behavior for any
rule, resource decsion, etc. Interventions or changes at any one
particular point on the matrix trigger reactions down the column by
related agency or environmental factors and across the row by related
perceptions. The analysis in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 identified a handful
of the key factors and their accompanying interrelationships. It is now
possible to predict what the likely worker behavior will be for a rule
change affecting these new factors. What remains to be done, in a future
research effort, is to establish clear causal relationships and
parameters for the matrix.
8.3 Give Workers More Discretion
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As noted in Chapter 1, it would be virtually impossible to
eliminate all the discretion from the worker's job. The constantly
changing nature of agency rules, the complex program regulations already
in existence, the great diversity of client situations, and the need for
human interaction all make worker discretion necessary. Welfare agencies
will never be able to circumscribe all of the possible client conditions
into set categories, nor could they decipher underlying client problems
and to deal with the ambiguous information generated by all aspects of
the system.
Furthermore, it may not be desireable from either the agency's or
the worker's interest to further reduce the discretion of front-line
workers. The gains made in standardizing client treatment and worker
productivity can be more than offset by the apathy and frustration of the
workers. As discretion is removed from the job, workers tend to feel
demeaned; they, in turn, begin to show a distrust of the agency.
Agencies have had a history of deflating the worker's job and
substituting a preoccupation with production numbers for concern over
quality and satisfaction. Worker's feel "if the agency doesn't care
about quality, why should I? I'll just do the job the fastest and easiest
way I can."
This type of attitude suggests another important implication: the
worker has to have some flexibility to adjust to the system. Welfare
workers develop a wide range of coping behaviors to deal with the demands
of the agency, the job tasks, the client and themselves. Rules are
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obeyed in form but not spirit, techniques are invented to minimize
paperwork or expedite policy clarifications, and stereotypes or other
subjective judgements are used to screen out/screen in particular types
of clients. There appears to be large discrepancies between the way the
welfare system should operate (according to policy) and the way it does
operate (according to workers' actions). Any attempt at reducing
discretion to eliminate the unfairness of the system has the potential
consequence of eliminating one or more of the coping strategies that keep
the welfare system in operation. In judging worker behavior, we should
not loose sight of the fact that such short cuts and relief valves are
what enables the agency to survive the complexity and pressures of the
larger system. Thus, attention should be focused not on the limits to
discretion, but on other aspects of the program or bureaucracy that cause
discretion to be channeled in one direction or another.
The findings also indicate that the attempt on the part of the
worker to use adaptations for implementing abstract rules under real
world conditions may be an action to be encouraged rather than
discouraged. In Chapter 1 I noted that the purpose of the rules is to
control worker behavior in the accomplishment of organization
objectives. Organizations have traditionally attempted to make
operations more efficient or effective by eliminating discretion from the
worker's job. But discretion appears to provide the necessary slack in
the policy implementation process to make rules work under non-ideal
conditions. Agencies could very well accomplish their objectives by
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introducing more rather than less discretion into the worker's job.
In the state of Washington, for example, the Department of Social
and Human Services (DSHS) has developed the concept of the "prudent
person" and has tried to impress this concept upon the workers undergoing
training. Department trainers try to get the worker to apply reason and
common sense in any discretionary situation that should arise. Exhibit
7-2 presents a page from the training manual summarizing the DSHS concept
and the suggested behavior of the worker. In applying the "prudent
person concept" workers are instructed that:
the worker is required to make reasonable decisions
based on experience, available facts and knowledge of the
program... Applying Prudent Person Concept means applying
common sense. (DSHS FST Handbook, August 1978)
The DSHS has decided to formally recognize the department's inability to
set clear guidelines for every situation and the importance of worker
discretion. The findings of this suggest that welfare department go
further in this direction and enhance the amount of discretion.
Naturally, new rules would still be needed because of changing program
emphases and court actions, but the system could call upon the workers to
exercise more professional judgement.
8.4 Focus Reform Efforts at Existing Obstacles
Most of the discussion and debate surrounding the topic of welfare
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Exhibit 7-2
THE "PRUDENT PERSON" CONCEPT
Definition
Prudence is defined in Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary as "The
ability to govern and discipline oneself by the use of reason; caution or
circumspection as to danger or risk;" (to be) prudent is defined as
"(being) marked by wisdom or judiciousness."
Synonyms of the word prudent additionally define its meaning, such as
"careful," "cautious," "discrete," and "having foresight." In plain
language prudence is simply applying reason and common sense to a given
situation.
Application
When a worker is asked to apply the Prudent Person Concept, that worker
is required to make a reasonable decision based on experience, available
facts and knowledge of the program. This method is used to determine the
validity of case situations or client statements.
Documentation
Whenever the Prudent Person Concept is applied the decision and how it
was arrived at should be written in the narrative or intake summary. It
is essential to have this information in the case record because it
creates an audit trail; anyone reading the case will understand why the
decision was made and what facts were available in making the decision.
Summary
Applying the Prudent Person Concept means applying common sense. It
requires being able to identify inconsistent statement or situations,
clarifying them, and documenting the problem, decision, and what facts
the decision was based on....
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In applying Prudent Person Concept the worker asks himself: "Is this a
reasonable statement? Are the facts consistent? Does the situation make
sense?" The worker then makes a judgement. The entire process is a
serious responsibility and one that must be treated accordingly.
Source: Excerpted from DSHS FST Desk Handbook, Region V, August 1978.
Washington Department of Social and Human Services.
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reform is focused on instituting sweeping changes in income policy,
restructuring assistance packages, or reorganizing welfare agencies. The
issues that are explored and evaluated tend to be on the macro-level. In
contrast to this national policy and state policy orientation is the
growing preoccupation with micro-management studies that are taking place
within virtually every public service agency. These studies are
initiated in hopes that by setting very precise productivity standards,
processing deadlines, and unit scheduling, agencies can somehow improve
the quality of the services they are providing. Many initiatives at this
level have failed because they failed to understand the complex
relationships underlying service agency operation.
My investigation into the world of the welfare worker leads me to
believe that there is a fundemental concept of organizations that must be
remembered whenever change or reform is attempted: the system is composed
primarily of human beings who are actively involved in serving or
treating other human beings. Any effort at reform must recognize the
objectives and motivations of the individuals comprising the agency. New
polices can be promulgated and new agency structures implemented but the
net effect of these changes depends largely on the front-line worker who
translates policy into reality through his actions. If we start
discussing change, therefore, from the point of the individual service
provider rather than agency objectives, we will remove one of the biggest
stumbling blocks in any public service system.
The message that came through very clearly from the welfare workers
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interviewed was that policy makers should stop paying so much attention
to major reform and start paying more attention to the multitude of
administrative obstacles that prevent the system from functioning the way
it is already designed. In general, workers are a conscientious group of
people who care both about what happens to the client and what happens to
themselves. But they felt that policy makers were deliberately making
their job harder by passing down unintelligible, conflicting, and
illogical policies while not passing down wage increases for jobs well
done and recognition for the myriad tasks never mentioned in their formal
job descriptions. Workers all agreed that modifications and reforms were
needed, but at a level rarely discussed outside the units themselves.
The problems and issues in need of attention coincide with those
identified in this study. First, there needs to be a clear definition of
the welfare worker's role in the state agency and in the execution of
program policy. Standardized job descriptions that are devoid of any
real direction and minimal amounts of training only serve to confuse the
worker as to the expectations of the job, the department, and the proper
relationship with the client. Furthermore, the recent job deflation of
the welfare worker has taken a severe toll in morale, dedication, and
self-esteem. To be trained as a social worker, to retain the title of
social worker, to have a caseload of clients, to do home visites and
limited counseling, to help people in crisis situations, and then
suddenly be stripped of the title and prestige is perhaps the hardest
change that the agency ever dealt the worker.
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It is important for policy makers and top agency officials to cease
sending their front-line workers conflicting signals. On the one hand
workers are told that their job is not terribly difficult and so the
state is decreasing the entrance requirements, starting pay, and job
diversity. Yet on the other hand, the state is increasing the number of
regulations, the complexity of the regulations, the size of the
caseloads, and the amount of work handled through special projects. A
similar conflict occurs with respect to accountability. On the one hand
workers are held strictly liable for any errors made in determining
eligibility and/or the enforcement of rules and regulations. Yet on the
other hand, the worker is at the mercy of the client for all verification
of information; state rules prohibit the worker from independent
verifications or pursuit of suspicious cases. It is conflicts such as
these that cause workers to experience severe frustrations with the
system and to react with short cuts, rule deviation, or just plain
apathy.
Second, there needs to be clear recognition of the emotional and
physical stress that the job places on the worker and mechanisms
implemented to channel or mitigate that stress. Continual interruptions
take their toll in both lower productivity and loss of concentration.
Constant dealings in crisis situations, lack of cooperation from other
service agencies, and growing client demands take their toll in
attentiveness, empathy, and courtesy. Simple management practices such
as regulating calling hours for clients (as in the Massplace office) or
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weekly 3 hour blocks of uninterrupted time (as in Washington) can provide
the respite necessary for handling the heavy demands of the job.
Similarly, the potential for physical violence in both the office
and on the way to home visits needs to be addressed. Federal and state
regulations mandating home visits do not take into account the dangers of
female workers visiting single male clients. Virtually no protection is
offered to workers going into high crime or racially violent
neighborhoods. Thus, workers risk being sanctioned for not following the
regulations when to do so would pose a direct physical threat to them.
In the office, few precautions are taken (e.g., alarms in the interview
rooms) to avoid trouble with hostile or emotionally disturbed clients.
Third, there needs to be a solution to the proliferation and
duplication of paperwork. Single page obsolete forms spawn new multiple
copy forms and different programs or agencies require identical
information only filled out in a slightly different format. The repeated
entering of name, address, and social security number on each of the 20
to 30 forms in an interview siphons time away that could otherwise be
spent talking with the client. Also, the use of pre-designated lines
labeled with items that are actually used to record a totally different
piece of data makes workers seriously question the competence of the
state agency staff. An effort should be made to consolidate forms as
well as to standardize forms across various assistance programs. Many
workers devise their own forms or letters to streamline the work process
but as yet there is no effort for management to seek out and learn from
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its workers.
Fourth, along with the clarification of the worker's role
definition and expectations, there needs to be an effective performance
evaluation system. Existing evaluation systems appear short circuited by
guaranteed pay increases, seniority based promotions, and supervisor
discomfort with doing evaluations. Only when workers feel that the
evaluation system can make a difference in their career path will they
begin to pursue those behaviors rewarded by the agency as ways of
promotion.
Accompanying this revamping of the promotional system must be a
rethinking of the particular criteria on which workers are to be judged.
Currently, the criteria fall at one of two extremes. On the one hand,
the worker is evaluated on very general dimensions that have little to do
with the quality of her work and which requires a very subjective
assessment by the supervisor: How well does the worker follow
directions? Use time? How well do they get along with co-workers? A
few supervisors have attempted to adjust the evaluation criteria on an
informal basis by asking a slightly different set of questions: Are there
many complaints from clients? Are there many erors in eligibility
determination? Has the person shown initiative in trying to improve the
workflow? On the other hand, the worker is evaluated on a very precise
measure of a very small number of job tasks. Monthly quotas are set for
each worker; "acceptable" work is defined as exactly meeting the quota,
unacceptable work is anything else. The work involved in meeting the
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quota comprises less than half of the total work done during the week.
Current criteria ignore this other, larger portion of the work being
done.
Finally, there needs to be a recognition that different types of
people are more compatible and do work better together than others.
Civil service requirements, affirmative action programs, and the move
toward job standardization have forced a situation where workers are
perceived as interchangeable parts, each with an identical set of skills
and talents. The research cited earlier suggested that we need to do
better matching of worker and client so that each is getting what they
personally need from the interaction as well as satisfying the overall
program requirements. A few offices are making efforts along these lines
by assigning Spanish speaking clients to bi-lingual workers. And while
this move seems logical strictly from an expediency standpoint, it is my
impression that workers who had clients of similar background to
themselves were much more satisfied with their work. Of course, to
initiate a system of worker-client matching (or deliberate mismatching)
requires some understanding of the variables and characteristics that
make a difference to the interaction.
Thus, the need is to undertake reform at the "middle level", i.e.,
not directed at the meta program structures nor lost in the micro-world
of time and motion studies. They are changes which policy makers and top
administrators can make relatively quickly, albeit with some resistence
from the entrenched interest of the workers' union and others. Even
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without the more drastic changes, it would be a relatively easy matter
for management to recognize individuals doing good work, to keep workers
fully informed in the changes and reasons occuring in their job
definition and the agency structure, to remove obstacles and conflicting
rules, and encourage worker initiatives for improving the welfare
system's operations. Policy makers fail to do this now because they,
like the workers, become paperbound. Many of the workers interviewed for
this study indicated that they are interested in the better operation of
the agency, are willing to make improvements, and have some good ideas
about reforms. The remaining need, then, is for a mechanism to tap those
ideas and energies.
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Interview Guide Used in Interviewing
Local Office AFDC Caseworkers
I. ORGANIZATION AND STAFFING
1. What do you do in the normal day-to-day performance of your
job? What are the major components of your work and about
how much time (per day, week, etc.) do you spend on each
component? About how much time do you spend on the following
functions (probe at local office): What are your priorities
in acccmplishing the tasks of your job?
Probe with:
intake and application
case maintenance
redetermination/special reviews
fair hearings
fraud detection
worker evaluations
administrative activities (specify)
2. To whom are you responsible? How often do you have contact
with these person(s)? (Position, title, location) How
would you characterize your relationship with these people?
3. Who is responsible to you, i.e., whom do you supervise?
(Position, title, location)
4. Characterize any contact you have with the local office
director. Frequency? Issues?
5. Do you think the present staffing levels for your agency
or office are adequate? Why? If not, for what functions
are more staff needed? Characterize the effect on service
delivery.
6. Do you or any of the agency staff work overtime? Who
specifically? Why? Is this a regular occurence? Characterize
the effect this has on service delivery.
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II. Management
A. Programs
1. What is your caseload?
2. What do you consider a manageable caseload per
caseworker for each category of aid? (Probe for
each category, e.g., AFDC, AFDC-FC, AFDC-FS,
MAO-NURSING HOMES, FOOD STAMPS, CS, etc.
3. How are cases assigned to you? How do you feel
about that (e.g., rotation, alpha/numeric)?
4. Have workload standards been established for your
job by your agency?
a. How and by whom were they developed?
b. If no, or don't know, by what method is
quantity and quality of work insured by your
agency? Obtain documentation.
5. How are errors discovered? Can you describe the
process of handling errors? How are errors corrected
when discovered?
6. What use(s) is made of caseworker error information?
Probe with:
staff/supervisor conferences for corrective action
documentation of training needs
part of formal worker performance evaluation
aggregated for local agency and submitted to
State upon request
day-to-day case management
B. Flow of Policy Info
1. How often do you confer with your supervisor/director? Per
day? Per Week? Per Month?
2. How many of these conferences have been at:
your request?
your supervisors/directors request?
other (specify)?
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3. When confronted with a difficult case or problem you cannot
solve, what action do you take?
4. If policy questions cannot be answered at the local agency
level, where--above the local level--are questions directed?
5. What is the procedure for requesting answers to policy ques-
tions (e.g. written request, notifying supervisor, etc.)?
What actually happens?
6. Who in the local agency actually carries out such requests?
How is it decided?
case worker supervisors only?
local agency director only?
caseworkers only?
other?
combination of above (specify)?
7. How are policy changes from the State communicated to you?...
from the County? (Probe for methods of communication.)
8. Are there any formal or informal methods, such as staff
conferences meetings, for discussing new policy inter-
pretations or problems? If yes, on what basis? Who attends?
How often held? Who handles this?
9. How much discretion is left to you for interpreting policy?
10. What constraints are imposed on you? By whom?
11. Do you have contact or request assistance from state DFCS
offices? If yes, which, why, what results?
12. What is the nature of your contact, if any, with the
county board? What is the function of the county board?
C. Supervisor's Role
1. What is your role in seeing that program requirements are
carried out? (e.g. WIN registration, CSE)
2. What is your role in seeing that deadlines are met (i.e.,
elapsed time between portions of the application process and
elapsed time of total application process)?
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3. What is your role in determining how many cases will receive
home visits as a part of eligibility determination and verifi-
cation? What new regulations concerning home visits have you
received? What effect has this had on service delivery?
staff performance?
1) When are visits necessary?
2) When are exceptions made?
4. What is done when a backlog occurs (when there are too many
cases for available workers to deal with promptly)?
5. When and why does peak workload occur? During week? During
month? During year?
6. What procedures are followed for review of casework super-
visor's performance? How often are supervisors evaluted?
D. Clerical Info
1. How does the clerical unit work?
2. How do unit supervisors communicate needs to the
clerical unit?
3. What happens to the case file folder if case processing is
interrupted (for any reason)?
E. Form Info
1. What forms are used to collect information from clients? (collect)
2. What is the title and description of each form?
3. What is the general purpose of the form?
4. How and from where does worker acquire copies of each form?
5. What files are created from the information on the form or
from the form itself?
6. Tb what extent; is there duplication of information received
from to form? What would you change to make form
completion more efficient?
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F. Resource Allocation
1. What daily problems or decisions do you encounter regarding
materials and non-labor resources (e.g,, supply problems,
methods of acquisition, travel requests, and funds)?
Performance
A. Measurements
1. What performance standards have beendeveloped for this office
or agency by
the State?
the District Office?
the local office?
List the specific standard and cite specific sources. Which
are part of the federal or state QC program?
2. Are there any aspects of agency or office performance you feel
should be measured and reviewed but are not? If yes, list
areas and probe for explanation.
3. What kinds of workload information or other performance data
do you record yourself? How do you record it? What happens
to the information? (e.g., goes to adjust workload if reported
to state, individual evaluation or promotionl (obtain copy if possib
4. What other information (data and source) is used to evaluate
your performance? The evaluation of worker's performance in general
5. How often is your performance officially valuated?
6. Are there interim, informal evaluations as well? Describe.
7. Is feedback on your performance provided in day-to-day communica-
tion with your supevisor?
8. Is there an evaluation of your interaction with other staff
or with the client?
9. On what basis is your work evaluated?
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B. Training
1. What formal training have you received during the past 12
months? 24 months?
2. What formal training have you provided for during the past
12 months? 24 months?
NB: For 1) and 2), list topic, length of session, conducted
by, form provided in, and whether it was felt to be useful.
Probes for type: e.g., workshops, seminars, group, individual,
preservice, inservice, remedial.
3. Who is generally responsible for the training of caseworkers?
(e.g., casework supervisors, state DFCS training staff, district
staff, other.)
4. Who decides when and what kind of training is necessary for
staff members? What factors are considered in this decision?
5. Who do you feel could benefit from further training? (e.g.,
supervisors, caseworkers, agency director, clerical staff.)
What kinds of training would you reccmmend?
6. Does the agency provide stipends for professional conferences,
workshops, etc.?
IV. PROCESS
A. Entry
Outreach
1. Describe the AFDC outreach program and how it fits in with
other outreach programs, especially WIN and Food Stamps.
2. What is your involvement in outreach.
3. Characterize the outreach program.
4. Do you feel outreach is effective? Why or why not?
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Client Entry into Agency
1. In what ways do clients first contact the office? Rank
according to frequency. Probe for:
Mail
Telephone
Walk-in
Proxy
Internal referral
External agency referral
External non-agency referral
Reception
1. Who briefs the client on the forthcoming process? When? How?
Describe the process.
B. Intake
1. Initial (or Pre-Initial)/Second (or Intake) Interview
1. Where does the first interview take place? Do you feel it is
adequate in terms of privacy, noise level, comfort, etc.?
2. What information is collected at this stage? What forms
completed? Who completes them? What happens to them? What
decisions are made? By whom?
3. How is the process described to the applicant? Characterize a
typical interaction with an applicant.
4. Does the worker take notes at this stage? Do they become part
of the case record? May an applicant review his/her case
record?
5. Describe the form completion process. What does the worker
complete? The applicant? Is the form(s) explained to the
applicant? What if certain information is not available?
6. Is consideration of an application dependent on participation
in other programs (e.g., WIN, CSE)? T what extent? What
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happens if applicant refuses to cooperate?
7. Is any action taken to ensure applicant understands his/her
responsibilities and what the next steps are? Are there
guidelines on the subject? What?
8. Does applicant receive any counseling? Under what circumstances?
who decides whether the applicant should receive counseling?
9. What happens after the initial interview? Describe in detail;
go back to beginning of this section
Referrals to Other Programs/Services
1. Describe the interface AFDC has with other programs/services.
Be sure to include:
WIN
Child Support
Food Stamps
Medicaid
Probe for tensions between AFDC and these programs vis-a-vis
office and worker functions. Cover:
How contact is made, by whom
Procedures followed
Determination process
Personnel involved
Data required
Percent referred
AFDC worker involvement in other program/service, e.g., in
completing forms, making contacts, obtaining information,
keeping records if client is AFDC or non-AFDC eligible
Time Sampling System
Follow-up
(Find out if there are other important interfaces)
2. Are external referrals made? What kinds? Describe.
3. Are other services (e.g., adult/child protective services)
available through this office? What are they? What is your
involvement in them?
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Post-Interview Processing
1. Describe the work flow once the applicant has: left the inter-
view.
2. What happens to each form completed or begun during the
interview? Where are forms "in progress" kept? (Observe)
Who gets copies? How are they transmitted?
3. What does the applicant do at this stage?
4. If the applicant needed/wanted to contact the agency, how
does he/she do it? TO whom would he/she speak?
C. Case Workup
Verification and Documentation
1. What verification/documentation tasks are performed? By
whom? At what points? What degree of discretion is there
in the amount of verification performed?
2. What guidelines are there concerning verification/documentation?
3. What are the consequences of lack of verification/documentation?
How is the applicant affected?
D. Eligibility and Grant Amount Determination
1. What forms/worksheets are used to determine eligibility and
grant amount (collect worksheets/forms) Who does each?
2. What factors go into determining eligibility? Who makes
the decision on eligibility?
3. What factors go into computing the grant amount? When is
the grant amount finalized? By whom? Is the grant amount
adequate for most clients?
4. Describe the procedures and guidelines on making initial
home visits? Why and by whom are these home visits waived?
5. What information is collected during the initial home visits?
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E. Case Approval/Denial
1. What happens once a case has been approved? Denied? Who
makes the approval/denial? Where is the case fiie stored?
(Observe) Do some forms get sent elsewhere? Where? Why?
2. Who, if anyone reviews a case for approval/denial? How often?
How thoroughly?
3. Once an application has been locally approved, is it ever
questioned or reviewed at a higher level? How often? For
what reasons?
4. Is help ever sought at higher levels for making approval/denial
decisions? Under what circumstances? From whom? How often
does this happen? What are reasons for denial other than
excessive income?
F. Case Maintenance
Payment
1. How is the payment initiated? How often made? How confirmed?
At which point in the process? On the average, how long
between notification of approval and check receipt?
2. Is there ever any exception to the normal payment prpcess?
For example, in case of emergency, what would happen? Would
there be any other means of obtaining assistance for an
applicant?
3. What kinds of assistance might be available for an emergency
case?
4. What procedures are followed in case a payment; is reported
not received or is lost?
5. What is the incidence of lost/stolen/unreceived checks? Are
clients compensated for loss/theft? Is there an investiga-
tion procedure? Describe.
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Special Reviews
1. Describe a special review.
2. What are the guidelines concerning special reviews?
3. What sorts of items trigger special review processes?
4. For what reasons are special reviews performed?
5. What procedures are followed?
6. How are special reviews scheduled?
7. Are there any regularly scheduled special reviews?
8. How does an AFDC special review interface with other programs,
e.g., Food Stamps?
G. Redetermination
1. What are the guidelines concerning redeterminations?
2. How often is radetermination performed?
3. Is redetermination ever waived? By whom? Why?
4. Who performs redetarmination?
5. What procedures are followed for redetermination?
6. What information is gathered during a redetermination?
7. On what forms?
8. What happens if a redetermination is missed? How does that
affect the client?
9. Is redetermingtion for other programs (e.g., Food Stamps) done
along with AFDC or separately?
H. Other
Fraud and Abuse
1. How are fraud and abuse defined?
2. How are they generally detected?
3. What procedures are followed, in a suspected fraud case?
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4. How is such a case initiated? By whom? Who actually carries
it out? Frcm which office?
5. What procedures are followed in a suspected abuse case?
6. How is fraud actually determined? Who determines it?
7. How long on the average, does it take to reach a conclusion
of fraud?
8. How is abuse actually determined? Who does it? How long does
it take to reach a conclusion of abuse in general?
9. How many (percent) suspected abuse cases are actually pursued?
Proven? What is the outcome of a proven abuse?
I. Fair Hearings
1. What is your involvement in Fair Hearings?
J. Emergency Provisions
1. What emergency provisions are there for contacting the office
and getting help:
for new applicants
for established clients?
2. What guidelines are there concerning emergencies? When is an
emergency deemed to exist?
3. How do normal procedures vary in case of emergency?
4. What kinds of assistance are available in emergency cases?
5. What kinds of referrals are made in emergency cases?
6. What kinds of emergencies do you deal with?
1. Are there any changes in the organization of the office or agency
that could improve your efficiency or effectiveness? Describe.
2. Are there any changes in policies or procedures that could
improve your efficiency or effectiveness? Describe.
3. Are there any changes in the work flow or other agency functions
that could improve your efficiency or effectiveness? Describe.
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